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A Chinese amphibious transport ship
leaves port in the Netherlands in January
2015. In “Surging Second Sea Force:
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement
Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the
Gray Zone and Beyond,” Andrew Erickson,
Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst analyze
the growth of China’s sea services and
the coordination between the gray hulls
of the PLA Navy and the white hulls of
the China Coast Guard as together they
work to enhance China’s maritime lawenforcement activities throughout the
western Pacific.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The challenge of the People’s Republic of China to American interests and global
order continues to focus the attention not only of American policy makers but of
friends and allies as well. In “Surging Second Sea Force: China’s Maritime LawEnforcement Forces, Capabilities, and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond,”
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst provide a comprehensive
overview and audit of the newly consolidated China Coast Guard and its role as a
powerful adjunct of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and instrument for maintaining and extending Chinese control of its home waters. This study employs the
rigorous methodology using multiple Chinese-language sources developed in recent years by the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, in which
Andrew S. Erickson is a research professor. Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for
the Department of the Navy; Henry Holst consults for a private defense firm.
In “U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional FirstStrike Capability,” Sam Goldsmith provides a broader analysis of the implications
of China’s growing conventional challenge to the U.S. presence in the western
Pacific and what the United States should be doing to deter a potential first strike
against American forces and bases in the region. Of particular interest are his
suggestions concerning the role of Australia in supporting the appropriate U.S.
strategy. Sam Goldsmith is a defense consultant and a PhD candidate at the Royal
Melbourne Institute of Technology.
The last several years have seen a dramatic increase of interest in wargaming
throughout the Department of Defense, including the Department of the Navy.
At the Naval War College, it is fair to say, wargaming has achieved unparalleled
levels of sophistication and rising demand from its extensive customer base. But
wargaming also has important applications outside the military sphere. As Shay
Hershkovitz shows in “Wargame Business: Wargames in Military and Corporate
Settings,” gaming can be used in a variety of ways in business settings to improve
a corporation’s understanding of its strategic environment and how to cope
with sudden changes in it, as he illustrates with reference to three such exercises
recently conducted with business organizations in Israel. Shay Hershkovitz is a
former senior intelligence official in the Israel Defense Forces.
In “Peacetime Naval Rearmament, 1933–39: Lessons for Today,” Jamie McGrath revisits a salient but forgotten chapter in the history of America’s navy:
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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the long period of rebuilding of U.S. naval forces and shipbuilding capabilities
initiated and overseen by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in close collaboration
with Congress, in particular Representative Carl Vinson. This effort was vital to
the nation’s ability to expand its navy rapidly in response to the requirements of
war against Japan when that materialized in 1941. McGrath draws particular attention to the need for a deliberate nurturing of the naval defense industrial base
of the kind that occurred in the 1930s, pointing out that China today is in a much
better position than the United States to ramp up naval construction quickly, owing to its very extensive commercial shipyard capability. Captain Jamie McGrath,
USN, is a professor in the department of Joint Military Operations at the Naval
War College.
Finally, in “Running Silent and Algorithmic: The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision
in 2019,” Sam J. Tangredi performs a commendable service by reviewing the current state of play of Navy strategy documents and their relationship to broader
Department of Defense strategy and guidance statements of recent years. He
carefully analyzes the tensions and seams among these various documents and
the degree to which each remains authoritative within the Navy, and provides his
own synthesis of the Navy’s strategic vision going forward. He calls particular attention to the extent to which the “ideology of jointness” has provided significant
obstacles to the coherence of such a vision. Captain Sam Tangredi, USN (Ret.),
is the director of the recently established Institute for Future Warfare Studies at
the Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College Coasters
Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W309, 330, 333,
334, 335). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401841-2236).
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Rear Admiral Jeff Harley is the fifty-sixth President
of the U.S. Naval War College. The College is responsible for educating future leaders, developing their
strategic perspective and critical thinking, and enhancing their capability to advise senior leaders and
policy makers.
Admiral Harley is a career surface warfare officer
whose sea-duty assignments have included command
of USS Milius (DDG 69), Destroyer Squadron 9, and
Amphibious Force Seventh Fleet / Expeditionary
Strike Group 7 / Task Force 76. During his command
of Milius, the ship participated in combat operations
supporting Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and his crew
won the Battle Efficiency Award and the Marjorie
Sterrett Battleship Fund Award for overall combat
readiness.
Admiral Harley attended the University of Minnesota, graduating with a bachelor of arts in political
science, and received master of arts degrees from the
Naval War College and the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Additionally, he
served as a military fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations in New York City.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Global Reach, Global Engagement, and Global Impact

AS IT HAS BEEN SINCE ITS INCEPTION,

the Naval War College’s
primary mission is to educate and develop future leaders. Our
talented and highly motivated graduates complete their studies in Newport and
then go on to serve in demanding positions in our military services, in those of
our allies, and throughout the government’s national security sector. In these
positions they apply the critical-thinking skill sets that were refined and honed
at this great institution. Their close interaction with our extraordinary faculty
and staff sparks a desire for lifelong learning that continues to pay dividends for
our students both as national security practitioners and as informed and engaged
citizens.
At the end of the day, the greatest resource the College provides to our services, agencies, and nations is our alumni! In important assignments around the
globe, they are often the critical voices that make the arguments that carry the
day. In commands and organizations large and small, they provide a foundation
of ethical decision-making in the complex, dynamic, and volatile world in which
we live. There is no better case study on the value of networks and interpersonal
relationships than the one demonstrated by our extraordinary alumni.
While the majority of our alumni are from the United States, we recognize
that the Naval War College is a major player on a global scale. Our global reach is
reflected in the fact that we are honored to claim more than 4,700 international
graduates, representing 137 nations. The record of success for these international
alumni is remarkable, with nearly half of all Naval Command College graduates
having attained flag or general officer rank, and nearly a quarter of these alumni
having become Chiefs of their Services.
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Our global engagement efforts seek to maintain a robust alumni network that
can enhance graduate effectiveness in the international environment. We constantly hear from our graduates, who express praise for the way in which their
College experiences enhance their effectiveness in maintaining global maritime
partnerships. We continue to strengthen these partnerships through our aggressive Regional Alumni Symposium series of academic conferences. They are designed to encourage professional interaction among like-minded military leaders
and allow our graduates to foster the “Newport connection” across graduating
classes and generations.
Regional Alumni Symposia are co-hosted by the President of the College and
a regional partner navy. Participation is open to all international and U.S. graduates of the College. Past Regional Alumni Symposia have taken place around the
globe, including in Brazil, Germany, Peru, the Philippines, Oman, and Malaysia,
and on our home campus in Newport, Rhode Island. The College’s seventeenth
annual Regional Alumni Symposium will be held in Bergen, Norway, in April
2019, co-sponsored by the Royal Norwegian Navy. The symposium will explore
a wide range of topics under the overarching theme of “Challenges in Arctic and
Cyber Security.”
Symposia routinely include keynote speeches by prominent military leaders
and faculty-led panels addressing current strategic and operational issues. All
participants are encouraged to exchange their insights and perspectives. Such
networking develops professional linkages among military officers at critical
junctures in their careers when international relationships prove invaluable.
These events validate the value of partners and friends in a world where you
can surge ships and other assets rapidly to the scene of confrontation, but you
cannot surge trust—a commodity that must be nurtured across many years. As
former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations and founder of our modern international
education programs Admiral Arleigh A. Burke wrote: “Most important among
navies or among nations is friends.”
Over the past two years, we have revitalized our alumni programs with an aim
to strengthen relationships through real-time alumni-to-alumni engagement by
hosting in-person events such as Regional Alumni Symposia, as well as through
a significant expansion of our online networks and learning opportunities. You
can learn about, and participate in, our alumni programs at myUSNWC.com, or
on Facebook at facebook.com/USNWCAlumni, or on LinkedIn at linkedin.com/
school/usnwc.
Finally, we trust that you will continue to leverage all aspects of our alumni
network and use them as unmatched resources for professional development in
war fighting, naval and joint operations, and maritime policy. Together, we will
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have global impact as we build trust and confidence among our graduates and
continue our ongoing efforts to operationalize and internationalize your U.S.
Naval War College.

JEFFREY A. HARLEY

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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Dr. Andrew S. Erickson is a professor of strategy in
the China Maritime Studies Institute and the recipient of the inaugural Civilian Faculty Research Excellence Award at the Naval War College. He serves on
the editorial board of the Naval War College Review
and is an associate in research at Harvard University’s John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies.
In 2013, while deployed in the Pacific as a Regional
Security Education Program scholar aboard USS
Nimitz, he delivered twenty-five hours of presentations. Erickson is the author of Chinese Anti-ship
Ballistic Missile Development (Jamestown Foundation / Brookings Institution, 2013).
Joshua Hickey is a senior analyst for the Department
of the Navy, with over fifteen years of direct subjectmatter experience.
Henry Holst is a consultant for Deloitte.
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SURGING SECOND SEA FORCE
China’s Maritime Law-Enforcement Forces, Capabilities,
and Future in the Gray Zone and Beyond
Andrew S. Erickson, Joshua Hickey, and Henry Holst

C

hina’s armed forces are divided into three major organizations, each of which
has a maritime subcomponent. The gray-hulled People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) claims a growing portion of the PLA’s personnel and resources;
the People’s Armed Police (PAP) leads, and increasingly reflects the paramilitary
character of, China’s white-hulled maritime law-enforcement (MLE) forces, including the China Coast Guard (CCG); and the militia contains a growing proportion of sea-based units, the blue-hulled, PLA-controlled People’s Armed Forces
Maritime Militia (PAFMM). Each of China’s three sea services is the world’s largest in terms of ship numbers. Unlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding
industry, China’s massive commercial shipbuilding industry subsidizes overhead
costs for construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. That explains in part how
China has been able to build and modernize all three services so expeditiously,
none more rapidly than its second sea force, centered on the consolidating CCG.
Using a platform-based approach that spans ongoing organizational changes,
complexity, and overlap, this article assesses these vessels, their order of battle,
and their capabilities, as well as likely future trends and implications.1
Over the past decade-plus, China has undertaken a massive MLE modernization program that has increased greatly its capability to operate MLE vessels
in remote areas. A key contributor to near-seas maritime operations to further
disputed sovereignty claims in the “gray zone” between peace and war, these
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional
maritime situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating
power while reducing the risk of escalation and allowing the PLAN to focus on
other, more “naval” missions farther afield.2
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This build-out has yielded Beijing a formidable “second navy.”3 Today China
boasts not only the world’s largest navy but also the world’s largest maritime
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin. As of 2017, China’s 17,000-plus
CCG personnel crewed 225 ships of over five hundred tons capable of operating
offshore, and at least another 1,050 vessels confined to closer waters, for a total
of over 1,275—more hulls than the coast guards of all its regional neighbors
combined.4 At more than ten thousand tons full load each, its two Zhaotou-class
patrol ships are the world’s largest MLE ships.
China is applying lessons learned from the U.S. and Japanese coast guards as
well as indigenous experience, including the incorporation of new ship features
such as helicopters, interceptor boats, deck guns, and high-capacity water cannon. Most recently constructed CCG ships now have high-output water cannon
mounted high on their superstructures. The 2014 Haiyang Shiyou (HYSY) 981 oil
rig standoff demonstrated their ability to inflict damage by breaking pilothouse
windows, damaging bridge-mounted equipment, forcing water down exhaust
funnels, and breaking bones of crewmembers on Vietnamese vessels. Many new
CCG ships have quick-launch boat ramps astern, allowing for rapid deployment
of interceptor boats.
China’s MLE buildup is slowing, but far from over; in 2020, China’s coast guard
is expected to have 260 ships capable of operating offshore.5 Many are capable
of operating anywhere in the world.6 Numbers of small craft are not expected
to change significantly; we estimate that the CCG will continue to own at least
another 1,050 smaller vessels confined to closer waters, for a total of more than
1,300 hulls. From 2005 to 2020, this represents overall a fifteen-year net increase
of four hundred total coast guard ships, among them 202 additional ships capable
TABLE 1
CHINA COAST GUARD FORCE LEVELS (2005–20)
Type (tonnage)

2005

2010

2017

2020

15-Year Net Increase

3

5

55

60

+57

Regional patrol ships (1,000–2,499)

25

30

70

80

+55

Regional patrol combatants (500–999)

30

65

100

120

+90

Subtotal: Ships that can operate offshore

58

100

225

260

+202 (+350%)

Coastal patrol craft (100–499)

350

400

450

450

+100 (approx.)

Inshore patrol boats / minor craft (<100)*

500+

500+

600+

600+

+100 (approx.)

Total: All China Coast Guard

900+

1,000+

1,275+

1,300+

+400 (approx.)

Oceangoing patrol ships (2,500–10,000)

Note:
* There are forty-ton interceptor boats stationed on at least one (probably all) of China’s offshore islands. With forward basing available in the South
China Sea disputed areas, size is less relevant than it was previously.
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of operating offshore, representing 350 percent growth in that category. As table
1 indicates, all types of CCG ships have increased in numbers, with the most
significant force-level increases, proportionately, occurring in oceangoing patrol
ships (those over 2,500 tons).
FOUNDATION
China’s MLE modernization program has proceeded in three major phases, the
latter two of which overlap. Phase 1 (2000–10) focused on modest, dual-role
research and patrol ships. These were relatively small (mostly 1,000–1,750 tons,
with several larger ships) and generally unarmed. Only a few had helicopter facilities. Phase 2 (2010–17) yielded dozens of new purpose-built offshore patrol
ships. Much larger than phase 1 vessels (three thousand to ten thousand tons full
load), these ships featured improved sea keeping and endurance, as well as moreadvanced (military-style) electronic systems. Internet photographs indicate that
all CCG ships built within the last five years have a datalink antenna (such as the
HN-900), similar to those on PLAN vessels and to the U.S. Navy’s Link 11; older
CCG ships now are being retrofitted with such antennae. Most vessels have helicopter decks, some with hangars. Some ships have high-pressure water cannon
and ten-meter-long fast-interceptor boats with twin outboard engines enabling
a thirty-five-knot top speed, well suited for dispatch to land features for local security operations. Most new ships built in phase 2 have 30 to 76 mm guns. Phase
3 (2014–18) backfilled with coastal law-enforcement units, primarily dozens of
modern, capable, fast patrol combatants with guns, oriented toward traditional
law-enforcement functions. Several medium-sized patrol ships were built to provide command and control.
In 2013, China consolidated four of its five major maritime law-enforcement
agencies (the “five dragons”) into a new agency called the CCG. The four dragons
thus consolidated are the former State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and its
subordinate China Marine Surveillance (CMS); the former Maritime Police and
Border Control, previously administered by the Ministry of Public Security; the
former Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE), previously administered by the Ministry of Agriculture; and the former Maritime Anti-smuggling Police, previously
administered by the General Administration of Customs (GAC). Only one major
MLE agency remains independent of the CCG: the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). Another non-CCG organization, China Rescue and Salvage (CRS),
plays a supporting non-MLE role. The latter two will be discussed briefly just
before the conclusion of the article.
More than twenty naval and commercial shipyards have produced CCG vessels over the past decade. With overhead costs reduced by a strong commercial
shipbuilding industry, construction of coast guard and other MLE vessels is both
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cheap and efficient. Use of commercial, off-the-shelf drivetrains and electronics,
combined with a lack of complex combat systems, facilitates rapid assembly, with
multiple units built simultaneously. According to contract and media details,
typical total construction time (from start to commissioning) is twelve to eighteen months for a large (over one thousand tons) patrol ship (designated WPS)
and nine to twelve months for a smaller (under one thousand tons) patrol craft
(WPC) or patrol combatant (WPG).
By 1999, China had made a national-level decision to start expanding and
modernizing its MLE agencies.7 The majority of the shipbuilding budget was
allocated to the organization
then known as CMS, primarUnlike America’s military-focused shipbuilding industry, China’s massive commercial ship- ily responsible for enforcing
building industry subsidizes overhead costs for Chinese maritime territorial
construction of all three sea forces’ vessels. . . . claims and conducting offshore law enforcement.8 Prior
China has been able to build and modernize
to the turn of the century, the
all three . . . expeditiously, none more rapCMS force consisted primaridly than . . . the consolidating China Coast
ily of a limited number of
Guard.
1970s-built dual-use patrol
and research ships, most of which were relatively small and intended for operations in near-coastal areas. None of these ships was configured specifically for
law-enforcement duties, as no guns, helicopters, fast-interceptor boats, water
cannon, or other MLE equipment was fitted.9
Initially, the CMS ship-modernization program focused on the acquisition of
dual-use ships of several sizes that could perform patrol and surveillance duties,
as well as limited research and survey activities. This initial acquisition program
began in earnest in 2004, with most new ships launched and commissioned
by the end of 2005. CMS received three Shuyou-class “1,000-ton” patrol ships
(1,428 tons full load), three Shuwu-class “1,500-ton” patrol ships (1,740 tons
full load), and the first Shucha I “3,000-ton” patrol ship (4,000 tons full load),
which were distributed relatively evenly among the three CMS branches (North,
East, and South). Typical of earlier dual-use patrol ships (known colloquially as
“WAGORs”), all three classes were fitted with stern A-frames and cranes to
enable them to handle hydrographic and oceanographic research equipment,
although few ever have been seen performing such roles.10 Significantly, the
Shucha I class was fitted with a helicopter landing deck and hangar facilities—
not previously fitted to any CMS ships—giving the first indication that CMS
intended to perform offshore missions requiring helicopter support. However, in
keeping with the missions of SOA and CMS—stated publicly as being primarily
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scientific—none of these new ships was armed with any permanent weapons.11
Central to the CMS ship buildup was the thirty-six-hull program that began in
2010. Supplied to provincial and municipal MLE organizations, these ships displaced six hundred to 1,500 tons.
China’s other maritime law-enforcement agencies, which historically only had
limited offshore roles and capabilities, began to acquire a small number of ships
capable of operating offshore. By 2007, the PAP Maritime Police acquired its first
large patrol ship, the Haixun II class’s solitary vessel, Zhong Guo Hai Jing 1001
(now known as Hai Jing 31101). Historically, the PAP Maritime Police had operated only small, fast, heavily armed patrol craft in support of its primary responsibilities of border defense, antismuggling efforts, and immigration enforcement
(as well as regime security). Hai Jing 31101 was equipped with a 37 mm main gun
and a helicopter deck. It had more than four times the displacement of most PAP
Maritime Police patrol craft, and its restricted initial operations revealed the PAP
Maritime Police’s discomfort with operating larger ships; most PAP Maritime
Police patrol craft crewmen were drawn from land-based defense forces rather
than maritime backgrounds. The PAP thus had difficulty adapting to the twentyfour-hour cycle of activity that is required when a ship goes out for days or weeks
at a time; this was not part of its organizational culture.12 For most of its early
career, Hai Jing 31101 rarely ventured beyond coastal waters. It was seen largely
as a ceremonial “status” platform for the PAP Maritime Police, although in recent
years under the CCG it has played a slightly more active offshore role.
The Bureau of Fisheries oversaw China Fisheries Law Enforcement, which
already operated several dozen aging offshore patrol ships used for resource
protection and fisheries enforcement. FLE began its own modest modernization program in the first few years of the new century. This consisted mostly of
introducing new coastal patrol craft classes, but culminated in the construction
of the then-impressive Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310,
which was launched in 2010.13 As with other MLE agencies’ recent acquisitions,
FLE chose to equip WPS 310 with a helicopter deck and hangar—even though
FLE did not actually own any helicopters. In its initial years, FLE used WPS 310
extensively for offshore patrol duties, and in later years the ship would serve as
a proof of concept for at least one follow-on class that now forms the backbone
of the FLE fleet.
Early in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the fourth major maritime
law-enforcement agency, GAC, had just finished building over thirty new twohundred-ton patrol craft (of the Hailin I and II classes) for coastal countersmuggling operations. It did not have a significant ship-construction program ongoing
after about 2003.
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MSA continued its own construction program, acquiring a variety of ships
to fulfill its specialized missions, ranging across buoy tending, environmental
cleanup, search and rescue, light maritime towing and salvage, and port operations. MSA also acquired several large patrol ships that were able to respond to
offshore maritime disasters and emergencies and interact with major coast guard
organizations from other Pacific countries. MSA was the first of the five dragons
to obtain purpose-built patrol ships large enough for transoceanic operations,
with the two Shubian-class ships attending joint exercises in Hawaii and other
distant locales. Unlike China’s other MLE agencies, MSA consistently has maintained a close working relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Japan Coast
Guard, and other regional MLE organizations.14 Unlike the other dragons, MSA
historically has acquired a large portion of its funding from collection of port
fees from commercial shipping, allowing it some degree of budget autonomy and
insulation from the country’s leadership and national budget issues.15
MOVING FORWARD: CHINA’S NEW COAST GUARD
As previously noted, 2013 saw the integration (at least on paper) of four of these
agencies into a new agency called the China Coast Guard. This reform had been
anticipated for several years by the individual agencies, several of which apparently began aggressive construction programs after 2010, perhaps in an attempt
to assert dominance within the new organization’s command structure.16 There
was little cooperation, with each organization (particularly FLE and CMS) apparently focusing on its own ship designs.
Shortly before CCG integration, the CMS force also acquired several auxiliary
ships that recently had been retired from PLAN service. These transfers likely
were intended to fill gaps in patrol capabilities as China began to pursue maritime
expansion more assertively in the South and East China Seas. The vessels included three former intelligence-collection ships (the icebreaking Yanbing-class
former AGI 723, the Xiang Yang Hong 9–class former AGI 852, and the Haiyangclass former AGI 411), as well as a few other old PLAN auxiliaries, including a
converted cable layer, a minelayer, and three large ocean salvage tugs. The former
PLAN ships were pressed into service immediately (largely without naval guns
and electronics), while the ship-construction program of CMS—a leading component of the soon-to-be CCG—proceeded.17
One hallmark of CCG modernization in recent years has been the clear specialization of ships and craft toward particular missions, an outcome of procurement programs initiated in the era of the five dragons.18 Moreover, China’s massive shipbuilding industry (and, presumably, shipbuilding budget) has allowed
the CCG to focus on a variety of designs oriented toward specific requirements,
rather than building jack-of-all-trades ships that were more flexible but less
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capable of specific functions. However, all these ships and craft remain highly capable of acting in other roles, particularly those related to promoting sovereignty
in disputed South and East China Sea areas.
A second hallmark of CCG modernization is a preference for evolutionary
design modifications. Since 2010, various initial designs have been followed by
frequent revisions in configurations and capabilities. For instance, China has
made four sequential variations of its “regional thousand-ton” patrol-ship design
since the program started almost a decade ago. The original variant (the Shuyou
class) was essentially a dual-purpose research and patrol ship for CMS. It was
equipped with A-frames and cranes at the fantail to accommodate survey activities. As the design progressed to the Shuke I, II, and III classes, the ships clearly
evolved toward a law-enforcement role, with cranes and A-frames removed; davits for small, fast boats added; and hull and superstructure modifications made
to allow them to handle open-water operations better.
Similar upgrades have been made in other classes. These changes were both a
result of close observation of other modern MLE ships (primarily those operated
by the U.S. Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard) and lessons learned by CMS,
FLE, and other CCG agency ships operating farther offshore for longer periods.
MARITIME CUSTOMS AND ANTISMUGGLING
The segment of the CCG that performs maritime customs enforcement (formerly GAC) has been active in acquisitions in recent years, replacing most of
its 1980s/1990s-built fleet of small patrol craft with three new classes of ships
intended specifically for maritime law-enforcement and customs duties. The new
Zhaogao-class patrol ship, of which three were built, gives the CCG additional capability for exclusive economic zone (EEZ) patrol activities, such as intercepting
smugglers farther offshore. The 1,750-ton ship is 308 feet long and thirty-nine
feet in beam. Unlike most CCG patrol ships, which have maximum speeds of just
over twenty knots, the Zhaogao design has four powerful diesel engines that likely allow it to reach top speeds of nearly thirty knots, with a range of five thousand
nautical miles (nm) at fifteen knots.19 These ships also are equipped with two
quick-launch davits for fast-interceptor boats that can be deployed while under
way. The ships are fitted with a 30 mm automatic main gun and a helicopter deck.
A second specialty class, the Hutao I patrol combatant, is configured for
extended patrols deep into China’s EEZ. Like the Zhaogao, the Hutao I is fitted
with four diesels providing a full-power speed of over thirty knots via four shafts
and propellers, and a range of five thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots. The
625-ton Hutao I measures 223 feet long and 28.5 feet in beam. It has dual quicklaunch stern ramps, allowing it to launch and recover fast-interceptor boats while
under way, and is armed with a single 30 mm gun, two smaller guns, and water
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TABLE 2
CHINA COAST GUARD MARITIME CUSTOMS: NOTABLE CLASSES
Number in
Country

Class

3

Zhaogao
WPS
Hutao I
WPG

8 (3+ new units)

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

(Hai Jing) 33103 (Zhejiang),
44104 (Guangdong), 46014
(Hainan)

308

1,750

30

(Hai Jing) 31101, 31103,
33104, 35104, 44105, 44106,
45103 + more

223

625

30

Known Pennant Numbers

Guns
(millimeters)

Hutao
III WPG

2

44109, 44110

223

625

30

Haihei
WPC

2

(Hai Guan) 905 + another

205

450

37

Haifeng
WPC

5

(Hai Guan) 900–904

190

440

14.5

(Hai Jing) 33004, 35007,
37001, 44005, 44008, 44015–
18, 44020, 44021, 45001,
45002, 46003 + more

177

330

14.5

Hulai II
WPC

15 (+ new units)

Hailin I
WPC

25+

(Hai Jing) 44059, 44068,
44069; (Hai Guan) 853–80
(pennant numbers probably
changed)

170

230

23,
14.5

Hailin II
WPC

10+

(Hai Jing) 21091, 31088,
33086, 35089; (Hai Guan)
881–90 (pennant numbers
probably changed)

170

230

23

(Hai Jing) 33028; (Hai Guan)
823–30 (pennant numbers
probably changed)

145

170

14.5

(Hai Guan) 810–20 (pennant
numbers probably changed)

140

100

14.5

Type 611
WPC

~10

Haigao
WPC

10+

Notes:
WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The China Coast Guard overall has several hundred classes of ships; to keep this and subsequent tables manageable, only the most significant classes
are included.

cannon. At least eight Hutao Is are operational already, and additional units continue to be built.
A third class, the Hulai II, is cosmetically similar to the ubiquitous Dutch Damen Stan Patrol 4207, a patrol craft operated by over a dozen navies and coast
guards internationally. However, the Hulai II adds a third engine, once again
giving it a top speed of over thirty knots, for missions inside China’s EEZ, particularly maritime customs interdiction, and a range of 1,200 nm at eighteen knots.
The 330-ton Hulai II is 177 feet long and twenty-four feet in beam, and also is
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equipped with a fast-launch stern-ramp system, allowing it to deploy its interceptor boat while under way. It has small arms and a smoke grenade launcher, highcapacity water cannon, and reinforced hull rub rails. In recent years, variations
of both the Hutao I and the Hulai II designs have been sold to export customers
(the latter to Pakistan), indicating that these are competitive, effective designs in
a crowded international patrol craft market. Over a dozen Hulai IIs have been
built in the last few years, and as many as thirty total units may be built to replace
the CCG’s older Type 611– and Hailin I/II–class patrol craft built in the 1980s
and ’90s.20
LONG-RANGE FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT
Fisheries enforcement and other resource protection in furtherance of China’s
territorial claims always has been a primary mission of China’s maritime agencies, specifically the former FLE. FLE’s progressive integration into the CCG
likely improved the budgetary situation for the former, which to execute its
mission historically had relied on a jumble of older, less-capable patrol ships, a
hodgepodge of patrol craft, and assorted converted fishing boats. Over the past
decade the CCG’s former Fisheries Enforcement Branch embarked on an active
program to replace and modernize its entire fleet.
Most notable with regard to long-distance fisheries enforcement is the new
Zhaoyu-class large patrol ship, of which a dozen were commissioned from 2014
to 2016. At 360 feet long and forty-six feet in beam, the 3,500-ton Zhaoyus have
a traditional combatant-style hull optimized for long-distance cruising in heavy
seas, as these ships are intended for operations well outside China’s disputed
maritime periphery—in theory, anywhere.21 This class has an estimated top speed
of twenty-five knots, with a range of 7,500 nm at fourteen knots. Design modifications were based on lessons learned from FLE’s former flagship, the one-off
Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo Yu Zheng 310, which recently was transferred to the Sansha City municipality. FLE likely identified some design and
stability flaws in the ship, and subsequently improved the Zhaoyu configuration
by reducing the superstructure by one deck (for roll stability) and adding a sternlaunch boat ramp to deploy interceptor and boarding craft from beneath the
helicopter deck. Additional fittings include a helicopter hangar and a substantial
armament of one single 30 mm gun and four single automatic 12.7 mm guns.22
New to this category is the Zhaochang patrol ship, purpose-built for longdistance fisheries enforcement with a new tumblehome hull design and a 30 mm
gun.23 The 3,500-ton ship is 360 feet long and forty-nine feet in beam. A proof
of concept for the CCG’s first ship with electric-drive propulsion, complete with
diesel generators, the sole Zhaochang built to date yields a top speed of only
twenty knots, but has a long range: ten thousand nautical miles at fifteen knots.
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TABLE 3
CHINA COAST GUARD FISHERIES ENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)
Class

Number in
Country

Zhaochang WPS

1

Known Pennant Numbers

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Gun(s)
(millimeters)

(Hai Jing) 2301

360

3,500

30

(Hai Jing) 1301–1304, 2302–
2304, 3301–3305, 46305

360

3,500

30

(Hai Jing) 1102–1104,
3104–3106, 21115, 31115,
33115, 35115, 37115, 46115; (Yu
Zheng) 45005, 45013, 45036

269

1,764

30

30

Zhaoyu WPS

12

Zhaotim WPS

14–15

Dalang I WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 3411

370

4,500

Zhongeng WPS

10+

(Yu Zheng) 13001, 32501,
33001, 33006, 35001, 37008,
44061, 45001, 46012 + more

180

~1,000

Zhongwen WPS

1

(Yu Zheng) 21103

195

850

unknown

Zhongke WPG

6+

(Yu Zheng) 21101, 21111,
27061, 33018, 33205, 45002 +
possibly more

180

~500

unknown

Zhongem WPG

2

(Yu Zheng) 37361

190

550

14.5

Zhongtao WPC

50+

(Yu Zheng) 12002, 21006,
21009, 21137, 21202, 21401,
32511, 32521, 32528, 32543,
32545, 33012, 33015–19, 33023,
33025, 33129, 33316, 33416,
33417, 37001, 37005, 37015,
37529, 37601, 45012, 46013 +
more

160–70

Zhongsui WPC

6

(Yu Zheng) 35199, 44601–603,
44606, 45003

165

~350

14.5

Duancude WPC

10+

(Yu Zheng) 21402, 31006,
37057, 37206, 37518 + more

130

~200

none

(Yu Zheng) 44025, 44081,
44121, 44168; (Hai Jian) 9040,
9060 (additional units operated
by China MSA and PLA MTS)

110

150

~150

Nanhua Type A
WPC

~10

Zhongbong
WPC

10+

(Yu Zheng) 13203, 13301,
32511, 37078, 37163, 37606,
37607

100–20

Fisheries patrol
trawlers

30+

(Yu Zheng) variety of designs
and numbers

100–20

Red Arrow WPB

50+

4-digit, ending in H

40

300–450

250–600
15

14.5

14.5

23

none

none,
generally
none

Notes:
MSA = Maritime Safety Administration; MTS = Maritime Transport Squadron (Army Logistics); PLA = People’s Liberation Army; PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; WPB = coast guard patrol boat; WPC = coast guard patrol craft; WPG = coast guard patrol gunboat; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
The six classes at the bottom of the table (beginning with the Zhongsui WPC), while relatively small in tonnage, are deployable to Chinese-occupied
features in the South China Sea, and may well be used thus.
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For regional fisheries-enforcement operations—particularly in disputed
fisheries areas adjacent to Vietnam (e.g., the Gulf of Tonkin), Japan, and the
Koreas—the CCG built a large class of smaller patrol ships, the Zhaotim class.
The fourteen or fifteen 269-foot-long, thirty-nine-foot-beam, 1,764-ton ships in
this class are optimized for regional, medium-endurance patrols, with a reported
7,500-mile range at thirteen knots, an ice-strengthened hull (for operations in the
northern Bo Hai [formerly known as the Gulf of Chihli]), a 30 mm gun, two small
fast-interceptor boats, and a moderate towing capability to assist disabled fishing
boats. With their regional, near-shore focus, Zhaotims lack helicopter facilities.
The relatively beamy, low-slung hull design, with bulbous bow, indicates that sea
keeping in heavy weather and efficiency were key design factors, rather than the
high speed and maneuverability prioritized in other CCG ships intended for interdiction duties. (Fishing boats, typically low speed, cannot outrun even patrol
ships whose top speed does not exceed twenty knots, such as the Zhaotim class.)
Provincial-level fisheries law-enforcement agencies also have undertaken a
major modernization program. As late as the 1990s, PRC coastal fisheries enforcement predominantly was performed by converted fishing boats and various older patrol craft. However, in the last decade local forces have built about
a dozen different designs of thirty-five-to-sixty-meter coastal patrol craft and
combatants for more-local, short-endurance enforcement duties. Most notably,
the fifty-meter, 450-ton Zhongtao class has been in constant production since
the early years of this century, with over fifty units built at six shipyards to date.
All units share a common hull and basic superstructure design, but vary significantly in how they are fitted out topside, depending on operational location
and typical weather conditions. For operational areas where assertive fishermen
may use collisions and shouldering as a defense against enforcement (e.g., the
Gulf of Tonkin), Zhongtao units have reinforced ribbing along the hulls. For operational areas with heavier sea conditions (e.g., the East China Sea), Zhongtao
units may have raised bow bulwarks. Some units stationed in the Yellow Sea and
Bo Hai may have ice-strengthened bows. Earlier units used small, davit-launched
interceptor boats, while later units have a stern gate and quick-launch ramp. The
Zhongtao class is yet another example of coast guard designers adapting and
learning operational lessons when building new ships and patrol craft.
OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND
SOVEREIGNTY ENFORCEMENT
While the CCG in its entirety has a general role of performing offshore surveillance and patrol (particularly with its larger patrol ships), as well as border defense and territorial enforcement, historically these roles were played primarily
by two former dragons: CMS and the PAP Maritime Police. CMS was primarily
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responsible for offshore duties, with much of its force composed of larger ships
capable of longer-endurance operations and dual hatted as oceanographic research ships.
As a component of the well-funded SOA, CMS substantially bolstered its new
shipbuilding programs during and after the consolidation with orders for several
new classes of large ships (most of which eventually were commissioned into the
now-consolidated CCG). New CMS ships clearly were built with a primary role
of open-seas, long-term patrol and surveillance duties, and were less equipped for
law-enforcement interception, fisheries administration, oceanographic research,
or safety of life at sea (SOLAS)
roles than CCG ships built
CCG-centered MLE forces afford Beijing increasing influence over the regional maritime prior to 2012.24
The most notable of the
situation without the direct use of PLAN warships, demonstrating power while reducing the new ships built for the CCG
in recent years were the two
risk of escalation.
massive Zhaotou-class flagships, one each based in the south and the east. The Zhaotous have received an
inordinate amount of media attention owing to their great size: with a length of
165 meters (541 feet), a beam of more than twenty meters (over sixty-five feet),
and a full load of more than ten thousand tons, their displacement is greater than
that of modern naval destroyers. Their estimated speed is twenty-five knots, their
range 15,000 nm.
However, the substantive rationale for construction of these ships is unclear,
as they do not offer any technical advantages vis-à-vis other, smaller, patrol ships
built recently for the CCG.25 There are Internet rumors that the ships were ordered in direct response to Japan’s deployment of its 9,500-ton Shikishima-class
cutters to the Senkakus in 2013, which at the time dwarfed any ships in the CCG
inventory, suggesting that construction of the Zhaotou class represents a point
of pride for China—to have the world’s largest coast guard ships—rather than
an actual capability requirement. While that rationale is speculative at best, the
Zhaotou design nonetheless does provide the CCG with a large platform that can
operate anywhere in the world with maximum endurance, while carrying a helicopter and mounting a 76 mm main gun. It is unlikely that any additional units
of this class will be built, however, owing to the ship’s berthing requirements and
the presumably higher cost of operations without any tangible benefit in capability compared with smaller CCG patrol ships.26
Since consolidation, the CCG’s three most effective new classes of large patrol
ships have been the Shucha II, Shuoshi II, and Zhaolai classes, all of which are
based on earlier classes that were operational before the CCG reform. The Shucha
II, of which ten units are currently operational, is based on the Shucha I design
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originally built for CMS early in the new century. When built, the Shucha I was
the most modern ship in the CMS inventory, combining long-distance endurance with a substantial ability to perform oceanographic research. The Shucha II
improved on this design and oriented the mission strictly toward patrol activities
by eliminating the survey handling equipment and stern A-frame, replacing them
with a larger helicopter deck and launch facilities for small interceptor boats. The
Shucha II, like its predecessor, is equipped with a hybrid diesel-electric power
plant—providing good cruising efficiency and range—and a drivetrain that uses
steerable electric propulsor pods—giving it excellent maneuverability. Moreover,
Shucha II has positions available for installation of 30 mm main guns in the future, if required.27
Arguably comprising the most capable and versatile class in the CCG, the four
Shuoshi II–class units are based on MSA’s flagship Hai Xun 01, built several years
earlier. With a length of 130 m and beam of 16 m (fifty-two feet) and a 5,800-ton
displacement, it is similar in overall size and design to the U.S. Coast Guard’s
Legend-class National Security Cutter. The Shuoshi II design is configured for
long-distance open-ocean operations in any weather conditions. It is fitted with
high-capacity water cannon and a helicopter landing deck and hangar, and has
design provisions for the future fitting of a 76 mm gun. However, unlike that of
many other large, purpose-built patrol ships the CCG operates, a Shuoshi II’s
aft area is considered a “working stern,” capable of performing light rescue and
salvage operations and moderate towing of ships at sea, giving this class a wellrounded capability that is not limited to law-enforcement operations. While it
remains unclear whether additional hulls will be built, this is one of the world’s
most capable, versatile MLE vessels.28
The Zhaolai-class patrol ship likely was an off-the-shelf design intended to
provide the capability quickly to interact with Japanese and Vietnamese vessels in
the Senkakus and the South China Sea. The Zhaolai is based closely on the CRS
Hai Jiu 111–class salvage and rescue ship, giving it a heavy-duty hull, a powerful
engineering plant, and the ability to operate in even the worst sea and weather
conditions. The 4,800-ton Zhaolai design eliminated the large salvage cranes
present on the CRS variant and added davits for small interceptor boats. Each of
the CCG’s four Zhaolais also is equipped with a helicopter landing deck and has
a mount position forward for a 76 mm gun, should the CCG desire to backfit the
ship with one. Among CCG ships, the Zhaolai is configured best for heavy towing
and shouldering of other ships, and its large, high-mounted water cannon can be
used both for firefighting and for dousing smaller foreign ships during close-in,
nonkinetic dissuasion operations. As the Zhaolai was initially an off-the-shelf
stopgap solution to CCG capability shortfalls and is inferior to more-specialized
designs, it is unlikely that additional units will be built.29
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TABLE 4
CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTYENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED)

Class

Number
in
Country

Known Pennant Numbers

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Guns
(millimeters)

Zhaotou WPS

2

(Hai Jing) 2901, 3901

541

10,000+

76, 30

Zhaoduan WPS

6

(Hai Jing) 31301–303, 46301–303

450

4,000+

76

9

21111, 33111, 35111, 37111, 44111,
45111, 46111–13

328

2,700

76

Shuoshi II WPS

4

(Hai Jing) 1501, 2501, 2502, 3501

426

5,800

76 (prov.)

Zhaolai WPS

4

(Hai Jing) 1401, 2401, 3401, 3402

325

4,800

76 (prov.)

(Hai Jing) 1305–307, 2305–308,
3306–308

321

4,000

30

Zhaojun WPS

Shucha II WPS

10

Hai Yang WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 3368

345

3,325

none

Kanjie WPS
(ex-PLAN)

1

(Hai Jing) 2506

425

5,830

removed

Type 053
Jiangwei I WFF
(ex-PLAN)

3

(Hai Jing) 31239 [former PLAN
FF 539], 31240 [former PLAN FF
540], 31241 [former PLAN FF 541]

367

2,000

37

Shusheng WPS

5

(Hai Jian) 1010, 2115, 3015, 7008,
9010

290

1,750

14.5 (prov.)

245–65

1,450

none

Shuke I/II/III
WPS

20

Shuyou WPS

3

(Hai Jing) 1117, 2146, 3171

242

1,000

none

Shuwu WPS

3

(Hai Jing) 1115, 2151, 3184

288

1,750

none

Tuzhong WPS
(ex-PLAN)

3

(Hai Jing) 1310, 2337, 3367

278

3,300

none

Haixun II WPS

1

(Hai Jing) 31101

311

1,900

37, 23

Haijian
WAGOR/WPS

4

(Hai Jian) 1118, 2149, 3172, 3174

230

1,350

none

II: (Hai Jian) 9012
III: (Hai Jian) 1015, 1116, 1117,
2030, 3011, 3012, 4067, 4073, 5030,
7018, 7028, 7038, 8003, 8027

215

600

12.7

Shuzao II/III
WPG

15

I: (Hai Jing) 1127
II: (Hai Jing) 1123, 1126, 2166,
3175
III: (Hai Jing) 2112, 2113, 3111–
13; (Hai Jian) 1002, 1013, 2032,
2168, 4001, 4002, 4072; (Yu Zheng)
46016

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 24

30

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

E R I C K S O N , H I C K E Y, & H O L S T

25

CHINA COAST GUARD OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE, PATROL, AND SOVEREIGNTYENFORCEMENT ORDER OF BATTLE (SELECTED) CONTINUED

Class
Type 618B-II
WPG

Number
in
Country
30+

Known Pennant Numbers
(Hai Jing) 015,* 12001, 13101,
13102, 21101–104, 31102, 32102,
33101, 33102, 35101–103, 37101,
37102, 44101, 44103, 45101, 45102,
46101, 46102, 46105, 46106 +
more

Length
(feet)

Displacement
(tons)

Guns
(millimeters)

201–208

650

25 or 30

Notes:
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy; prov. = provisional (i.e., collar fitted but no gun mounted); WAGOR = oceanographic research ship; WFF = coast
guard frigate; WPS = coast guard patrol ship.
* This is a training vessel subordinate to the Maritime Police Academy, but is nonetheless fully combat capable.

Meanwhile, the PAP Maritime Police was primarily a coastal and riverine force
not known for its members’ seamanship skills, as most of its personnel originated in ground-based PAP units.30 The CCG currently is building a significant
number of patrol ships from two new, highly capable classes that apparently were
ordered before CCG consolidation by the then PAP Maritime Police (i.e., the old
coast guard). The larger of these classes, the Zhaoduan (Type 818), is the CCG’s
newest and fastest class under construction. It is based directly on the PLAN’s
Jiangkai II (Type 054)–class guided-missile frigate, using an almost identical
hull and likely the same powerful 2+2 combined diesel and diesel (referred to as
“CODAD”) power plant. This naval design has proved highly reliable in PLAN
antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The overall configuration of the Zhao
duan is similar to the Jiangkai II above the main deck as well, but with an additional superstructure deck added and some other topside changes. The Zhao
duan lacks the powerful combat systems of the Jiangkai II, eliminating the HQ-16
vertical-launch surface-to-air missile system, close-in-weapon systems, and longrange military electronics.31 However, the Zhaoduan does retain the same 76 mm
main gun as the Jiangkai II. Together with two 30 mm guns, this makes it the
CCG’s most heavily armed ship. Its helicopter landing area and hangar accommodate Z-9, AW109, or EC135 helicopters. With the propulsion system from the
Jiangkai II but a reduced displacement of something over four thousand tons, the
Zhaoduan likely can attain a top speed of over thirty knots, making it one of the
world’s fastest large coast guard ships, with a ten-thousand-nautical-mile range
at fifteen knots. These qualities will make the Zhaoduan a go-to workhorse for
the CCG. Six units of this class have been launched to date, and additional units
have been ordered, according to some media sources.32
The CCG also is building the smaller Zhaojun (Type 718)–class cutter, using
what appears to be an original design. Displacing 2,700 tons, the ship is 328 feet
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long and forty-three feet in beam. Its estimated maximum speed is twenty-five
knots, its range 6,500 nm. At least nine of these patrol ships have been launched
to date, with several already operational, and additional units are possible. The
Zhaojun has a helicopter deck and a small interceptor boat–launch facility. Like
the Zhaoduan, it is fitted with a 76 mm main gun forward.33
Capable of operating offshore for regional security missions, Type 618B-II patrol combatants performed with distinction in the 2014 HYSY 981 oil rig standoff. They displace 650 tons,
Today China boasts not only the world’s larg- are up to 208 feet long and
est navy but also the world’s largest maritime thirty feet in beam, and have
law-enforcement fleet—by a sizable margin
a large power plant capable of
. . . —more hulls than the coast guards of all
around thirty knots top speed
its regional neighbors combined.
and a two-thousand-nauticalmile range. They are also very
maneuverable. The CCG’s more than twenty-five hulls of this type each have a
25 mm or 30 mm main gun and high-capacity water cannon. Some units have a
fast-boat launch ramp at the stern.
Aside from these purpose-built border-defense ships and craft, the CCG has
accepted three former PLAN Jiangwei I patrol frigates. Their missiles and most
naval systems have been removed, but each retains twin 37 mm guns and a helicopter hangar. These ships are only two thousand tons in displacement, 367 feet
in length, and 40.7 feet in beam; their strength is a top speed of around thirty
knots and a range of 4,500 nm at eighteen knots.
FACILITIES
In recent years, copious open-source information has indicated that China is
consolidating its myriad MLE facilities into a smaller number of larger bases with
substantial berthing capacity and other shoreside infrastructure. Although the
precise number of CCG maritime facilities in China is difficult to determine, the
service is thought to have over two hundred total facilities at which ships or small
craft are stationed.34 However, fewer than forty of these are regarded as large
bases that can accommodate offshore-capable patrol ships. The rest provide basing for coastal or local patrol craft and patrol boats. Many of these smaller bases
are collocated with or near fishing harbors, and are home to FLE patrol craft that
require limited shoreside infrastructure. Many other facilities host even smaller
inshore patrol boats, and essentially are just a small pier or jetty with a single
support building, if that.35
In recent years, the most substantial CCG bases have been expanded significantly, with much larger piers to accommodate all the new ships and substantial
shoreside capacities, including barracks, athletic facilities, and, in some cases,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
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TABLE 5
SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES
Province or Equivalent

Coordinates
(approx. latitude/longitude)

Beihai

Guangxi

21.485, 109.084

Fangchenggang Shiping

Guangxi

21.626, 108.316

Qinzhou

Guangxi

21.736, 108.639

Jinzhou

Liaoning

40.846, 121.103

Fuzhou Guling

Fujian

26.055, 119.353

Fuzhou Tingjiang

Fujian

26.074, 119.513

Xiamen downtown

Fujian

24.467, 118.065

Xiamen China Coast Guard (CCG)
base

Fujian

24.511, 118.065

Dalian Mianhuadao

Shandong

39.006, 121.675

Dalian Wantong

Shandong

39.010, 121.709

Yantai Yangma Dao

Shandong

37.444, 121.582

Yantai Zhifu Bay

Shandong

37.545, 121.392

Tianjin port area

Tianjin

Guangzhou Taihe

Guangdong

23.109, 113.395

Huangpu Changzhou

Guangdong

23.077, 113.432

Huangpu Luntou

Guangdong

23.078, 113.375

Shantou

Guangdong

23.353, 116.688

Zhanjiang Tiaoshun

Guangdong

21.286, 110.409

Qinhuangdao fishing wharf

Hebei

39.921, 119.617

Qinhuangdao coal terminal

Hebei

39.935, 119.668

Shanghai Fuxing Dao

Shanghai

31.288, 121.561

Shanghai Gaoqiao

Shanghai

31.357, 121.614

Shanghai port facility

Shanghai

31.384, 121.549

Nantong

Jiangsu

31.908, 120.910

Haikou port

Hainan

20.031, 110.278

Haikou Haidian River

Hainan

20.025, 110.323

Sanya

Hainan

18.233, 109.492

Wenchang

Hainan

19.560, 110.825

Shandong

36.050, 120.298

Location

Qingdao Tuandao Inlet
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SELECTED MAJOR CHINA COAST GUARD FACILITIES CONTINUED
Province or Equivalent

Coordinates
(approx. latitude/longitude)

Qingdao port area

Shandong

36.082, 120.309

Qingdao Huangdao

Shandong

36.005, 120.272

Zhoushan Waichangzhi

Zhejiang

29.980, 122.082

Ningbo CCG Academy

Zhejiang

29.945, 121.710

Wenzhou Lucheng

Zhejiang

28.025, 120.672

Location

Source: Located via Google Earth.

limited ship-repair facilities. Growing emphasis on ship repair shows both an
understanding of a maturing fleet’s operational needs and a desire to avoid being
subordinated to the PLAN for access to maintenance. As part of these efforts, the
CCG built its first floating dry dock. The dock can be moved to different locations,
including South China Sea “features,” and can accommodate smaller patrol ships.
Although the CCG reform began in 2013, in most cases the service’s facilities
remain somewhat segregated according to organizational mission; that is, bases
that previously hosted FLE ships continue to host ships that perform fisheriesenforcement activities. It is unclear whether duplicative facilities will be eliminated in the future.36
CHINA MARITIME SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
MSA was not included in the 2013 CCG consolidation and remains an independent agency with its own fleet and facilities. MSA is responsible for the control
and securing of China’s maritime ports and commercial maritime traffic, for aids
to navigation (buoys, lighthouses, etc.), for pollution control, and for SOLAS,
among other missions. MSA’s presence largely is limited to China’s territorial
waters, although the agency does have several large patrol ships that occasionally
take long voyages for joint exercises with other nations’ coast guard forces or to
participate in search-and-rescue operations (such as searching for the missing
plane from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370). However, the great majority of the MSA
fleet is composed of hundreds of coastal patrol craft; thousands of inshore patrol
boats; and a variety of specialized vessels used for buoy tending, hydrographic
survey, pollution cleanup, and other utilitarian roles.37
MSA, while considered a law-enforcement agency, generally is not involved
in territorial disputes (such as in the South China Sea or Senkakus), fisheries
enforcement, customs, or other countercriminal activities. MSA maintains a
good working relationship with regional forces, including the U.S. Coast Guard,
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the Japan Coast Guard, and South Korea’s Korea Coast Guard, and often works
jointly with these forces.38
CHINA RESCUE AND SALVAGE
CRS, while not a law-enforcement organization, nonetheless is a governmentrun agency under China’s Ministry of Transportation that has a substantial presence in China’s maritime realm. CRS operates both in an official capacity (in
support of SOLAS) and in a commercial capacity, taking on contract work ranging from towing stranded ships and salvaging sunken ships to transporting and
placing commercial oil rigs.
Profits from this commercial side provide CRS with a substantial independent
budget, much of which CRS spends on constant modernization of its impressively large fleet of rescue, salvage, heavy-transport, semisubmersible, and large
crane ships. The most visible CRS units are the thirty-plus modern rescue and
salvage ships, which spend most of their time loitering in busy maritime traffic
areas and roadsteads off Chinese ports.
CRS has several major bases, some of which are collocated with or near CCG
or MSA facilities, but CRS generally does not operate with or interact heavily
with CCG forces.39 While CRS’s large ships may be present in the vicinity of maritime disputes, they typically are there only to provide rescue in case of damage
to other-agency (or foreign) ships and do not get involved in any enforcement or
deterrence activities.
CRS is highly regarded in the international maritime community owing to
its courageous, professional, and experienced personnel, strong rescue ethic,
modern and highly capable fleet of ships, and lack of involvement in maritime
disputes. CRS ships often are contracted to perform transport and other work
around the globe.40
In building both the world’s largest coast guard and the largest overall MLE
force, China has achieved an impressive increase in its maritime capabilities. It
has leveraged massive capacity for building all sizes of patrol ships, cost relief
from commercial construction profits, and domestic production of most systems
(including engines and electronics) to field a formidable number and variety of
ships specialized for different roles and operating areas. Enhanced CCG capacity
is envisioned to allow the PLAN to focus on naval roles beyond the first island
chain, with a commensurate reduction in PLAN small patrol craft over the past
decade.41 Moreover, new CCG ships capable of long-distance operations in
higher seas—the largest capable of operating globally—could permit extended
deployments beyond maritime East Asia (e.g., to conduct antipiracy patrols or
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perform escort duties along sea lines of communication). CCG modernization
and expansion afford China presence and influence to further its East and South
China Seas sovereignty claims while maintaining both domestic and international law-enforcement capability regionally.
China will continue to modernize its MLE agencies’ respective fleets, with primary emphasis on the consolidated CCG. However, the winding down of the major ship-construction program of 2010–17 portends less class variation and more
focus on future construction
[M]assive infrastructure builds, evolutionary of a few (perhaps three or
ship designs, and extensive use of commercial, four) major classes and severoff-the-shelf components offer China the abil- al minor classes, to streamline
logistics and operations. Emity to surge CCG ship construction rapidly.
phasis on size is giving way to
emphasis on speed and filling capability gaps. The CCG likely will continue to grow
numerically but is unlikely to repeat the rate of growth of the past decade—primarily
because China by now has replaced virtually all its older, less-capable large patrol
ships.
In the coming decade, China likely will prioritize smaller coastal-patrol craft
and patrol combatants to continue replacement of the large fleet of small craft
that were built largely in the 1990s and are nearing the end of their operational
life spans. The CCG undoubtedly will focus on remedying its major remaining
areas of weakness: severe rotary-wing limitations (only about fifty helicoptercapable ships and few helicopters); uneven existing crew training, with seamanship competency depending on former agency; and ships being produced faster
than new crewmembers can be trained.42 To improve situational awareness, the
CCG likely will acquire additional maritime-patrol aircraft, including helicopters
(imported or domestic). It will strive to strengthen planning, communications,
and operational control.
While China will continue to focus on security enforcement of its established
territorial waters and EEZ, the CCG will continue to operate regularly throughout waters within the first island chain to support China’s maritime claims, as well
as to perform enforcement and surveillance operations. Forward-basing CCG
units on augmented features in the Paracels and Spratlys will enhance operational
tempo and facilitate coordination with the PLAN and PAFMM.
These expanding CCG capabilities support a decisive shift in Chinese maritime strategy: from a three-sea-force focus on regional seas to an evolving division of labor in which its first sea force—the PLAN—significantly increases its
overseas missions and focus. While regional operations likely will remain the
focus for China’s second sea force, its MLE forces centered on the CCG, the
larger CCG ships increasingly could deploy out of area into the Pacific and Indian
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 30

36

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

E R I C K S O N , H I C K E Y, & H O L S T

31

Oceans, both to increase presence and influence and to participate in joint coast
guard exercises with other major countries, including the United States, Japan,
South Korea, Russia, and India.
As before, designs will be adapted to suit new missions. Moreover, massive infrastructure builds, evolutionary ship designs, and extensive use of commercial,
off-the-shelf components offer China the ability to surge CCG ship construction
rapidly, if desired. When it comes to rapidity of fleet expansion and modernization, China’s second sea force already is leading the way.

NOTES

Authors’ note: The information in this article
does not rely heavily on other finished academic papers or analyses, although several of
these are cited for context. Instead, the great
majority of supporting information derives
from the authors’ compilation and original
analysis of a vast body of available opensource, firsthand information, almost all of
which is posted on the Internet. The majority
comes directly from tens of thousands of specific Internet and media sources that cannot
be listed individually. For a full discussion of
the documentation methodology and sources
used herein, see the China Analysis from
Original Sources website at the following url:
www.andrewerickson.com/2019/02/open
-source-research-on-chinas-maritime-law
-enforcement-force-structure-development
-methodology-references/.
1.	This article surveys China’s principal MLE
ships from a platform-centric perspective,
organized by mission set. Broadly categorized, MLE forces include the national-level
China Coast Guard; the portion of China
Marine Surveillance (CMS) and Fisheries
Law Enforcement (FLE) vessels organized at
the subnational level (which still exist and are
active in the “gray zone,” but are not included
in the CCG); Maritime Safety Administration
(MSA) vessels, which exist outside the CCG
even at the national level; and China Rescue
and Salvage (CRS) vessels, which are outside
the CCG even at the national level and generally
play only supporting (not MLE/sovereigntyupholding) roles. The present analysis
spotlights the CCG as the core organizing
entity for the majority of China’s MLE forces
at the national level, whose consolidation
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remains a work in progress, and refers to
them broadly as “China’s coast guard.” The
article also addresses some of the most
important non-CCG ships, including from
provincial-level—but not municipal—MLE
organizations. This ecumenical, organizationally flexible approach, which acknowledges
the complexities and vicissitudes of China’s
evolving empirical reality, has the virtue that
the vessels themselves remain discrete and
readily identifiable amid substantial changes
in leadership, control, and nomenclature.
China’s MLE organizations have been reconfigured tremendously in recent years (and
reforms remain ongoing), and vessels have
shifted both among them (as well as having
been transferred in from the PLAN) and in
their relationship to the gray zone. The past
decade also has witnessed multiple firsts in
terms of China’s MLE assets operating in certain areas. MLE fleet usage, like the general
regional situation, is fluid. Ships from all the
agencies (including FLE, General Administration of Customs [GAC], and MSA) have
been observed participating in, or at least in
the vicinity of, conflicts in the gray zone. For
instance, while GAC vessels are absent from
many gray-zone operations, GAC patrol craft
can be seen in photos of the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation Haiyang Shiyou
(HYSY) 981 oil rig operations. Accordingly,
our coverage includes some MLE ships and
forces (e.g., GAC, MSA, and CRS) that are
not always involved in gray-zone operations,
but conceivably could become involved in the
future, particularly as features the Chinese
have augmented in the South China Sea offer
forward-deployment options. Moreover, not
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all CCG ships are relevant to gray-zone operations. Some are too small to be considered
“oceangoing,” although this is a subjective
term. For instance, many ships performing disputed-area operations and similar
functions displace fewer than five hundred
tons, leaving no identifiable size cutoff in
this regard. Conversely, some ships outside
the CCG are relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions. The CCG reorganization in 2013 incorporated only national-level
assets, not provincial, county, or municipal
MLE vessels. For example, the Zhongtao class
is not actually part of the CCG, but rather is
part of provincial-level fisheries-enforcement
resources. CMS also has provincial-level
cutters. Guangdong and Hainan Provinces
have provincial-, county-, and municipallevel cutters relevant to rights-protection/
gray-zone missions. One vessel dramatically
encapsulates the value of a platform-centric
approach: Having joined FLE in November
2010, Zhongyang-class patrol ship Zhong Guo
Yu Zheng 310 conducted multiple rightsprotection missions when it was homeported
in Guangzhou, including the 2012 Scarborough Reef standoff and its March 2013
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U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STR ATEGY
Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability
Sam Goldsmith

T

he People’s Republic of China makes extensive territorial claims over Taiwan,
the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. China’s neighbors openly dispute these claims and the international community does not recognize most of
them. The Chinese government views the settlement of these disputes on terms
favorable to China as a national priority. Ideally, the Chinese government would
like to resolve these disputes through diplomatic channels or by using coercive
and paramilitary techniques that fall short of triggering armed conflicts.1 However, concurrently the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is preparing war plans
and acquiring capabilities to resolve these disputes through the use of armed
force. The Chinese government views all its territorial disputes as “core interests”
and has signaled its willingness to achieve these core interests through the use of
armed force. The U.S. government openly opposes any coercive or aggressive activities that upset the status quo, putting it at odds with the Chinese government.2
The problem is that the Chinese leadership appears unconvinced that the
United States would risk a conflict with China—one that could escalate to a
nuclear war—over disputes concerning territoSam Goldsmith has over eight years of research and
ries that geographically are distant from the U.S.
analysis experience focused primarily on military
capabilities, submarines, and surface combatants.
mainland and seemingly are unrelated to core U.S.
He has received a master of arts (with honors) from
national security interests.3 However, the PLA has a
the Australian National University (ANU) Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, a master of project
relatively small nuclear arsenal, estimated at fewer
management from ANU, and a bachelor of arts (with
than four hundred warheads, in contrast with the
honors) from Monash University. He has done pro4
fessional research consulting work in the Australian U.S. arsenal, which has around 1,550 warheads.
defense field.
Any nuclear strike China made on the United
States would involve only a fraction of the PLA’s
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overall arsenal, because it would need to retain
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some reserve to deter other nuclear-armed neighbors, such as Russia and India.
If the Chinese leadership authorized a nuclear strike against the U.S. homeland,
or even a limited nuclear strike against forward-deployed U.S. forces, it would
be inviting overwhelming devastation from the considerably larger U.S. nuclear
force.5 For these reasons, China likely would aim to confine itself to the use
of conventional weapons during any potential high-intensity conflict with the
United States—particularly given that China already possesses a lethal array of
long-range, conventional, theater-strike options.6 Such a strategic, conventional,
first-strike option is one that the United States should seek to deny China by
developing an effective conventional access strategy.
The U.S. military has three principal strategic objectives. The first is to protect
the U.S. mainland and offshore U.S. territories from armed attacks.7 The second
is to foster a stable, rules-based, global security order through an interconnected
web of alliances and partnerships. The third is to deter and, if necessary, decisively defeat aggressors through the projection of military power. Under the national
military strategy that the Joint Staff published in 2015, the U.S. military would
deter and defeat state aggressors by leveraging U.S. forward-deployed units,
force-projection capabilities, alliances, communications networks, and “resilient
logistics” infrastructure.8 This strategy appears identical to the U.S. military’s
force-projection approach to the 1991 Gulf War.9 But the central problem with
emulating the Gulf War style of force-projection operations is that in future decades the U.S. military no longer will enjoy uncontested use of its forward bases
or the ocean.10
Operation DESERT STORM required the U.S. military to transport around five
hundred thousand personnel, 6.1 million tons of fuel, and 3.7 million tons of
equipment and stores to the Persian Gulf theater. Building up sufficient personnel, equipment, stores, and supplies required seven months of intense air and
sealift operations, as well as access to bases in Saudi Arabia.11 Because of the range
limitations of tactical aircraft and payload-laden airlifters, the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) was forced to use in-flight refueling tankers to form “air bridges.” Air
bridges allowed aircraft with range limitations to cross oceans by flying between
in-flight refueling tankers until they reached the desired theater of operations.
USAF in-flight refueling tankers also supported U.S. and allied short-range tactical aircraft, flying around 16,868 sorties to deliver four hundred thousand tons
of fuel in flight.12 The U.S. military deployed a total of around 1,600 short-range
tactical aircraft that operated from in-theater air bases and six U.S. Navy (USN)
aircraft carriers stationed in littoral waters.13 Long-range, precision-guided munitions accounted for around 5 percent of all air-to-ground ordnance delivered,
supported by around sixteen Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites.14 U.S.
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military satellite constellations also gathered intelligence and provided global
communications.15
The PLA keenly observed the 1991 Gulf War, particularly American exploitation of conventional, long-range, precision strikes.16 The PLA also observed how
two USN carrier strike groups intervened during the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis.
Both developments highlighted the PLA’s technological inferiority and inability
to prevent USN sea power from threatening the Chinese mainland.17 In response,
the PLA has developed a “counterintervention strategy,” designed specifically to
negate traditional U.S. advantages in global force projection. The core problem is
that the PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to undermine the
U.S. military’s credibility to deter and defeat state aggressors—thereby increasing
the likelihood of a China-U.S. armed conflict.
PLA COUNTERINTERVENTION STRATEGY
Strategically, the PLA is tasked with using its counterintervention strategy to
deter the United States and deny the U.S. military access to the western Pacific.
The primary purpose of this strategy is to provide the Chinese government with
the ability to isolate and coerce U.S. allies or regional countries to accept Chinese
sovereignty demands in a number of territorial disputes.18 The PLA might be
directed to apply this counterintervention strategy in relation to the disputed
sovereignty over Taiwan, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China
Sea.19
The PLA’s counterintervention strategy requires four main types of military
operations: theater strike, denial of service, antiaccess, and area-denial operations.
Ideally, all four types of operations would be carried out simultaneously; however, the PLA’s finite resources might force it to prioritize. If the PLA were forced to
prioritize, it would place the greatest emphasis on neutralizing forward-deployed
U.S. forces, followed by denying critical services to the U.S. military, followed by
activities to prevent the U.S. military from reinforcing the Pacific theater. Theaterstrike operations would be required to disable or destroy forward-deployed U.S.
military assets, including aircraft, ships, and submarines, in addition to infrastructure at U.S. bases located west of Pearl Harbor.20 Strikes against these targets
would be executed rapidly at the outset of a conflict to catch adversaries unprepared and achieve decisive in-theater superiority.21
In carrying out this strategy, the PLA will employ each of its four subordinate
service branches: the PLA Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF), and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF). PLAN submarines would execute
undersea attacks against U.S. ships and submarines in port or at sea and strike at
land targets with cruise missiles.22 The PLAAF would execute air strikes against
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U.S. aircraft on the ground or in the air, as well as U.S. ships and submarines in
port or at sea. Strikes against U.S. bases would occur with extended-range missiles launched from PLAAF combat aircraft or conventional ballistic missiles
launched from the Chinese mainland.23
PLAAF combat aircraft can deliver antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) out to
two thousand kilometers (km) from the Chinese mainland, and PLAAF H-6
long-range bombers can deliver land-attack cruise missiles out to 3,300 km from
the Chinese mainland. Air-launched cruise missiles would be supplemented by
PLARF conventional ballistic missiles. The PLARF’s DF-16 short-range ballistic
missile would strike land targets at a range of around eight hundred kilometers.
The PLARF’s DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) would strike land
targets or moving ships in the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) configuration at a range of around 1,500 km.24 The PLARF’s DF-26 intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) would strike land targets or moving ships in the ASBM
configuration at ranges around three thousand kilometers.25
Denial-of-service operations would aim at denying the United States unfettered use of its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure.26 Successful PLA
denial-of-service operations would hinder the U.S. military’s ability to execute
land-attack strikes from USN submarines in the western Pacific, receive up-todate intelligence from USN submarines on patrol, marshal combat resources
to reinforce the Pacific theater, and communicate with surviving U.S. forces in
the western Pacific. One method would be for the PLA to apply its antisatellite
(ASAT) technologies to incapacitate, disrupt, or destroy U.S. military satellite
constellations used for global communications, satellite navigation, and intelligence gathering.27 PLA ASAT technologies include lasers, microwave technologies, and hard-kill methodologies.28 Cyberwarfare capabilities also provide the
PLA with a sophisticated method to disrupt or deny the U.S. military’s use of its
C4ISR infrastructure.29
Antiaccess operations would degrade or deny USAF and USN forceprojection capabilities for accessing the western Pacific, thus isolating U.S. allies.30 Denying USN seaborne force-projection capabilities would be a priority
because over 90 percent of all U.S. military assets, stores, and equipment are
transported by sea.31 PLA antiaccess operations would force USN task forces to
run a gauntlet of layered offensive PLA capabilities during the approach to the
western Pacific.32 Surviving USN task forces likely would arrive in theater with
depleted missile magazines, having suffered fleet-wide damage or ship losses, or
both, just to come within range of the Chinese mainland. Weapons and vessels
available for Chinese antiaccess operations include DF-21D ASBMs, potentially
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DF-26 ASBMs, air-launched ASCMs, diesel-electric and nuclear-powered attack
submarines, and surface combatants.33
U.S. airpower also could be denied access to the western Pacific through the
deployment of PLAN aircraft carrier battle groups. Other options might include
arming PLAN nuclear-powered attack submarines with submarine-launched, antiair missiles to shoot down USAF in-flight refueling tankers and cargo-transport
aircraft. Concurrently, some PLA units would aim to interdict U.S. follow-on
forces outside the western Pacific, particularly in Hawaii and Australia, with the
aim of harassing and interfering with the deployment of U.S. and allied forces
into theater.34
Area-denial operations would be required to limit the freedom of maneuver of
air or maritime forces in coastal areas close to the Chinese mainland. PLA capabilities that could be used for area-denial operations include advanced sea mines,
diesel-electric submarines, maritime strike aircraft, surface combatants, Type
022 missile patrol boats armed with ASCMs, coastal ASCM batteries, land-based
air-defense systems, and land-based conventional and rocket artillery batteries.35
PLA PASSIVE DEFENSES
Concurrently, the PLA has invested in three types of passive-defense capabilities
designed specifically to enable continuity of PLA conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities, even if the Chinese mainland comes under heavy attack.
PLA passive-defense capabilities include land-based sensor networks; land-based
command, control, and communications (C3) networks; and hardened facilities.
First, the PLA has invested in extensive land-based sensor networks to provide
persistent wide-area surveillance of the western Pacific to enable PLA landbased, long-range strike capabilities. The PLA uses land-based Skywave over-thehorizon (OTH) radar technology to track aircraft and ships at ranges of several
thousand kilometers from the Chinese mainland.36 The PLA uses Surfacewave
OTH radar arrays to track aircraft and ships at long ranges from the Chinese
mainland.37 These capabilities are being augmented with other infrared, pulsedDoppler radar, phased-array radar, and passive radar detection technologies.38
The PLA uses passive undersea sensors to detect and track submarines operating
within Chinese littoral waters.39 The PLA’s land-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are augmented by PLAAF airborne warning and control system aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and ISR satellites.40
Second, the PLA has invested in survivable, land-based C3 systems designed
specifically to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy to retain basic
C3 functions over all PLA branches, even while under heavy attack. 41 PLA
C3 systems include underground fiber-optic cables; microwave relays; and
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TABLE 1
TYPES OF HARD TARGETS
Type
Hardened structure
(HS)

Definition
Aboveground HS: aboveground facilities or structures that are protected from kinetic and air-blast weapons effects because of their aerodynamic shape that deflects
blast waves—typically covered with earth and reinforced concretea
Shallow-underground HS: underground facilities or structures up to twenty meters
below the earth’s surface
Deep-underground HS: underground facilities or structures twenty or more meters
below the earth’s surface

Hard and deeply buried target
(HDBT)

Underground facilities one to seven hundred meters below the earth’s surface that
protect a country’s national command structure, critical activities, equipment,
personnel, or strategic military response options from nuclear weapons effects

Note:
a. National Research Council of the National Academies, Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons (Washington, DC: National Academies
Press, 2005), p. 14.

long-range, high-frequency radio technologies augmented by civilian communication channels.42
Third, the PLA has invested heavily in aboveground hardened structures
(HSs), shallow-underground HSs, deep-underground HSs, and strategic hard
and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) (see table 1). The purpose of these hardened
facilities is to enable the Chinese national command hierarchy, strategic assets,
and other key capabilities such as logistics to survive and remain operational,
even after a nuclear strike.43 The PLA has invested in strategic HDBTs to protect
the Chinese national command hierarchy in the event of an armed conflict.44
These HDBTs are connected to the outside world through extensive land-based
communications networks that enable the Chinese national command hierarchy
to remain in command of its sea, air, and land forces.45
The PLARF has an extensive network of hardened tunnels and facilities buried
deep underground and within mountains that can protect land-based strategic
assets such as road-mobile ballistic missiles, launchers, and PLARF personnel.46
Some reports indicate that the PLARF has 4,856 kilometers of such hardened
and deeply buried tunnels, some as deep as one thousand meters. The tunnels
form part of an extensive underground web of HDBT facilities and are serviced
by internal transport or train networks that move ordnance and launchers. These
facilities have surface-level entrances where the missile transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) can access surface-level launchpads.47
The PLAAF has hardened its air bases to protect its combat aircraft.48 PLAAF
air bases feature hardened aboveground HSs, such as aircraft hangars, with reinforced concrete protection estimated to be between 0.9 and 1.2 meters thick.
PLAAF air bases also feature underground HSs that function as hangars and
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storage facilities. Some of the PLAAF underground HSs are very large, provided
with multiple entrances, constructed inside mountains, and covered by anywhere
from twenty to sixty meters of concrete, dirt, and rock. Other passive measures
include revetments between parked aircraft and long paved areas that can be
used as emergency runways, as well as multiple points of access for runways.
These measures usually are augmented by advanced camouflage and advanced
air-defense systems.49
The PLAN also has constructed extensive underground HSs to protect its
submarine forces, accessed by sea-level tunnels in coastal areas. These facilities
offer PLA submarines the ability to deploy covertly and return without being visible to U.S. overhead surveillance capabilities.50 The PLAN naval base on Hainan
Island currently is equipped with hardened underground submarine facilities of
this nature.51 The PLAN also plans to construct a significantly larger and more
modern underground HS naval base sufficient to protect and house its nuclearpowered, ballistic-missile submarines.52
PLA CONVENTIONAL FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY
The PLA’s most significant counterintervention capability is its inventory of longrange conventional ballistic missiles, particularly given that the U.S. military does
not field an equivalent capability. PLA DF-21 MRBMs and ASBMs have ranges
around 1,500 km; PLA DF-26 IRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around three
thousand kilometers. It is also important to note that the PLA currently possesses
between two and three hundred MRBMs and likely will expand this inventory
with the introduction of the DF-26. The long range and growing inventory of
PLA conventional ballistic missiles would force relatively slow U.S. maritime assets to run a lethal gauntlet of PLA ASBMs while they are unable to return fire
and degrade the threat.53
The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that the PLA’s conventional
ballistic missiles use maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs) equipped with
infrared and radar seekers, enabling PLA ballistic missiles to acquire fixed or
moving targets during the terminal phase of flight. PLA MARVs are difficult
opponents because of their significant agility and high reentry speeds (around
Mach 12), as well as electronic warfare, decoy, chaff, and flare countermeasures.54
PLA conventional ballistic missiles have the potential to carry submunitions
warheads capable of inflicting wide-area destruction, which increases their threat
profile.55 Against fixed land targets, however, MARV penetrator warheads provide the capability to inflict serious damage to hardened targets.56 MARV penetrator warheads could sink USN ships outright, whereas submunitions warheads
could inflict a range of damage to them.57 For instance, aircraft carrier flight
decks, arresting gear, catapults, and landing signal systems could be damaged,
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thereby preventing flight operations.58 Similarly, USN cruisers and destroyers
could suffer damage to phased-array radar panels and Mk 41 vertical launching system (VLS) missile batteries. Damage of either type likely would result in
a “mission kill,” rendering the damaged ship unfit to fight. The predicted high
lethality and significant impact of PLA conventional ballistic missiles pose a serious challenge to the survivability of U.S. forces operating in the western Pacific
and thus to U.S. force-projection capabilities.
The PLA’s unmatched conventional ballistic-missile arsenal and rapidly evolving military capabilities, combined with a perception of relative invulnerability to
U.S. retaliatory strikes, could lure Chinese leaders into a belief that a conventional
first strike might deliver temporary PLA regional superiority, during which time
Chinese leaders could settle regional disputes coercively, on their terms.59 A
perception of PLA superiority in a conventional theater strike is not helped by
the U.S. military’s apparent lack of a strategy outlining a credible response to an
overwhelming PLA conventional first strike.60 Without clear U.S. deterrence, the
risk of miscalculation only will increase—particularly as the PLA’s confidence in
its own capabilities grows in future decades.61
TOWARD A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
The Cold War concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD) maintained relative stability between the United States and the Soviet Union.62 Underpinning
MAD was the knowledge that both sides possessed credible nuclear secondstrike capabilities—the ability to absorb a nuclear first strike and still retain
sufficient operable capability to respond with unacceptable devastation.63 This
understanding provided a relative degree of stability, since both sides clearly
understood their mutual vulnerability and that any preemptive nuclear first
strike would receive a response in kind.64 Using Cold War deterrence theory as
an underlying basis, this article advocates that the U.S. military should consider
introducing a conventional access strategy, designed specifically to balance the
PLA’s counterintervention strategy. The purpose would be to provide the U.S.
military with an improved capacity to deter a PLA conventional first strike, and,
if necessary, degrade PLA capabilities with long-range conventional strike forces,
to facilitate access for follow-on U.S. forces.
Strategically, a U.S. conventional access strategy would provide Chinese leaders with a clearer understanding of how the U.S. military can impose costs on
China, even in the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike. Operationally, it
would increase the permissiveness of the western Pacific for forward-deployed
and follow-on U.S. forces. The Department of Defense’s Joint Operational Access
Concept (JOAC) states that “in-range combat forces at the beginning of a crisis
can facilitate operational access” for other forces in antiaccess/area-denial (A2/
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AD) environments.65 The primary operational objective of a U.S. conventional
access strategy would be to degrade the effectiveness of the PLA’s conventional
strike capability, as opposed to seeking its complete eradication, so as to facilitate
access for U.S. forces entering the western Pacific. The JOAC states that the U.S.
military must be able to strike deep into enemy A2/AD capability networks to
“disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive system” and that preferred targets
include “logistics and command and control nodes, long range firing units and
strategic and operational reserves.”66 The secondary operational objective would
be to deny the PLA unfettered use of communications, logistics, and transport
capabilities such as airfields, airports, ports, rail networks, land-based C4ISR
networks, and fuel or ordnance stocks. By degrading PLA strike and war-fighting
capabilities, forward-deployed U.S. forces could increase the permissiveness of
the western Pacific for U.S. forces arriving in theater.
A U.S. conventional access strategy would require four distinct capabilities.
A theater-wide passive-defense capability would enhance the ability of forwarddeployed U.S. forces to survive initial PLA conventional strikes. A conventional
theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading PLA
capabilities immediately at the outset of a conflict, without access to in-flight
refueling tankers or usable runways. A theater-recovery capability would restore
basic runway access in the aftermath of PLA conventional strikes. A rapidresponse capability would allow long-range USAF bombers and fighter escorts to
deploy rapidly to U.S. bases in the western Pacific, capitalizing on freshly repaired
runways as well as pre-positioned stocks of aviation fuel and conventional earthpenetrating ordnance.
Theater-Wide Passive-Defense Capability
The PLA aims to be capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hypersonic boost-glide (HBG) missiles by 2020 and capable of striking at intercontinental distances with hypersonic aircraft by 2025.67 The 2013 Air-Sea Battle Concept (ASBC) states that in a future armed conflict, U.S. bases could be attacked
and that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a sanctuary.”68 Both factors
indicate that the United States should consider hardening its infrastructure in the
western Pacific and at key locations across Hawaii and the continental United
States, so as to deny any adversary a relatively easy way to degrade or deny U.S.
force-projection capabilities.
Within this context, a theater-wide passive-defense capability would require
improvements in the hardening of critical fixed sites to withstand kinetic threats,
and the hardening of critical C4ISR systems to resist nonkinetic strikes. Hardening of critical fixed sites might include building aboveground HS submarine
pens, aboveground HS aircraft shelters, and deep-underground HS fuel- and

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 43

49

2/25/19 10:40 AM

44

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

ordnance-storage facilities, as well as deep-underground HS or HDBT shelters
for theater-strike missiles, personnel, and base-repair kits. A 2007 study from
the RAND Corporation notes that major U.S. forward bases should protect their
in-theater fuel stocks in underground HSs and that stores should be sufficient
to enable several weeks of high-intensity air operations.69 Hardening of critical
C4ISR systems might include the protection of base computer networks and
electronic infrastructure from the effects of cyber, electromagnetic pulse (EMP),
and high-powered microwave (HPM) weapon effects. At the bare minimum,
such improvements in hardened infrastructure should be rolled out across all
U.S. bases in the western Pacific. It also might be desirable for the U.S. military to
consider selectively rolling out similar hardened infrastructure packages across
key Hawaiian and mainland installations, such as Pearl Harbor and San Diego.
Conventional Theater-Strike Capability
A conventional theater-strike capability would allow forward-deployed U.S.
forces to respond within minutes or hours of a PLA conventional first strike. A
U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would enable the U.S. military to begin
degrading PLA strike and C4ISR capabilities at the outset of a conflict, even if
U.S. bases, air assets, and naval assets were destroyed or otherwise unavailable.
A conventional theater-strike capability should consist of theater-strike missiles,
hypersonic undersea strike missiles, ASAT weapons, cyberstrike weapons, and
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs). As mentioned earlier, the purpose of
such strikes would not be to destroy these capabilities outright but to degrade
PLA strike and war-fighting capabilities, thereby achieving the JOAC objective
of helping ensure access for follow-on U.S. forces attempting to enter the theater
of operations.70
Theater-Strike Missiles. Theater-strike missiles would enable forward-deployed
U.S. forces to execute conventional strikes against heavily defended targets on the
Chinese mainland, without support from in-flight refueling tankers or in-theater
runway access. Conventional missile strikes could take place in immediate response to, or in the aftermath of, a PLA conventional first strike. For U.S. bases
to retain a credible conventional theater-strike capability, theater-strike missiles
would have to be stored in hardened facilities.
One option might be road-mobile IRBMs with conventional warheads and
a range of 5,500 km, sufficient to strike at Haixi City in Qinghai Province from
Guam or the Cocos Islands. Another option might be an HBG missile with intercontinental or intermediate range, consisting of a rocket booster stack and
hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).71 After the boost phase, the HGV would exhibit
a limited ballistic trajectory before sharply reentering the atmosphere, followed
by the HGV’s transition into a high-altitude glide phase of flight to the intended
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target.72 The United States is developing an HGV that can be deployed from a
modified USAF intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) rocket booster.73 Either
option could carry a variety of conventional warheads, including penetrators for
hardened targets, submunitions for wide-area destruction, and EMP or HPM
warheads to cripple electronic infrastructure.
HGVs could exploit hypersonic terminal speeds and combine with existing conventional penetrator technology to threaten PLA HSs. The GBU-39 is
a small-diameter bomb that weighs 130 kilograms (kg) and can penetrate over
four meters of reinforced concrete.74 The GBU-28 is a 2,268 kg bomb capable of
penetrating over thirty meters of earth or over six meters of reinforced concrete.75
The GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator (MOP) weighs 13,600 kg and is capable of penetrating over sixty meters of five-thousand-pounds-per-square-inch
reinforced concrete.76 One option is for theater-strike missile HGVs to deploy
existing GBU-39 ordnance, as GBU-28 and GBU-57 ordnance is too large and
heavy. The other option is for the United States to develop a new penetrator that
combines hypersonic speeds with the GBU-57’s penetration technology, which
would be sufficient to threaten all grades of HSs up to one hundred meters below the earth’s surface. Using GBU-39 technology could provide HBG theaterstrike missiles with the ability to neutralize aboveground HSs, such as ordnance
magazines and hardened aircraft shelters, and also to inflict heavy damage to
paved areas necessary for flight operations. Using the GBU-28 technology could
provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize all grades of shallowunderground HSs and some grades of deep-underground HSs. Using the GBU57 technology could provide theater-strike missiles with the ability to neutralize
most grades of deep-underground HSs.
HBG theater-strike missiles ideally should be capable of being launched from
road-mobile TELs. Road-mobile HBG strike missiles would enable forwarddeployed U.S. bases, such as Guam, to protect ordnance and launchers from
PLA conventional strikes in HDBT facilities. After a PLA conventional strike,
the TELs could be driven out of their hardened facilities and launched. Roadmobile weapons also would increase the tactical survivability of deployed TELs,
as they would be better dispersed and camouflaged compared with fixed missile
batteries.
HBG theater-strike missiles should be used to target the weakest points of PLA
hardened facilities and infrastructure. Typically, these will be a hardened facility’s
communication links to the outside world and the surface-level entrances. The
reason for attacking entrances is that every underground hardened facility, by its
very nature, will have some surface-level access point. This is a vulnerability that
can be exploited by U.S. HBG theater-strike missiles to collapse the entrances to
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PLA hardened facilities, sealing all personnel and ordnance inside, or at the very
least impeding the movement of PLA assets in and out of the facility. In the case
of PLA HSs inside mountains, surface-level entrances would be vulnerable to
landslides, which could be triggered by U.S. HBG warhead detonations higher
up the mountain. However, the main problem with targeting the entrances of
PLA HSs is that they are likely to be camouflaged and “virtually undetectable by
current imagery assets.”77 Locating a significant portion of PLA hardened facility
entrances would require years of dedicated intelligence gathering by the entire
U.S. Intelligence Community, using its wide array of collection techniques.
Hypersonic Undersea Strike Missiles. Hypersonic undersea strike missiles would
enable forward-deployed U.S. forces to strike at heavily defended but not hardened targets across the Chinese mainland. Prime targets would include but not be
limited to Chinese civilian airports, military airstrips, military and civilian ports,
electrical power grids, communications nodes, and fuel depots. The purpose of
striking at these targets would be to deny the PLA unfettered use of these facilities, which otherwise could be exploited to enhance PLA operations.
Until the project’s apparent termination, the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (known as DARPA) was developing the Arclight HBG weapon,
designed around the RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 booster stack and designed to
achieve full compatibility with strike-length Mk 41 VLS naval batteries. Arclight
was built to deliver an HGV payload with a total mass of 45–90 kg out to a range
of 3,700 km in less than thirty minutes.78 Although budget reports suggest that
the Arclight program has been terminated, it does provide insight into the types
of capabilities that might be feasible.
Any future hypersonic undersea strike missile would need to be fully compatible with the U.S. Navy’s undersea wide-diameter payload tubes, which measure
2.2 meters in diameter and currently store seven UGM-109E Tomahawk landattack missiles.79 Ideally, a future hypersonic undersea strike missile also would
be fully compatible with strike-length Mk 41 VLS cells. Full compatibility with
both launching systems would enable the same missile design to be supported by
Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), Virginia-class nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs), and Ohio-class nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarines.
Undersea towed payload modules (TPMs) are another launch option for future USN undersea strike weapons. TPMs essentially are containers fitted with
vertically launched undersea ordnance that would be submerged and towed by
submarines into theater.80 TPMs are the most attractive option for several reasons. First, TPMs lack the expensive crew life support, hotel loads, fuel storage,
and propulsion systems of surface combatants and submarines, and they can be
acquired in large numbers. Second, TPMs could be pre-positioned in littoral
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waters near Guam years in advance of any conflict. Third, targeting data could
be uploaded by the towing submarine into a TPM computer system prior to
launch. An onboard TPM computer system would enable the TPM to activate
on a time delay, giving the towing submarine time to escape the area before the
TPM launch cycle compromised its location. At the outbreak of hostilities, one or
more submarines could tow the pre-positioned TPMs to within striking distance
of the Chinese mainland.
Antisatellite Strike and Cyberstrike Weapons. ASAT strike weapons would enable the U.S. military to neutralize Chinese military and civilian satellite constellations rapidly.81 Similarly, cyberstrike capabilities would enable the U.S. military
to degrade the effectiveness of PLA C4ISR networks. These targets would be a
high priority for the United States since PLA counterintervention capabilities rely
on space-based assets to enhance OTH targeting of U.S. bases and moving ships
at sea.82 In theater, ASAT capabilities are launched from ground-based missile
launchers. Out of theater, ASAT capabilities enter by way of destroyer-launched
ordnance.
Autonomous Underwater Vehicles. Long-range AUVs with large conventional
warheads would enable forward-deployed U.S. forces to strike at Chinese port
infrastructure, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens accessed
by sea-level undersea tunnels. Notice that only the entrance to a PLA hardened
sea-level tunnel would need to be sealed or rendered impassable to generate a
mission-kill effect and trap any submarines inside the PLA undersea facility.
Boeing’s Echo Voyager unmanned undersea vehicle measures 2.6 by 2.6 by
15.5 meters, is fully autonomous, and has a range of around 12,038 km. It also
has a maximum diving depth of three thousand meters and seagoing endurance
of several months, is fitted with non-GPS navigation technologies, and is capable
of carrying very large payloads of up to eight tons, with a total internal space of
14.75 square meters. The Boeing Echo Voyager uses an inertial navigation system
(INS), Doppler velocity logs (DVLs), depth sensors, and various other technologies to navigate independent of GPS satellite navigation constellations. Given the
exceptional range, seagoing endurance, diving depth, GPS-independent navigation technologies, and large payload, Boeing’s Echo Voyager could be an ideal
baseline from which to build an AUV tailored specifically for neutralizing or
rendering inoperable Chinese ports, PLA naval bases, and PLA hardened submarine pens, particularly by attacking sea-level tunnel entrances. To ensure the survivability of AUVs from PLA conventional strikes, AUVs should be submerged
in littoral waters close to shore, or alternatively stored in hardened underground
facilities ashore.83
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The PLA has invested extensively in capabilities to deny U.S. forces access to
satellite-based C4ISR and GPS navigation systems, particularly given its perception that space-based satellite constellations are a major vulnerability.84 Consequently, a credible U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would need to be
capable of functioning in denied war-fighting environments. In practical terms,
this means that HBG theater-strike missiles, Arclight HBG weapons, ASAT
weapons, and AUVs must be capable of executing their respective roles without
access to last-minute intelligence from C4ISR, space-based communications
systems, and space-based navigation systems. Instead, all these proposed conventional theater-strike capabilities should rely on high-end autonomous navigation systems (ANSs). ANSs might include INSs fitted with advanced-inertialmeasurement-unit components, DVLs, and advanced computing systems.85
Because of the threat that PLA kinetic and nonkinetic strikes pose against
C4ISR capabilities, at the outset of a conflict forward-deployed U.S. forces may
not have access to late-minute intelligence.86 Furthermore, computer networks
containing critical information might be disabled or destroyed. As a contingency,
the United States could deliver hard-copy intelligence packets with targeting data
to forward-deployed forces. This would enable forward-deployed forces to target
at least China’s fixed land and coastal targets, even if C4ISR is unavailable.
Theater-Recovery Capability
A theater-recovery capability would enable the U.S. military to regain use of its
in-theater bases and space-based infrastructure after a PLA conventional first
strike. Central to this capability would be the ability to repair damage to bases by
relying only on resources forward deployed at each base, resources deployed by
assets that would not require runway access, or both. A theater-recovery capability would consist of hardened in-theater facilities, pre-positioned air-base-repair
kits and machinery, airdrop repair teams, airships, and microsatellite launches.
Hardened facilities would shield personnel, supplies, repair kits, and reserve
air- and missile-defense (AMD) systems from a PLA conventional first strike.
Ideally, hardened facilities would be buried deep underground. Airdrop repair
teams would enable the U.S. military to repair damaged runways at bases without requiring USAF C-5 and C-17 airlifters to land. The USAF maintains prime
base engineer emergency force (Prime BEEF) units that execute on-site repairs,
largely using equipment and stores located at each base. Prime BEEF units are
supplemented by USAF rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair
squadron engineer (RED HORSE) units, which specialize in repairing air bases
under combat conditions. RED HORSE units can be air-dropped into distant
locations, and they aim to be capable of operating without support for limited
durations.87
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If current heavy machinery is too heavy or bulky to be air-dropped and a
PLA conventional first strike were to render most on-base heavy repair equipment unusable, it would be more difficult for air-dropped RED HORSE teams to
repair major damage such as large-diameter craters. One solution might be for
the USAF to develop a suite of custom, lightweight, facility-repair machines that
could be air-dropped, along with RED HORSE units and supporting stores, into
theater from C-5 and C-17 airlifters.
Large-payload airships would bolster repair capabilities without use of runways. An extended-range variant of the Lockheed Martin P-791 hybrid airship
could fulfill such a role; the current version has a range of 2,592 km carrying a
payload of 21,000 kg.88 To reach Guam, an extended-range P-791 would need a
range of around 3,300 km to deploy nonstop from Darwin Royal Australian Air
Force (RAAF) air base, in northern Australia. Alternatively, an existing P-791
airship could island-hop from Wheeler Army Airfield on Oahu to Midway Atoll
(around 2,087 km), from Midway to Wake Atoll (around 1,900 km), and from
Wake Atoll to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam (around 2,400 km).
Microsatellite launches would enable the United States rapidly to supplement
or replace USAF navigation, communications, and intelligence satellites lost to
PLA ASAT strikes.89 The airborne launch assist space access (ALASA) vehicle,
as deployed from USAF fourth-generation aircraft, could fill this role, given its
ability to launch several microsatellites at short notice.90
Rapid-Response Capability
In the aftermath of a PLA conventional first strike, runways on Guam and other
U.S. islands in the western Pacific likely would be inoperable, at least until repaired by Prime BEEF or RED HORSE teams. After initial repairs were complete,
the United States could fly long-range stealth bombers into theater, from Hawaii
and the U.S. mainland, so as to execute long-range conventional strikes against
hardened targets across the Chinese mainland. The pre-positioning of GBU-57
ordnance in HDBTs on Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands would significantly enhance a USAF rapid-response capability, as the logistics burden would
be greatly alleviated.
USAF B-2 Spirit stealth bombers have an unrefueled combat radius of around
5,500 km.91 However, the USAF inventory contains only twenty B-2s, as the
acquisition program was reduced significantly from an original order of 132
aircraft.92 The USAF also is replacing its legacy B-1B and B-52H bomber fleets
with one hundred B-21 Raider long-range stealth bombers.93 However, the
B-21 Raider could have an unrefueled combat radius as short as 4,600 km—
significantly shorter than the B-1B at 6,900 km and the B-52H at 8,100 km.94
Assuming that the B-21 Raider has a combat radius of at least 5,500 km, both
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B-2s and B-21s would be capable of executing deep strikes across the Chinese
mainland without access to in-flight refueling—as deep as Haixi City from Guam
or the Cocos Islands. Both the B-2 and B-21 can deliver the enormous GBU-57
MOP, which measures eighty centimeters in diameter by 6.25 meters in length
and weighs 13,600 kg per bomb. The B-2 is capable of carrying two GBU-57
MOPs, one in each internal weapons bay.95
If a PLA conventional first strike denied use of runways on Guam and the Cocos Islands, USAF B-2s and B-21s could operate from the RAAF Learmonth air
base, in western Australia, outside the range of most PLA conventional strike capabilities.96 Assuming the B-21 Raider has an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500
km, USAF B-2s and B-21s operating from RAAF Learmonth could be refueled
from RAAF in-flight refueling tankers orbiting the Cocos Islands, followed by
strikes out to 5,500 km. The return journey would be the mirror opposite, with
in-flight refueling above the Cocos Islands before returning to RAAF Learmonth.
The advantage of this option is that it would depend only on in-flight refueling
tankers and RAAF air bases outside the range of most PLA conventional strike
capabilities, and thus would provide a robust contingency plan.97
However, a fleet of 120 long-range stealthy bombers (twenty B-2s and one
hundred B-21s) is unlikely to meet the U.S. military’s operational needs during a
China-U.S. conflict, for several reasons. First, the high number of targets across
the Chinese mainland, exacerbated by the significant distance from Guam, will
reduce drastically the fleet-wide sortie rate—the number of targets that a bomber
can strike per twenty-four-hour period.98 Second, only a fraction of the entire
fleet will be available for combat operations, as the rest will be needed for training, maintenance, and reserve functions.99 For instance, a combat-coded force of
160 B-21 Raiders would require an overall fleet of two hundred aircraft.100 Third,
the B-2s and B-21s would play a disproportionate role in the air war portion of
any China-U.S. conflict.101 This is because B-2s and B-21s would be the only
aircraft in the USAF inventory with sufficient stealth to penetrate advanced PLA
air defenses; sufficient unrefueled range to strike at the Chinese mainland from
Guam, without depending on in-flight refueling tankers; and sufficient payload
to carry the GBU-57 MOP for neutralizing PLA HSs. In 2015, the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies found that the USAF might require a total fleet of two
hundred stealthy long-range bombers, particularly given reduced sortie rates,
combat coding, payloads, and the risk of force attrition.102
INVENTORY ESTIMATES
During any armed conflict nothing ever works perfectly or goes entirely according to plan. As Clausewitz once stated, this concept of “friction” means that the
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outcome of military operations is inherently uncertain and that any element of a
plan can fail.103 In the cases of conventional theater-strike, theater-recovery, and
rapid-response operations, the United States would need to consider how many
stores of various types are sufficient to respond to operational uncertainties that
might arise. For instance, conventional theater-strike capabilities could exhaust
in-theater ordnance stores, theater-recovery capabilities could run out of baserepair kits, and a rapid-response capability could run out of in-theater groundpenetrating ordnance.
To insulate against operational uncertainties, U.S. forward bases would need
large pre-positioned inventories of theater-strike missiles sufficient for at least
two strikes per PLA target. This estimate of two strikes per PLA target is based
on the RAND Corporation’s assessment that two weapons per hard target would
be needed to generate a kill probability of greater than 90 percent.104 In addition, the U.S. military would need to retain a strategic reserve of ordnance, in
the event that in-theater stores were exhausted, as well as for use in other global
contingencies.
For the theater-recovery capability, U.S. forward bases likely would need very
large inventories of base-repair kits and ALASA ordnance with microsatellite
payloads pre-positioned and sufficient to execute two full base repairs or ALASA
salvos, plus strategic reserves at mainland facilities for an additional four full base
repairs and four ALASA salvos. These reserves might be necessary if the PLA
executes persistent strikes and ASAT attacks throughout a protracted conflict.105
A rapid-response capability might need very large inventories of prepositioned GBU-57 MOP ordnance and aviation fuel, in shallow-underground
HS facilities at U.S. forward bases. This might require sufficient ordnance for two
strikes per PLA target, plus a strategic reserve for further combat sorties or use
in other global contingencies.
ADVANTAGES OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would provide six major advantages. The first is
that it would deny the PLA a conventional first-strike capability against U.S. bases
and forward-deployed forces, through passive-defense measures, a conventional
theater-strike capability, a theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability. With passive hardening of critical military infrastructure, a greater portion
of U.S. forces might survive the initial waves of PLA conventional strikes. Surviving in-theater forces could then execute land-based, undersea, ASAT, and AUV
strikes against a variety of PLA targets, across the Chinese mainland and in orbit.
This would enable the U.S. military to begin degrading the PLA’s capabilities at
the outset of a conflict, enabling theater-recovery capabilities to operate more
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effectively. With airfields repaired, B-21 and B-2 stealth bombers could then be
flown into theater to commence strikes against PLA targets across the Chinese
mainland.
The second advantage is that degrading PLA conventional strike capabilities
at the outset of a conflict would increase the permissiveness of the entire theater
for other force-projection assets. Undermining the PLA’s capability to execute
ASBM and ASCM strikes against USN task forces and logistics ships would provide USN assets with greater freedom of action and enhanced survivability. With
intense and persistent conventional strikes, PLA capabilities might be degraded
sufficiently to enable USN aircraft carriers eventually to operate with relative
impunity close to the Chinese coastline, significantly increasing the sorties generated by carrier air wings.
The third advantage is that it would buy time for U.S. force-projection capabilities to be mobilized, marshaled, and deployed to the western Pacific. With
significant air and naval assets deployed globally, the military would require time
to redeploy and logistically support a significant force in theater. For example, a
1993 General Accounting Office report stated that with a total projected force of
twelve USN aircraft carriers, six carriers could deploy with thirty days’ notice and
nine carriers with sixty days’ notice.106 Equivalent times likely would be required
to deploy or redeploy the full range of U.S. air, land, and sea assets necessary to
execute theater-wide, joint-service campaigns in the Pacific.
The fourth advantage is that it would focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities needed to enhance the survivability and operational effectiveness of traditional force-projection assets: tactical aircraft, in-flight refueling
tankers, aircraft carriers, surface combatants, logistics ships, and sealift ships.
For instance, prioritizing long-range strike capabilities not dependent on U.S.
bases or in-flight refueling would in turn drive the military to prioritize conventional theater-strike missiles, undersea-launched hypersonic missiles, ASAT and
cyberstrike weapons, and AUVs, combined with a large fleet of B-21s with range
similar to the B-2 Spirit.
The fifth advantage is that a credible U.S. conventional theater-strike capability would force the PLA to reevaluate its allocation of resources to offensive versus
defensive systems. The PLA might be driven to divert sizable defense funding to
harden its vulnerabilities further across the vast Chinese mainland and improve
costly AMD systems. This would reduce the funding available for the PLA to
pursue offensive war-fighting systems.
The sixth advantage is that a U.S. capacity to execute a conventional theater
strike from the Cocos Islands would complicate significantly the PLA’s operations to defend the Chinese mainland. During a South China Sea or East China
Sea crisis, the PLA could deploy most of its AMD systems along China’s east and
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southeast coastlines. However, if the Australian government allowed the U.S.
military to operate conventional B-21s or HBG theater-strike missiles from the
Cocos Islands, the PLA would have to defend a significantly greater area. For
instance, PLA AMD units would have to be more thinly dispersed along China’s
vast coastline as well as along the land borders of its Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces. Consequently, U.S. strike bombers and theater-strike missiles
would have an improved capability to penetrate PLA AMD networks and neutralize the intended targets.
LIMITATIONS OF A U.S. CONVENTIONAL ACCESS STRATEGY
A conventional access strategy would incur seven major limitations.
Homeland Sanctuary
The first limitation is the vexing issue of homeland sanctuary: the concept that
nuclear powers refrain from attacking the homelands of other nuclear powers, to
avoid triggering a nuclear response. The argument is that in a China-U.S. conflict
each side would initially avoid strikes against the other’s homeland, even with
conventional ordnance, to minimize the risk of nuclear escalation.107 It has been
pointed out that this asymmetry could allow China to strike at U.S. territories in
the western Pacific, such as Guam and the Northern Marianas, without retaliatory U.S. strikes on the PLARF and Chinese mainland—at least initially.
Four problems arise out of this argument. First, forward-deployed U.S. forces
at overseas territories such as Guam and the Northern Marianas are likely to be
heavily inundated by barrages of PLA ordnance in the initial phase of any ChinaU.S. conflict. Such PLA strikes are likely to inflict very heavy losses in terms of
personnel and combat assets and other matériel.108 In such a scenario, the United
States might inadvertently honor homeland sanctuary as a direct result of successful PLA strikes degrading U.S. in-theater capabilities. However, high losses
also would trigger significant pressure from Congress, cabinet secretaries, senior
officials, and the general public for the president to authorize robust conventional
strikes against targets across the Chinese mainland.
Second, even if the United States suffered very heavy initial losses in personnel and matériel, it eventually would execute high-intensity conventional strikes
across the Chinese mainland, if U.S. force-projection assets were able to deploy into
theater. For instance, the JOAC, which contains the ASBC and Gaining and Maintaining Access Concept (GMAC), aims to execute high-intensity, war-fighting
operations and strikes against the homelands of A2/AD adversaries.109 Notice
also that the GMAC explicitly states that U.S. Army and Marine Corps special
forces might be inserted covertly into an adversary’s homeland to “provide human contact to complement other intelligence.”110
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Third, the U.S. Department of Defense openly acknowledges that the military
must be ready to execute joint military operations against A2/AD adversaries
“at the outset of a contingency to avoid delays for buildups.”111 The JOAC states
that “joint forces will attempt to penetrate into the depth of an enemy’s antiaccess/area-denial defenses . . . to disrupt the integrity of the enemy defensive
system.”112 The ASBC states that deep strikes against A2/AD adversaries have the
objective of “disrupting, destroying or defeating an adversary’s A2/AD capabilities.” The ASBC also states that “even the US homeland cannot be considered a
sanctuary.”113 The deep-strike objectives of Pentagon operating concepts and the
notion of covert special forces teams operating across the Chinese mainland,
combined with the stated need to be ready at the outset of a conflict and open
acknowledgment that the U.S. homeland could be targeted, strongly suggest that
the U.S. military does not plan on granting the PLA homeland sanctuary during
a China-U.S. conflict.
Fourth, the United States, owing to its geographic distance from the western
Pacific, could be seen by global public opinion as a largely unnecessary target.
This is in stark contrast to the Chinese homeland, which out of necessity would
be seen as a valid target for conventional U.S. strikes, since the vast majority of
PLA conventional-strike capabilities are land-based ballistic missiles and longrange bombers. Consequently, if the PLA executed conventional strikes against
the U.S. mainland, particularly in a conflict in which China was viewed globally
as the aggressor, then global public opinion could strengthen the scale of coalition forces levied against the PLA. This would be true particularly in the case of
U.S. allies and security partners that otherwise might opt out of direct participation in a China-U.S. conflict. As the RAND Corporation has noted, in a short
conflict third parties would make little difference, but in a more protracted conflict between China and the United States the implications could be significant.114
Despite these counterarguments, the Chinese government still might believe
that the PLA could strike at U.S. forces in the western Pacific with minimal risk
of conventional strikes against the Chinese mainland, given an asymmetry in
homeland sanctuary.
Treaty Limitations on Aircraft
The second limitation is that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New
START) severely handicaps the acquisition of B-21 Raider long-range strike
bombers, since the aircraft will be capable of delivering both conventional and
nuclear ordnance.115 New START requires U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals not
to exceed 1,500 nuclear warheads and eight hundred nuclear delivery vehicles,
with seven hundred deployed and one hundred not deployed.116 Under New
START, nuclear delivery vehicles are defined as ICBMs, submarine-launched
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ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.117 A nuclear bomber is defined by New
START as an aircraft that has a maximum one-way range exceeding eight thousand kilometers and that could carry nuclear weapons.118 The problem is that a
B-21 Raider with an unrefueled combat radius of 5,500 km, as needed to strike
deep into the Chinese mainland from Guam, would give the aircraft a total range
of around eleven thousand kilometers. Given that the B-21 will be capable of
delivering both nuclear and conventional ordnance, it will be counted under
New START. Consequently, the challenge for the USAF will be finding a way to
increase the size of its combat-coded conventional long-range stealth bomber
force without violating New START.
One solution would be to produce a nonnuclear-capable variant of the B-21,
since nonnuclear variants would not count. According to the treaty, a nuclear
bomber is no longer counted once it has been permanently modified to be incapable of delivering nuclear ordnance and is visibly distinguishable from nuclearcapable variants.119 Modifications include ensuring that all mechanisms of the
internal weapon bays are “incapable of employing nuclear armaments.”120 Other
modifications would need to be made to the external design of a conventional
B-21 variant to render it visibly different from the nuclear variant.121 With a
conventional-only B-21 variant, the United States theoretically could produce as
many conventional B-21s as it requires without breaching New START. Another
solution might be to reduce modestly the USAF’s inventory of nuclear-armed
ICBMs, from four hundred under New START to three hundred.122 This would
allow the USAF to order a total of two hundred B-21 Raiders and still comply
with New START. Ultimately, either solution would increase significantly the
number of combat-coded B-21s, greatly enhancing the capacity of the USAF to
execute long-range strikes across the Chinese mainland from Guam. Moreover,
increasing the B-21 Raider production order to two hundred or more units would
drive down acquisition costs by distributing fixed research, development, and
other costs over a larger production run.
Treaty Limitations on Weapons
The third limitation is that the acquisition of conventional theater-strike HBG
weapons could breach New START, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty, or both. Under New START, an ICBM is defined as a nuclearcapable system that travels for most of its flight path in a ballistic trajectory, with
a range exceeding 5,500 km.123 The INF Treaty requires that U.S. and Russian
militaries dismantle all ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km.
The INF Treaty defines a ballistic missile as a weapon that follows a ballistic trajectory for the majority of its flight path.124
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However, HBG weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory for the majority of
their flight path and thus would not be subject to limitations under New START
or the INF Treaty.125 Consequently, the U.S. military could develop an HBG
weapon with a range of 5,500 km or greater, yet avoid breaching either treaty.
First-Strike Risk
The fourth limitation is that launching one or more HBG weapons could be misconstrued by the PLA, Russia, or both as a U.S. nuclear first strike. This risk has
been discussed since the conceptualization of hypersonic boost-glide systems,
because they depend on long-range rocket boosters similar to those that nucleararmed ballistic missiles use.
However, the nonballistic flight path of hypersonic boost-glide weapons, plus
a brand-new rocket booster design, would make a U.S. hypersonic boost-glide
system appear distinct on Chinese and Russian nuclear early-warning systems.126
If the United States were able to assure China and Russia that its hypersonic
boost-glide systems were used exclusively for conventional payloads, this would
further reduce the likelihood of HBG-weapon use being misinterpreted as a
nuclear first strike.
Potential Nuclear Aggression
The fifth limitation is that striking at the PLA’s conventional ballistic-missile
manufacturing and maintenance facilities, storage facilities, and launchers could
be misconstrued as an attempt by the United States to degrade the PLA’s nuclear
deterrent.127 This risk would arise because U.S. theater commanders would be
unable to distinguish readily between nuclear and conventional versions of the
PLA’s ballistic-missile arsenal, particularly if U.S. C4ISR systems were degraded
by PLA ASAT and cyber strikes.
This problem could be solved through a U.S.-China bilateral agreement for the
PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles from its conventional arsenal
and a mutual commitment to exclude all nuclear deterrents from targeting. The
net result would be a reduced risk of U.S. conventional strikes inadvertently targeting PLA nuclear capabilities.
Hardened Structures
The sixth limitation is that a U.S. conventional access strategy might not overcome the PLA’s extensive investments in hardened structures. This is a very
real possibility. To paraphrase Moltke, no plan, however good, survives contact
with the enemy.128 However, the measures proposed under a U.S. conventional
access strategy would provide a reasonable ability to neutralize PLA hardened
facilities, such as underground tunnels and sea-level submarine pens. This conventional access strategy prioritizes advanced penetrator ordnance delivered by
HBG theater-strike missiles and B-2s and B-21s, as well as AUVs armed with
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large conventional warheads for sea-level tunnels and submarine pens. While
the penetration capabilities of all ordnance might not be able to overcome PLA
HDBTs, such as tunnels buried deep within mountains, what this ordnance could
do is target the most vulnerable points of these structures. For instance, these
weapons could target external communications links and surface-level entrances.
By targeting surface-level entrances of PLA hardened facilities, U.S. penetrator
ordnance could be sufficient to seal the structures from the outside world, or at
the very least impede the movement of traffic in and out of the facilities. The advantage of targeting surface-level entrances is that every underground hardened
structure must be accessible from the surface, making them a vulnerability of all
PLA HSs and HDBTs that can be exploited.
Survivable and Capable Force-Projection Capability
A seventh limitation is that the United States might consider fielding a highly
survivable and capable force-projection capability designed to achieve the same
objective as the proposed conventional access strategy, just with less risk of escalation. While it is true that the United States could field a highly capable and
survivable force-projection capability, funding levels will determine whether it
will do so.
To field a force structure capable of defeating A2/AD adversaries, the U.S.
military would need to invest in many of the nine following critical capabilities:
arsenal ships; additional future guided-missile frigates (FFG-Xs); additional
Virginia-class SSNs; a large number of AUVs; a new, sixth-generation, long-range,
carrier-based strike aircraft; a new, sixth-generation, long-range, land-based
air-superiority fighter; additional B-21 Raiders; a new, stealthy C3 intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) aircraft; and a new, stealthy, in-flight
refueling tanker (see table 2). The numerous new research, development, and
acquisition programs needed would cost hundreds of billions of dollars, even
without accounting for significant additional orders of DDGs, FFG-Xs, SSNs,
and B-21s.
In short, the United States can field a highly survivable and capable counterA2/AD force—it is just a question of the funding and political willingness to do
so. Conversely, a U.S. conventional access strategy aims to achieve similar powerprojection objectives with less of a burden to the U.S. taxpayer, or fewer seismic
departures from the planned military force structure, or both.
The PLA’s counterintervention capabilities could be used to execute a conventional first strike against U.S. bases and forward-deployed forces west of Hawaii.
The Chinese leadership could be convinced that a decisive conventional first
strike, in conjunction with other PLA capabilities, would provide the PLA with
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TABLE 2
U.S. COUNTER-A2/AD FORCE-PROJECTION CAPABILITIES
Capability

Description

Arsenal ships

The U.S. Navy could consider a new class of large-displacement surface
ship, armed with 288–512 strike-length Mk 41 vertical launching system
cells and a larger, more capable ballistic missile–defense radar than the
AN/SPY-6.

Additional FFG-Xs

The U.S. Navy could consider expanding its order of FFG-Xs to serve
as capable surface combatant escorts for convoys of fleet oilers and drycargo and resupply ships, as would be needed to sustain high-intensity
combat operations in the western Pacific.

Additional nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs)

The U.S. Navy could consider accelerating the acquisition of Virginia
Payload Module–equipped SSNs, particularly given the projected
undersea strike shortfall when the fourth Ohio-class nuclear-powered
guided-missile submarine is retired in 2028.a

Autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUVs)

The U.S. Navy could consider acquiring AUVs armed with lightweight
torpedoes designed to deny maritime zones to PLA surface and subsurface forces.

Sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft

The U.S. Navy could consider truncating its order of F-35Cs in favor of
developing a sixth-generation carrier-based, long-range strike and airsuperiority aircraft.

Sixth-generation land-based aircraft

The U.S. Air Force could consider truncating its order of F-35As in favor
of developing a sixth-generation land-based, long-range air-superiority
aircraft with sufficient unrefueled range to escort B-21s during deeppenetration strikes.

Additional B-21s

The U.S. Air Force could consider retaining its planned fleet of one hundred nuclear-capable B-21s, plus a significant order of conventional-only
B-21s, perhaps on the order of three to four hundred aircraft.

Stealthy C3ISR aircraft

The U.S. Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, very highaltitude, long-range C3ISR aircraft, capable of replacing satellite communications networks during a conflict.

Stealthy in-flight refueling tanker

The U.S. Air Force could consider developing a stealthy, long-range
in-flight refueling tanker. This aircraft should be fitted with a tail ramp
to enable variants to support the covert insertion and sustainment of
special operations forces deep inside hostile territory.

Note:
a. Gunzinger and Dougherty, Outside-In, p. 85.

temporary regional superiority, giving China a rare window of opportunity to
settle regional disputes through coercion and on terms favorable to China. Any
such perception would undermine seriously the U.S. military’s ability to deter
Chinese aggression in the western Pacific.
The solution is not for the U.S. military to build a larger force structure but
rather for it to rearrange its thinking around a conventional access strategy. This
would require the U.S. military to acquire four critical capabilities: a theaterwide passive-defense capability, a conventional theater-strike capability, a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 58

64

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

GOLDSMITH

59

theater-recovery capability, and a rapid-response capability. Strategically, a conventional access strategy would accomplish several things: it would deny the PLA
a conventional first-strike capability, increase the permissiveness of the western
Pacific for follow-on U.S. forces, buy valuable time needed to mobilize and deploy
U.S. power-projection assets, focus the military’s attention on critical capabilities,
and impose resource constraints on the PLA. However, a conventional access
strategy would require the United States to think seriously about developing
and assigning a new rocket booster exclusively for use by hypersonic boost-glide
systems, as well as to assure Russia and China that U.S. HBG weapons would
carry only conventional payloads. Furthermore, the United States and China
would have to give serious consideration to entering into a bilateral agreement
for the PLA to separate clearly its nuclear ballistic missiles and for both parties to
exclude nuclear deterrents from targeting.
Even with its limitations, a U.S. conventional access strategy would return the
China-U.S. strategic deterrence calculus to a more stable equilibrium. One hopes
that this would deter Chinese leaders from seeing a conventional first strike as a
credible option. Pursuing a U.S. conventional access strategy would be a political
decision for the president and Congress. Such a decision would have to take into
account numerous dimensions, including military, political, fiscal, diplomatic,
and technological maturity considerations. Such discussions fall beyond the
scope of this article but provide ideal areas for future research.
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WARGAME BUSINESS
Wargames in Military and Corporate Settings
Shay Hershkovitz

W

argames have a centuries-long history in military circles, but the world
of business only adopted their fundamental principle in the late 1950s.1
In recent decades, both corporate and military thinkers have renewed their
interest in simulation games. Gamification (incorporating game elements into
more-serious activities) and “serious video games” have given wargaming a more
significant place in both business and military simulation discussions.
Wargames and business games do have some dissimilarities in their concepts
and methodologies, but they also have similar strategic environments, planning,
and decision-making processes. Therefore, the analysis of business game case
Shay Hershkovitz is the director of research at the studies can enrich the practice of wargames in the
XPRIZE Foundation. A graduate of Tel Aviv Unimilitary world, and vice versa.
versity, with an MA and PhD in political science
This article clarifies the similarities and the
from Bar-Ilan University, he did postdoctoral work
analogical relationship between the fields of war
in political science at the University of Maryland.
His extensive knowledge of intelligence, strategy,
and business, addressing three critical constructs
wargames, and geopolitical analysis was developed
(a) to illustrate the historical shift of wargames
through more than twenty years of experience as
both a practitioner and an academic. He was head from the military world to the corporate one; (b)
of the Regional Research Branch of the Directorate
to explore the shared challenges facing strategic
of Military Intelligence of the Israel Defense Forces
from 1994 to 2006. His scholarly interests range from planners, which wargames and business games
the theory and practice of national intelligence and can address and overcome; and (c) to present three
intelligence analysis to wargames, as well as Midbusiness games in a corporate setting. The article
dle Eastern geopolitics. He is coauthor of the book
AMAN Comes to Light: The Israeli Military Intel- then will describe the lessons identified from these
ligence in the ’50s (Maarachot, 2013).
three case studies and how these lessons can help
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF WARGAMES
The earliest wargames (e.g., chaturanga [chess, around AD 280–550] and wei-hai
[Go, around the third or fourth century BC]) were recreational, enabling simplified forms of operational thinking. In the wake of the French Revolution, as
well as the institutionalization and modernization of armies in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, militaries needed simulation-based thinking that
emulated the forms, factors, and functions of battles and campaigns, with critical
nodes and decision points. This led to sophisticated wargames that simulated
military forces, variable topography, and even maritime combat using tabletop
frameworks. The Prussians developed the most systematic methodology in the
Kriegsspiel (wargame), allowing them to test their battle plans as well as educate
their armed forces.2
At the close of the nineteenth century, wargames became a global phenomenon as the Russians, Japanese, French, British, and Americans assimilated this
practice into military planning.3 In 1905, German chief of the Great General
Staff Alfred von Schlieffen conducted a broad-ranging wargame that tested his
plan for a decisive attack of France by way of Belgium.4 After World War I, the
Germans conducted an investigation into their defeat, concluding that wargames
must include political processes to simulate better the strategic environment
in which armies function. On that basis, Germany began pioneering national
wargames in which civilians (e.g., politicians, diplomats, and journalists) participated for the first time. The Wargame Branch of the German military conducted
the first political-military (pol-mil) game in 1929.5
German chancellor Adolf Hitler ended Germany’s pol-mil games, seeing
them as an unnecessary intellectual exercise that failed to incorporate such variables as ideology and intuition. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht (unified armed
forces of Nazi Germany from 1935 to 1946) continued to refine Germany’s use of
wargames, including a simulation of the invasion of Poland, the occupation of the
Soviet Union, and an Allied invasion of Normandy. Almost all major countries
involved in World War II conducted strategic and operational wargames.6
Indeed, similarly to other military and technological development, World War
II was the catalyst behind wargames’ leap forward. As Joseph Wolfe has stated,
“Modern business gaming came about through the merging of developments in
wargames, operations research, computer technology, and education theory.”7
Richard D. Duke has argued that “World War II spawned at least five developments which have been woven into the fabric of gaming: computers, operations
research, the mathematical theory of games, simulation, and the early business
games.”8
After World War II and as the Cold War progressed, wargame development
accelerated in the United States, especially after the RAND Corporation began
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
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to “game out” crisis scenarios, particularly nuclear crises, with the participation
of senior U.S. officials.9 This heralded a return to the clear separation between
military wargames and political strategic games. Although not mutually exclusive, the former emphasized the use of military power and tended to focus on
operations, while the latter focused on grand strategy, in which military force was
one of many potential tools.
There are examples from the business sector as well. The former Soviet Union
conducted a hand-scored simulation dedicated to businesspeople in 1932, mainly
for the purpose of training managers of the Ligovo typewriter factory, and Japan
pioneered the field of simulation games dedicated to economic studies and business.10 The onset and subsequent disasters of World War II put an end to these
business gaming experiments in both countries.
Following World War II, interest quickly grew in the theory of organization,
along with some developments in game theory and its application to decisionmaking.11 Therefore, it is not surprising that in 1957 the American Management
Association developed and conducted one of the first business games—the Top
Management Decision Simulation—followed by the Top Management Decision
Game.12 In 1958, the Harvard Business Review published a paper assessing the
relevance of wargames to the business world.13 The journal’s prominence meant
that the practice received wide exposure, and business wargames gained additional momentum throughout the 1960s. Universities, research institutes, and
independent companies developed hundreds of games in fields such as management, business operations, finance, organizational theory, psychology, accounting, and marketing.
Through the mid-1980s, business games focused on strategic issues and
matters relating to competitive intelligence, including the behavior of business
players such as competitors and consumers, the evaluation of case studies and
strategic responses, and the robustness of initial work plans.14 This revolution
culminated in larger consulting firms, such as McKinsey & Company and Booz
Allen Hamilton, incorporating gaming methodologies into their customer
offerings.15
In recent decades, corporations have turned again to wargames, inspired by
the following factors:
• The benefits of games such as these are clear, even to industries long considered too important to be influenced by games. The increasing availability of
advanced computing power and information technologies also contributes to
the success of business games.
• Wargames are perceived as being grounded in the many approaches to strategic business planning popularized since the late 1990s.16
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• Wargames, and by extension business games, are well suited to making decisions in a strategic environment in which leaders must assess a wide range of
possible scenarios, under varied circumstances.17
Today, the two major types of business games are competitive scenarios, such as
the entry of a market competitor or the outbreak of a crisis, and structured frameworks to prepare for complex negotiations.18 Games also can be functional or
general. Functional games assess specific aspects of a value chain, while general
games take a strategic perspective relative to current and future markets.19 General games can be either closed games, using software and algorithms to estimate
market behaviors in response to participants’ actions, or open games, more similar to workshops, wherein the dynamics among participants reflect the possible
range of market conditions.20 The most popular format for business games is role
play, wherein participants compete with each other in teams.
In parallel, militaries around the world continue to use and improve their
wargaming techniques, further developing their extensive body of knowledge. In
2015, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work committed the Department of Defense (DoD) to overhauling its approach to wargaming to encourage innovation across the department; he imposed a five-year target of using
wargames to improve operational planning.21 In 2016, DoD requested more than
$55 million for wargaming for the next fiscal year, and more than $525 million
over the five-year Future Years Defense Program spending plan. As a senior CNA
(formerly the Center for Naval Analyses) wargame expert stated, “Wargaming
has gone through periods of popularity and disfavor, but I have never seen in the
past 40 years any situation like this with the senior leadership.”22
There is, therefore, no doubt that the public and private sectors can share each
other’s experience, methodology, and lessons learned to solve both their shared
and their unique problems.
THE MILITARY AND THE CORPORATION:
SHARED PROBLEMS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNERS
Examining the definitions of a wargame in each domain uncovers similarities and
ways to compare the business environment to that of the military. DoD defines a
wargame as a “simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving
two or more opposing forces, using rules, data, and procedures designed to depict
an actual or assumed real life situation.”23 Similarly, in his classic book, The Art
of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists, Peter P. Perla defines a
wargame as a “warfare model or simulation whose operation does not involve the
activities of actual military forces, and whose sequence of events affects and is, in
turn, affected by the decisions made by players representing the opposing sides.”24
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As for business games, the definitions reveal some similarities to military
games. Marco Greco and his coauthors state that a wargame in the business
world is “a game with a business environment that can lead to one or both of the
following results: the training of players in business skills (hard and/or soft) or
the evaluation of players’ performances—quantitatively and/or qualitatively.”25
According to Samuel Eilon, business simulation games have a threefold purpose:
to be used as training tools (in which players must face the consequences of their
decisions), to provide an overall view of corporate strategic functions, and to
simulate market trends to improve a player’s capacity to face changes.26
All these definitions describe an activity that simulates real-world conditions.
A wargame in this context is serious, “a game whose central purposes are not
recreational,” and represents “an exercise of voluntary control systems in which
there is an opposition between forces, confined by a procedure and rules in order
to produce a disequilibrial outcome.”27
Despite the differences between environments, military and business leaders
encounter similar challenges, particularly those related to analysis of an organizational setting, strategic planning, and implementation.28 Simulations and
games are an effective tool for overcoming these challenges, even partially, in
both worlds—and gaming experiences in either world produce relevant insights
for the other.
Two types of strategic planning challenges are those resulting from individual
and group cognitive limitations or failures, and those arising from organizational
structures, procedures, and behaviors.
Cognitive Limitations
Planning and decision-making require an accurate appreciation of one’s strategic
environment. The environment in which businesses (and militaries) operate,
however, features high complexity, rapid change, and imperfect information. The
cognitive capacity of individuals and groups to understand such informationintensive yet ambiguous situations is limited. Moreover, time pressure often does
not allow for both rapid assessment and effective decision-making.
Human perception is an active process in which individuals and groups build
their own versions of reality on the basis of assumptions and conceptions.29 The
“distorted perception” effect skews the process, however, so that decision makers
are not aware of the basic assumptions and conditions that shape their thinking.30
Cognitive biases often arise out of distorted perceptions and systematic
patterns or tendencies that cause errors in perception, memory, judgment,
or thought. All individuals employ rules of thumb that help them to process
information quickly and make decisions accordingly.31 These shortcuts allow people and organizations to cope in uncertain environments, but they
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nonetheless lead to systematic biases.32 Such individual and group biases often
are accompanied by chronic organizational problems, and the combination can
be devastating.
Barriers Caused by Organizational Structures, Procedures, and Behaviors
A failure to convey information accurately is a strategic threat to any organization, with the knowledge necessary for effective strategic planning often split
across separate organizational functions.33 The first business games were developed precisely to allow future managers to discover all the functions of the
firm, the interdependence of those functions, and the interrelations among the
different functions (marketing, finance, accounting, sales and purchases, etc.).
Furthermore, different people and functions have varied perspectives and interpretations of the operating environment and of how to achieve objectives, or even
what those objectives are.
A good example of this dynamic can be seen between intelligence officers—
both military and civilian—and elected officials. Elected policy makers generally lack professional knowledge regarding intelligence as a field and regularly
believe that intelligence officers tend to expand, rather than reduce, the level of
uncertainty. In most cases, intelligence officers lack the knowledge of both policy
issues from the policy makers’ perspectives and the constraints under which they
operate.34
In the business world, the chief strategy officer is analogous to the intelligence
officer, and the chief executive officer to the policy maker—yet the way players
deal with complex problems remains the same. Both realms, and both types of
roles, are rooted in a somewhat chaotic, unpredictable, and uncertain environment; in both realms there is an inherent tension between the desire to reflect
reality fully and the need to shape reality actively.
This lack of collaborative culture has a negative effect on organizations.
Organizational cultures that reinforce the concept of the “expert” and promote
ownership of knowledge at the expense of shared understanding create islands of
information and expertise that are not distributed through organizational channels. The knowledge produced on these islands could be valuable, sometimes
even critical, but unless it is shared it is practically worthless. Where knowledge is
power, those who give it up will lose, and those who do not have it are weak. This
kind of corporate culture can cause professional jealousy and friction, reducing
the organization’s competitive effectiveness, and can create arrogance, rigidity,
and impatience among decision makers, which restricts their ability to view a
company’s situation in its entirety. In contrast, wargames encourage the exchange
of knowledge and can help overcome such problems.
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THREE CASE STUDIES FROM THE ISRAELI BUSINESS SCENE
This section will examine three case studies of business games in the Israeli
business sector in which the author participated firsthand. They convert the
theoretical into an example-based data set and demonstrate the use of wargaming methodologies in different contexts. The studies also describe the outcomes
of these games and how organizations have incorporated these insights in their
strategic planning. The resulting implications for military planners are then presented and discussed.
Water Drops: The Entry of a New Competitor into the
Household Appliance Market
A household appliance company learned that a new competitor was planning
to enter and change the market within six to eight months. Until that point, the
original company had dominated its smaller competitors. The new challenger,
however, had significant financial backing from a parent company that allowed
it to enter the market aggressively and absorb losses over time. The original company’s managers sensed that this new competitor would deliver a major blow, but
they struggled to identify the specific implications, including how it would affect
the company, its existing competitors, and consumer spending patterns.
The primary objective of the business game, which the author led, was to
provide participants with a broad understanding of the new operational environment, which in turn demanded a new business strategy for the household appliance market. A second objective was to formulate general contingency guidelines
on how to respond to the new competitor.
The author created this business game and led its execution in late 2012. My
team created a two-phase game, with each phase having a different format to
satisfy different objectives. In the first phase, participants received a description
of the most likely scenario (on the basis of existing knowledge) to follow the new
company’s entry into the market. They then analyzed the new strategic environment and various scenarios that might develop. In the second phase, the emphasis was tactical. Participants worked in groups, receiving a concrete scenario
relating to the competitor’s products, pricing, or expected sales methods and
channels. Each group developed a set of responses to its given scenario.
The business game began just days after the media had reported the details
of the expected entry of the new competitor. These details troubled the original
company’s management, and an atmosphere of urgency surrounded the game environment. At the end of the series, participants were equipped with strategic and
operational principles to cope with future short- and long-term challenges. The
participants went through a cognitive journey, discussing how potential strategic
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scenarios might unfold and testing potential responses. They then compared the
insights gained in the game with their actual capacities, plans, and procedures,
illuminating the areas that required update or change.
Players unanimously agreed on the need to devise and implement an active
policy rather than a reactive one and to create an environment in which the new
competitor would operate under unfavorable conditions. At the end of the second stage, participants realized that the original company was not sufficiently
prepared for future competition and needed to make swift changes to its pricing
and market position. The company’s management later explored these vulnerabilities in greater depth.
A New Sheriff: A Telecommunications Group Prepares for the
Appointment of a New Regulator
A major telecommunications group sought to assess the competitive arena in
light of the expected appointment of a new minister of communications. Issues
for the participants to consider included the fundamental changes resulting from
the outgoing minister’s introduction of open-market competition, the entry of
new competitors (especially mobile virtual network operators), and the consumer climate following the social protests of the summer of 2011.35
The group wanted to explore a full array of possible scenarios, ranging from
maintenance of the status quo to deep structural change in the market. For each
of these scenarios, the company would examine predictive trends, detail their
manifestation, and examine their implications for the company. The players also
would rank the scenarios by likelihood and formulate a strategic action plan that
would foster desired scenarios and thwart dangerous ones.
This business game used a combination of scenario-based planning methodologies spread over a series of four sessions.
1.	 In the first session, participants defined the two central variables that
would affect the future of the company over approximately eighteen
months. After a thorough review of several options, they selected (a) the
level of change advocated by the new minister of communications, placed
on the x axis, and (b) consumer preferences for bundled or individual
products, placed on the y axis. Their combination created four potential
scenarios for the future condition of the communications market.
2.	 In the second session, participants split into four groups, each of which
received one of the four scenarios developed in the first meeting. Each
group then developed a detailed description of its scenario. In addition,
each group developed an inventory of real-world indicators that would
signal its scenario’s emergence.
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3.	 In the third session, the groups presented the scenarios and discussed
their implications for the company. Together, they identified the most
likely scenario, the most dangerous scenario, and the most desirable
scenario. Interestingly, all the participants agreed that the most likely
scenario was also the most dangerous, which surprised them. Although
they had engaged in future planning before the game, they had not
analyzed scenarios through the prism of impact and probability.
4.	 In the fourth session, participants formulated strategies to promote the
most desirable scenario and avoid the most likely and dangerous scenario.
Participants ultimately gained a deep understanding of potential scenarios
and their inherent implications, risks, threats, and opportunities. This new level
of knowledge, along with a discussion of the probabilities of different scenarios,
formed the foundation for the development of a strategic plan aimed at preventing (or at least manipulating) the dangerous scenario and promoting the desirable one.
Health for All: A Public Health Fund Prepares for the
Rekindling of Social Protests
A year after Israel’s social protests in the summer of 2011, many companies
in the Israeli market were concerned about the protests’ possible renewal and,
particularly, the chances of being the next target of consumer rage. Against this
backdrop, a public health fund sought to examine its preparedness in the event
it became a target.
This game used the classic methodology of role playing.36 The game structure
divided the participants into several groups. One group played the health fund;
three played its three competitors; a fifth played the minister of health (the regulator); and the last, most diverse group played the consumers.
All participants received an opening scenario that described a rekindling
of consumer activism, along with a series of events leading to consumer anger
targeting all health funds. The group playing consumers developed creative campaigns against the health funds, while the groups playing the competing health
funds identified responses. Finally, the group playing the regulator created barriers limiting the marketing campaigns of the health funds—a common occurrence
in reality.
The game revealed deep failures in the health fund’s assessments of the scenario. Participants were unaware that a protest directed at their competitors likely
would harm them as well. They also lacked awareness of their own weak points
with respect to high-volume inquiries, potentially leading to a total collapse of
their customer-service system. This game did not include a planning stage; that
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is, there was no stage during which participants generated guidelines toward the
formulation of a strategic plan. In the aftermath of the game, however, the health
fund did prepare a plan, one involving various stakeholders, that provided detailed guidelines in case such a protest ever occurred.
LESSONS FOR THE MILITARY AND BUSINESS WORLDS
As the examples above demonstrate, wargames are an analytical tool designed
to overcome the difficulties that characterize strategic planning and decisionmaking. The following discussion details a few of these unique challenges.
The Strategic Environment
Wargames are an effective tool for creating a laboratory environment in which
there is room to experiment with ideas without paying the price of failure. In
each of the case studies described above, participants confronted a possible
future problem and attempted to find a solution via trial and error. In the third
case study, for example, the participants learned to develop potential reactions to
events that might result from the behavior of other groups.
Some argue that the laboratory environment is sterile, that reality is always
more powerful and complex, and that it is impossible to predict the future fully or
reconstruct the past.37 These claims are correct, but they do not negate the usefulness of wargames. Although some wargames have shifted from training for the
present to predicting a few possible futures (as happened during the First World
War), wargames usually seek to provide general representations to help understand the problem at hand. Wargames apply a concrete perspective to abstract
or ambiguous problems, whether actual or potential. The case studies presented
above did not seek to provide a full description of reality, but rather focused on
simulating key features of the current and future competitive landscapes and informing leadership of potential challenges and opportunities that might emerge
from developments in the operating environment.
The objective of a wargame is to generate discussion of selected elements of
the environment, given specific, defined parameters. A limited discussion is not
less serious than an exhaustive one. On the contrary, discussions that take place
in the context of a simulation normally occur without any pretense of predicting
the future, instead illustrating a range of potential futures. Business games are,
by their nature, somewhat imprecise. Their ambition is to be realistic, but not to
reproduce the current reality and prevent or promote a certain future. Wargames
make it possible to prepare for and shape the future by educating those who will
operate in it. They focus on developing tools and capabilities to prepare for a
variety of scenarios, including those not discussed here, and on implementing
strategies in the present.
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Wargames are not effective if the insights they generate are relevant only to
the future. In fact, a significant proportion of future scenarios examine specific
implications and make them operational in the present. The first two case studies presented above demonstrated this emphasis. The third exposed current
weaknesses, rather than developing contingency plans. As a result, it provoked a
process of evaluation within the organization, which led to the development of
plans involving similar scenarios.
The principles exercised in these games can reduce the complexity of the
strategic environment in both the military and business domains. They give
participants a relatively simple—but not simplistic—way to discuss future events,
subsequent outcomes, and potential implications for the organization.
Individual and Group Cognitive Limitations
Wargames and business games are a useful tool for overcoming many cognitive
distortions, particularly biases in decision-making, beliefs, and behavior. By
their nature, role-playing games in business and military realms involve multiple
perspectives and provide a framework to challenge existing conceptions by using
scenarios. Given their isolated, self-contained environment, they allow participants to focus their thinking on the specified challenges at hand. For this reason,
they have the potential to bypass the heuristic jumps that often create cognitive
biases.
Role-playing games make no pretense that participants can predict behavior. Rather, they encourage participants to broaden their repertoire of mental
schemes and worldviews, allowing them to expand their points of view and take
different perspectives. For example, in the first case study, one of the participants
played the role of one of his own suppliers and reflected on the real-world actions
of his company. From that perspective, he realized that his behavior alienated not
only his competitors but also his suppliers and crucial partners in the company’s
day-to-day activities. In the third case study, participants used their deep understanding of the health fund’s weaknesses to explore protest moves that would
exploit the fund’s vulnerabilities; this revealed which issues required immediate
attention before a certain scenario came to pass.
Wargames and business games require a group of experts to come together for
a defined period and think together. In essence, this is the “wisdom of the crowd,”
in the form of the wisdom of many experts together.38 The use of communities
of experts as a supporting mechanism in strategic processes helps organizations
overcome built-in cognitive difficulties. This, in turn, can help them overcome
the significant complexities of strategic environments that are incomprehensible
for individuals alone. It integrates subfield expertise with the need to present a
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holistic, interdisciplinary picture. The use of targeted crowd wisdom, such as a
group of experts playing out a scenario, combines the best of both worlds: that of
the individual and that of the crowd.39
Wargames provide a space to employ the expertise and individuality of every
participant while leveraging collaboration among participants, to generate maximum value from the intellectual encounter and cross-fertilization of ideas. That
said, wargame participants should include experts from a wide range of fields
within the organization, including some who are at the core of operations and
others who work in the company’s general ecosystem.
When creating the lists of participants in all three case studies, the wisdom of
the expert crowd was the key principle applied. Each group contained people who
performed different business functions, including marketing, sales, finance, and
operations. To give participants a multitude of perspectives and stimulate their
thinking, their suppliers and contractors also were invited to attend (contingent
on signing confidentiality agreements). This injected outside perspectives into
the exercise, which otherwise might not have been represented.
Finally, the division into subgroups that must compete with each other or contend with different aspects of the problem (such as in different scenarios) minimized the risk of individual or group bias. In the second case study, participants
developed several futures, with the goal of preventing a focus on just one future
that the designers presented or that the group dynamic created.
Organizational Structures, Procedures, and Workflows
Wargames, and role-playing games in general, create a unique learning process
in which a core group from within the organization creates new knowledge and
understanding. The product of the process is not just another book by an external
consultant that sits unopened on the shelf. In role-playing games, every participant contributes to the development of the resulting strategic knowledge and
therefore is committed to implementing the results. The task of the game manager
is to create the conditions for organizational learning and the means for effective
implementation of the resulting insights, while also creating deep and multidimensional commitment at the organizational level. Games at this level require the
allocation of resources, including time, attention, and money. Beyond that, however, they require serious commitment and cannot be conducted as a side event.
Strategic thinking always requires time and attention and must be removed
from everyday concerns. The investment is rewarded, however, when it enables
decision-making that is based on careful thought and thorough investigation
of the most serious issues. Moreover, bringing key players together in such a
laboratory environment leads to deep and relevant insights in a relatively short
period. It also promotes flexible, collective thinking that allows the scenario to be
adapted to any challenge or strategic environment.
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Many organizations experience multidimensional communication problems.
Wargames promote shared learning and require group members to set aside their
preconceptions and engage in genuinely collaborative analysis. In this kind of
learning, there is a free flow of ideas and thoughts among people, organizational
functions, and hierarchical levels. These games potentially will improve vertical,
horizontal, and external communication, provided that the participating group
is heterogeneous and the environment allows for open dialogue, even if it is
structured. In the three case studies presented above, each of the groups was heterogeneous in its composition; in the last two games, several of the participants
noted that the experience had given them their first significant opportunity to sit
down together to think strategically.
Games also involve learning about learning—that is, identifying patterns in the
discourse of the participating group that reflect organizational communication
patterns. Companies often discover that their patterns of discourse interfere with
learning and create a closed organization with a conceptual hierarchy in which
struggles for professional integrity freeze the organization and hinder its ability to
produce a holistic, strategic picture. In a complex, information-saturated world,
the basic unit of learning is the group rather than the individual. The framework
of a wargame experience exposes decision makers to a different pattern of learning and allows them to infuse a new perspective into the corporate culture.
In addition, wargames are particularly effective as part of company procedures, rather than as a detached event. The preparation of a wargame for any organization requires a deep understanding of the issues challenging the members
of management; the challenges they perceive as central; and the language they
use to describe the organization, its goals, and environment. The preparation also
should take into account the organization’s short- and long-term plans. During
the game, the game manager should connect the game processes and the issues
that participants raise without a predefined plan for how the game will run. At
the conclusion of the game, the game manager should identify the discourse
and learning patterns that emerged through the process and compile them for
management to use in future company processes. Throughout the game, the
game manager should observe the group’s insights critically and its results in
light of changing circumstances. Just as the laboratory experience is dynamic
and changing, so too should organizations and their development of knowledge
be dynamic.
Although wargames originated in a military setting rather than a boardroom,
thinkers on both sides can learn from methods used on the other, for both ongoing planning and concrete preparation for threats or opportunities.
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Surprisingly, the business world’s application of wargames is not always in
the context of competition among players in the business environment. Business
games are based on probable and realistic scenarios; involve a wide variety of actors and variables; and cover complex scenarios involving cooperation, negotiations, and more, similar to pol-mil games.
Perhaps because they are not subject to rigid doctrines and practices, business
games tend to be more flexible in terms of methodology, combining several types
of methodologies in one game. Such flexibility should be encouraged in military
wargames. The military has a tendency to compartmentalize, but in wargames it
is worthwhile and often necessary to broaden the crowd of participants instead.
Business environments are often similarly hierarchical, although it is easier to
remove such barriers in the private sector. Good leaders, however, strive to break
down those barriers so that the best ideas emerge, rather than hearing only the
loudest voice of the most senior person. A successful wargame allows all participants to express themselves freely, which can be a key component for application
in a military environment.
Ultimately, most strategic questions are about mysteries to be solved rather
than secrets to be discovered. The distinction is crucial not only for a successful
wargame but, more importantly, for successful policy planning and execution.
As Richard Duke and Jac L. A. Geurts so accurately summarize, wargames are
“a process that will simultaneously master complexity, optimize communication,
stimulate creativity, lead to consensus, and develop commitment to action.”40

NOTES

1.	Simulation games were used at the end of
the eighteenth century in Belgian business
schools and then in the 1820s in France; see
Léo Touzet and Pierre Corbeil, “Vital Roux,
Forgotten Forerunner of Modern Business
Games,” Simulation & Gaming 46, no. 1
(2015), pp. 19–39, available at journals
.sagepub.com/.
2.	Milan Vego, “German War Gaming,” Naval
War College Review 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2012),
pp. 106–47, available at www.dtic.mil/.
3.	Peter P. Perla, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide
for Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
4.	Robert T. Foley, “Preparing the German
Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger,” War and

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 80

Society 22, no. 2 (October 2004), pp. 1–25,
available at www.tandfonline.com/.
5.	Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer: Wargaming from Ancient Chinese
Mapboard to Atomic Computer (New York:
Delacorte, 1969), pp. 27–28.
6.	For example, during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, also known as
the Tokyo trials or the Tokyo war crimes tribunal (1946–47), Japanese officers described
such wargames.
7.	Joseph Wolfe, “A History of Business
Teaching Games in English-Speaking and
Post-socialist Countries: The Origination
and Diffusion of a Management Education
and Development Technology,” Simulation
& Gaming 24, no. 4 (December 1993), pp.
446–63, available at journals.sagepub.com/.

86

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

8.	Richard D. Duke, Gaming: The Future’s
Language (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1974), pp.
10–11.
9.	Thomas B. Allen, War Games: Inside the Secret World of the Men Who Play at Annihilation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), p. 141.
10. R. F. Dzhukov et al., “In Memoriam:
Mironovna Beershtain / Mary M. Birshtein,
1902–1992,” Simulation & Gaming 24, no.
1 (March 1993), pp. 6–8; John H. Gagnon,
“Mary M. Birshtein: The Mother of Soviet
Simulation Gaming,” Simulation & Gaming 18, no. 1 (March 1987), pp. 3–12; Arata
Ichikawa, “Early Japanese Gaming Simulation
Efforts,” Developments in Business Simulation and Experiential Learning 35 (2008), pp.
289–98, available at journals.tdl.org/.
11. Martin Shubik, “The Uses of Game Theory
in Management Science: What Is Game
Theory?,” Management Science 2, no. 1
(October 1955), available at doi.org/10.1287/
mnsc.2.1.40; Martin Shubik, Games for
Society, Business and War: Toward a Theory of
Gaming (New York: Elsevier Science, 1975).
12. Franc M. Ricciardi et al., Top Management
Decision Simulation: The AMA Approach,
ed. Elizabeth Marting (New York: American
Management Association, 1957); Albert N.
Schrieber, “Gaming—a New Way to Teach
Business Decision Making,” University of
Washington Business Review 17 (1958), pp.
18–29.
13. Gerhard R. Andlinger, “Business Games: Play
One!,” Harvard Business Review 36, no. 2
(April 1958), pp. 115–25.
14. Peter M. Ginter and Andrew C. Rucks, “Can
Business Learn from Wargames?,” Long Range
Planning 17, no. 3 (June 1984), pp. 123–28,
available at www.sciencedirect.com/; Jay
Kurtz, “Business Wargaming: Simulations
Guide Crucial Strategy Decisions,” Strategy
and Leadership 31, no. 6 (2003), pp. 12–21,
available at www.emeraldinsight.com/.
15. Daniel F. Oriesek and Jan Oliver Schwarz,
Business Wargaming: Securing Corporate
Value (London: Gower, 2008), p. 20.
16. Henri Mintzberg, Bruce W. Ahlstrand, and
Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari: A Guided
Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York: Free Press, 2005); Kees van
der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 81

H E R S H KO V I T Z

81

Conversation, 2nd ed. (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley, 2005), available at www.untag-smd.ac.id/;
Hank J. Brightman and Melissa K. Dewey,
“Trends in Modern War Gaming: The Art of
Conversation,” Naval War College Review 67,
no. 1 (Winter 2014), p. 17, available at www
.dtic.mil/.
17. “Shall We Play a Game?,” The Economist, May
31, 2007, www.economist.com/.
18. See, for example, Soren Malmborg, who is
considered a leader in the field of wargames
used for negotiations. In fact, this argument is
true from the very first business games. The
first writings about business games, such as
the French book Les jeux d’entreprises (The
Business Games) published in 1960 by Arnold
Kaufmann, Robert Faure, and André Le
Garff, argue that the first scenarios of business simulation games exist in the entry of a
new market competitor.
19. This basic division was established by
Andlinger in his article “Business Games:
Play One!”
20. For closed games, see, for example, Mark
Chussil, “The ACS Business War-Gaming
Bibliography,” Advanced Competitive Strategies, 2012, whatifyourstrategy.com/. For open
games, see Benjamin Gilad, Business War
Games (Franklin Lakes, NJ: Career, 2008).
21. Matthew E. Hanson [Lt. Col., USAF], “Improving Operational Wargaming: It’s All Fun
and Games until Someone Loses a War” (student paper, United States Army Command
and General Staff College, 2016), available at
paxsims.files.wordpress.com/.
22. Michael Peck, “The Return of Wargaming:
How DoD Aims to Re-imagine Warfare,”
GovTech Works, April 5, 2016, www
.govtechworks.com/.
23. U.S. Defense Dept., DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, April 12, 2001, amended
through May 30, 2008), s.v. “war game,”
available at www.dtic.mil/.
24. Perla, The Art of Wargaming, p. 164.
25. Marco Greco, Nicola Baldissin, and Fabio
Nonino, “An Exploratory Taxonomy of Business Games,” Simulation & Gaming 44, no. 5
(September 20, 2013), pp. 645–82, available at
journals.sagepub.com/.

87

2/25/19 10:40 AM

82

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

26. Samuel Eilon, “Management Games,”
Journal of the Operational Research Society 14,
no. 2 (1963), pp. 137–49, available at www
.tandfonline.com/.
27. Ben Sawyer, “Serious Games: Improving Public Policy through Game-Based Learning and
Simulation” (Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2002), available at www
.scribd.com/.
28. Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper,
Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders
Can Learn from America’s Army (New York:
Broadway Books, 1997).
29. Richards J. Heuer Jr., The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (McLean, VA: Center for the
Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1999), available at www.cia.gov/.
30. Additional seminal research in the field,
especially from the perspective of decision
makers, can be found in the following: Robert
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1976).
31. Aaron Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
“Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases,” Science 185, no. 4157 (September
1974), pp. 1124–31.
32. Heuer also describes several types of biases,
which can be categorized into three families:
biases in decisions, beliefs, and behavior; social biases; and biases and errors in memory.
33. This article does not go into detail on communication channels (direct, indirect, and
mediated) and communication types (direct
and indirect).
34. Arthur S. Hulnick, “The Intelligence Producer–
Policy Consumer Linkage: A Theoretical Approach,” Intelligence and National Security 1,
no. 2 (1986), pp. 212–33, available at www
.tandfonline.com/.
35. The 2011 Israeli social justice protests were a
series of demonstrations in Israel beginning

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 82

in July 2011 involving hundreds of thousands
of protesters from a variety of socioeconomic
and religious backgrounds. The protesters opposed the continuing rise in the cost of living
(particularly housing) and the deterioration
of public services such as health and education. See Shay Hershkovitz, “‘Not Buying
Cottage Cheese’: Motivations for Consumer
Protest—the Case of the 2011 Protest in
Israel,” Journal of Consumer Policy 40, no. 4
(2017), pp. 473–84.
36. For details on role playing, see Gilad, Business
War Games, pp. 127–34, and Kesten C. Green,
“Game Theory, Simulated Interaction, and
Unaided Judgment for Forecasting Decisions
in Conflicts: Further Evidence,” International
Journal of Forecasting 21 (2005), pp. 463–72,
available at www.professionalwargaming
.co.uk/.
37. Robert C. Rubel, “The Epistemology of War
Gaming,” Naval War College Review 59, no. 2
(Spring 2006), pp. 108–28, available at www
.dtic.mil/.
38. Shay Hershkovitz and Alina Shkolnikov,
“Harnessing Collective Wisdom,” Ivey
Business Journal (September 2017),
iveybusinessjournal.com/.
39. Compare with actor-network theory and
Bruno Latour’s theory that the social or
economic “harmony” stems from the capacity
of individual actors to give a part of their
attention to the collective (to the crowd) that
they want to make work. The crowd “possesses” each of the individuals who compose
it, and each of these individuals “possesses”
the whole to which it agrees to lend itself. See
Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford,
U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005).
40. Richard D. Duke and Jac L. A. Geurts, “Policy
Games for Strategic Management,” Rozenberg
Quarterly, October 2011, rozenbergquarterly
.com/.

88

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

PEACETIME NAVAL REARMAMENT, 1933 –39
Lessons for Today
Jamie McGrath

[T]o maintain a navy which is not strong enough to win in battle is the
worst form of extravagance.

T

REPRESENTATIVE CARL VINSON, 1934

he election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 sparked an unprecedented peacetime naval rearmament that ultimately prepared America
to fight and win World War II. The Republican administrations of the 1920s,
driven by isolationism and austerity, had made a series of decisions that left the
fleet underresourced and therefore incapable of defending the nation from a
determined adversary. Roosevelt’s efforts, combined with congressional action
led by Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), turned around a decade of neglect
of the Navy, funded a balanced fleet, and revitalized the American shipbuilding
industry.1 The service and the industry responded immediately, building modern
ships to designs that had been refined throughout the 1920s.
The post–Cold War decline of the U.S. fleet in many ways mirrors the decline
that followed World War I. Calls today for a 355-ship “Navy the Nation Needs”
appear to be in line with the actions taken in the 1930s to recover naval strength.2
However, the principal actors differ significantly
in their levels of commitment and coordination.
Captain Jamie McGrath, USN, joined the Joint Military Operations faculty of the Naval War College in Whereas the naval rearmament of the 1930s aimed
July 2017 following his tour as Chief, Joint Exercise
to achieve desired ship numbers in under a decade,
Division, Joint Staff J7. A nuclear-trained surface
today’s rebuilding plan projects a completion date
warfare officer, he has served in a variety of billets
at sea and on operational staffs, including command over forty years in the future. The rapid growth
of Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron 7 in
of shipbuilding contracts in the mid-1930s forced
Guam. He holds a BA in history from Virginia Tech,
shipbuilders to expand their collective infrastrucan MA in national security and strategic studies
from the Naval War College, and an MA in military ture and workforce, while today’s modest increase in
history from Norwich University.
projected construction rates leaves shipbuilders cauNaval War College Review, Spring 2019, Vol. 72, No. 2
tiously optimistic, at best, about investing in growth.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 83

89

2/25/19 10:40 AM

84

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

During the 1930s, the executive and legislative branches worked in concert
with the Navy and industry to coordinate a rebuilding of the infrastructure needed to build a fleet rapidly in time of war. That level of close coordination is missing today, which threatens to leave America unprepared for future naval conflict.
AFTER WORLD WAR I: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
On Armistice Day 1918, the United States possessed one of the most modern
fleets in the world and was building toward a navy equal in strength to the Royal
Navy. However, post–World War I efforts to end future conflict, initiated by the
United States and supported by the other major world powers, began in 1921–22
with the Washington Naval Conference. The resulting Five-Power Treaty called
for a ten-year capital ship building “holiday” and placed restrictions on the size
and numbers of future capital ships. To comply with the Five-Power Treaty’s limits, the United States scrapped seven of nine battleships and four of six battle cruisers laid down between 1919 and 1922, and America built no new battleships until
1937.3 The treaty also restricted the construction of various smaller warships.
However, successive Republican administrations, focusing on fiscal austerity
and isolationist policies, chose to fund American naval construction at levels well
below treaty limits. Throughout the 1920s, the General Board of the U.S. Navy,
tasked with advising the Secretary of the Navy on naval policy, remained frustrated with the continued refusal of presidents and Congress to fund shipbuilding,
not merely to have sufficient ships, but to field prototypes of new technologies so
they could be evaluated in the fleet. While this forced the Navy to explore theories on the application and operationalization of sea power, ideas alone—without
modern ships to execute them—were insufficient for national defense. Recognizing the impact of delaying warship construction, the General Board continued
to advocate for building to the treaty limits to maintain sufficient capability
to defend against the Japanese, who were widely recognized at the time as the
most likely adversary of the United States. Unfortunately, the American political
climate of isolationism and austerity precluded such shipbuilding, so the board
continuously tailored its annual recommendations to make them more palatable
to a reluctant Congress.4
As a result of this congressional reluctance, the U.S. Navy designed and built
only two classes of ships following the completion in 1923 of the World War I
construction program. These cruisers and submarines were developed in direct
response to the perceived threat from Japan. Starting in 1921, the Navy designed
and built a number of submarines intended to create a force capable of operating
in Japanese waters, in anticipation of supporting fleet operations in the western
Pacific. The cruiser program began in response to Japanese exploitation of a
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loophole in the Five-Power Treaty that restricted the size of individual warships
but not aggregate tonnage. Japan used this provision to embark on an aggressive
cruiser-building program that challenged American naval strength in the Pacific.
The United States initiated its cruiser-building program in 1924 with two units
and added six more in 1928. In 1927, the General Board requested authorization
to build an additional twenty-five cruisers, but Congress cut that request in its
enactment of the so-called Cruiser Act (also known as the Butler Cruiser Bill) on
February 13, 1929.5
Despite this small and relatively inexpensive initiative to counter the Japanese
naval buildup, lack of funding and presidential actions that delayed allocating
available construction funds prevented the building of these vessels until after
Roosevelt’s election in 1932. By the early 1930s, the fiscal constraints of the Great
Depression further curtailed construction, leaving the U.S. Navy inferior to the
Japanese navy in modern warships, especially cruisers and destroyers.
The General Board and other naval advocates, including Admiral William V.
Pratt, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1930 to 1933, struggled with Congress and the president to maintain a modern American fleet. But their attempts
were in vain, and American underage warship numbers in the decade following
the signing of the Five-Power Treaty lagged woefully behind those of the other
four powers.6 In London in 1930, the world’s major maritime powers agreed on
further limitations to cruiser, destroyer, and submarine tonnages. After the signing of what is known as the London Naval Treaty, U.S. policy continued to keep
the Navy below the levels the treaties allowed, in an effort to lead by example on
disarmament. By 1932, with Hoover’s proposed further reductions in several ship
categories, there appeared to be no stopping point for naval disarmament.7
American constraint in shipbuilding ceded the initiative to the world’s other
naval powers. The other signatories to the Five-Power Treaty continued to build
warships aggressively in the first decade under the treaty’s constraints, as shown
in figure 1. Japan, Great Britain, and France each executed construction programs at levels near or slightly exceeding the treaty limits. Italy’s program, while
slightly less aggressive, also built ships near to treaty limits in numbers, if not in
tonnage. In contrast, between January 1922 and March 1933, American warship
construction remained well below allowable treaty limits. Because of America’s
anemic shipbuilding program, the four other Five-Power Treaty signatories each
outbuilt the United States, on average, by over one hundred ships and one hundred thousand tons. Japan more than doubled American shipbuilding output,
giving it the parity it desired in the Pacific.
By the end of 1933, the American fleet consisted of 187 warships, only eightyfour of which were underage—less than half the number of underage ships in the
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FIGURE 1
FIVE-POWER TREATY NATION WARSHIP BUILDING, 1922–33
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fleet when the United States signed the Five-Power Treaty in 1922. This left the
U.S. Navy 157,280 tons below the treaty limits for underage warships, even when
including vessels under construction. This amounted to approximately ninety-six
vessels below treaty limits, accounting for allowances by type. During the first ten
years under the Washington Treaty system, the United States remained caught
in a cycle of uncertainty over whether to spend the limited funds available on
modernizing battleships, developing carriers, building submarines, supporting
naval aviation, or renewing the destroyer fleet.8
The dearth of naval construction in the 1920s and early ’30s left the American
shipbuilding industry incapable of rapidly closing the gap between the shrinking
fleet and the treaty limits. Over the course of the 1920s, the number of private
shipyards involved in building naval vessels declined steadily. By 1933, only seven
private shipyards capable of building warships remained, down from twentyseven at the end of World War I. Many of the yards that had been building naval
vessels turned to other products, such as railroad cars, fishing vessels, or luxury
yachts, to maintain financial solvency.
But the reduction in the number of shipyards represented only a portion of
the decline in shipbuilding infrastructure. Capacity degraded across the entire
range of shipbuilding capabilities throughout the 1920s. Among the significant
losses were the physical infrastructures needed to construct ships, such as building ways, and the cranes and outfitting equipment that were sold off to cover
lack of profit. Commercial shipbuilding also suffered during this period, further
diminishing the shipbuilding industrial base. Shipbuilders were not the only
ones that suffered; ancillary industries, such as producers of marine propulsion
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systems, armor, and engineering equipment, and even steel manufacturers, also
contracted because of the loss of shipbuilding contracts.9
The loss of private shipyards and the underemployment of navy yards further
led to the loss of workers with critical skills. Design capability eroded as trained
naval architects and draftsmen left the business, but the loss of shipyard labor,
especially skilled labor, had the most dramatic impact. During the 1920s, both
the government’s navy yards and private shipyards were unable to attract workers. In 1923, when the Five-Power Treaty went into effect, private shipyards in
America employed 68,100 workers. By 1933, less than half that number—33,800
shipyard workers—remained at work in private yards. Because it appeared that
jobs were not available in the shipbuilding industry, colleges saw severe declines
in enrollment in marine engineering and naval architecture programs. Additionally, fewer people were learning the mechanical trades of shipbuilding, because
active apprenticeship programs were no longer available. Workers who possessed
those skills, as well as experienced draftsmen and ship designers, drifted away
from shipyards, both government and private, to other industries in pursuit of
paying employment. This drain in skilled workers represented “one of the most
serious handicaps to a revival of shipbuilding.”10
THE 1930s: REARMAMENT BEGINS
The efforts of American naval leaders in the decade leading up to Roosevelt’s
election prepared the U.S. Navy to build a balanced fleet once naval construction
authorizations and appropriations arrived. Although the General Board’s influence waned during Admiral Pratt’s tenure as CNO in the early 1930s, the road
map outlined in the board’s 1922 U.S. Naval Policy served as a guide for the naval
rebuilding program of the mid-1930s.11
Three mutually dependent concepts—War Plan ORANGE, the “balanced fleet,”
and the “treaty navy”—helped secure internal cohesion and external support for
naval construction when funding again became available. War Plan ORANGE did
not constitute a specific plan, but it represented the manner in which USN planners envisioned fighting a war in the Pacific, using “orange” as the code word
for Japan in U.S. planning parlance. The need to transit the vast open-ocean
areas of the Pacific to reach the expected battle zone drove fleet and warship
design throughout the 1920s and ’30s.12 The balanced fleet concept recognized
that, while battleships remained the cornerstone of the Navy’s ability to control
the seas, a range of smaller vessels played crucial roles in that effort as well. The
treaty navy concept that Pratt espoused provided the “magic formula for securing
appropriations” despite American distrust of war machines and war manufacturing.13 The 1930 London Naval Treaty extended the capital ship building holiday
to 1937, but it also extended tonnage limits across other classes of warships, so
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Pratt advocated for building ships within the available treaty tonnage that supported the aging battle line. Additionally, by the 1930s, the importance of aircraft
carriers and their associated aircraft had been demonstrated, so—with over
fifty thousand tons of aircraft carrier tonnage available under the London Naval
Treaty—the Navy encouraged expansion of the American carrier force.14
Pratt’s successor as CNO, Admiral William H. Standley, and the chief of
the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, worked
closely with Representative Vinson to shape legislation that satisfied the Navy’s
construction needs and met congressional expectations for rebuilding American
naval capability.15 This level of close cooperation between the Navy leadership
and Congress allowed the Navy to execute shipbuilding plans rapidly when funds
became available.
Legislation and Directives
A naval enthusiast since his time as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt possessed an excellent grasp of naval
issues. Now, as president, Roosevelt had authority over domestic and foreign affairs, which allowed him the resources to achieve the American naval supremacy
in which he believed.16 In May 1933, as part of his effort to bring the country
out of the Depression, Roosevelt submitted massive public works legislation that
became the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which included provisions
for funding naval construction. Under this legislation, Roosevelt allocated $238
million to the Navy—nearly seven times the shipbuilding appropriation for fiscal
year (FY) 1934. Since shipbuilding was a very labor-intensive activity, its value
as a work-relief program alone justified this spending, but the boost in deliveries
of modern naval vessels also improved the fleet. In March 1934, Representative
Vinson ensured passage of the Vinson-Trammell Act (also known as the Naval
Parity Act and the First Vinson Act), which made it U.S. policy to build ships up
to the treaty limits and to replace ships as they aged, as the treaties then in effect
allowed. These efforts combined not only to provide the U.S. Navy with a modern
fleet to counter Japanese assertiveness in Asia but also to promote the strengthening and growth of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, which had languished in the
1920s owing to the lack of work.
Executive Order (EO) 6174, issued on June 16, 1933, the day after Roosevelt
signed the NIRA into law, granted the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works “authority to allot the sum of not to exceed $238,000,000 to the Department of the Navy for the construction of certain vessels, the construction whereof
conforms to the London Naval Treaty and has heretofore been approved by me.”17
Coupled with the FY 1933 appropriation, the Navy now had nearly $282 million
to spend on new construction—a figure twice that allocated for shipbuilding in
any year since 1920. Naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison credits Roosevelt’s use
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of NIRA funds to restart the naval building program as the principal impetus of
the U.S. Navy’s rebirth.18
On August 3, 1933, less than two months after Roosevelt’s executive order, the
Navy awarded contracts for the aircraft carriers USS Yorktown (CV 5) and USS
Enterprise (CV 6), one heavy cruiser, two Brooklyn-class light cruisers, twelve
Gridley-class destroyers, and three submarines to private shipyards, and contracted for two more destroyers on August 20, 1933. Orders for an additional two
light cruisers, ten destroyers, and two submarines went to government yards. The
funds allocated from the NIRA resulted in the construction of thirty-two warships, in addition to the five ships already contracted under the FY 1933 naval
appropriation. One heavy and five light cruisers authorized by the 1929 Cruiser
Act remained unfunded.19
After the initial surge of naval construction funded under the aegis of employment relief, Congress, led by Representative Vinson, acted to provide the president and the Navy with permanent authority to build to treaty limits and replace
overage ships. Vinson’s powerful influence resulted in passage of the aforementioned Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which provided what Vinson referred to
as blanket authority for ship construction and replacement to treaty limits. Naval
historian Norman Friedman describes the Vinson-Trammell Act as “fundamental legislation” that called for the Navy to maintain an underage treaty fleet.20
Vinson and the Navy wanted a long-range plan for naval construction rather
than an emergency program that was executed only when a crisis arose. Such a
plan allowed for several improvements, including steady employment of available
shipyards, incorporation of changes in ship design on the basis of operations, and
prevention of block obsolescence. Vinson stressed that spreading ship construction out over several years allowed for the testing of various types and making
improvements. It also allowed for delaying construction of smaller, more quickly
built vessels, so that they would be delivered when the larger ships they were
designed to support became available. Additionally, Vinson argued that building
ships at a steady, predictable rate reduced unit costs, saving the American people
money.21
The Vinson-Trammell Act authorized expansion of the Navy from its current
state, but only to the limits permitted under the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and
the 1930 London Naval Treaty. An excerpt from the act follows:
That[,] subject to the provisions of the treaties signed at Washington February 6,
1922, and at London, April 22, 1930, the President of the United States is hereby
authorized to undertake prior to December 31, 1936, or as soon thereafter as he
may deem it advisable (in addition to the six cruisers not yet constructed under the
Act approved February 13, 1929 (45 Stat. 1165), and in addition to the vessels being
constructed pursuant to Executive Order Numbered 6174 of June 16, 1933), the
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construction of: (a) One aircraft carrier of approximately fifteen thousand tons standard displacement, to replace the experimental aircraft carrier Langley; (b) ninetynine thousand two hundred tons aggregate of destroyers to replace over-age destroyers; (c) thirty-five thousand five hundred and thirty tons aggregate of submarines to
replace over-age submarines.22

Several critical elements in this section of the act demonstrate the close
coordination between Congress and the Navy that proved critical to restoring
the fleet. First, the act acknowledged and provided congressional authorization for the ships ordered under President Roosevelt’s EO 6174 of the previous
summer. Second, the act directed completion of the 1929 cruiser program that
had languished under President Hoover. Third, the act directed the replacement of certain overage vessels, amounting to sixty-five destroyers and thirty
submarines—two categories in which the American fleet fell woefully short of
treaty limits—in an effort to build a more balanced fleet. Fourth, the act recognized the intent and letter of the 1930 London Naval Treaty, calculating the available aircraft carrier tonnage to build USS Wasp (CV 7) to replace USS Langley
(CV 1) to achieve the maximum number of aircraft carriers allowed under the
treaty, once the latter ship was converted to a seaplane tender. This also enhanced
balance by increasing the aviation capability of the fleet.
While these elements of the act allowed for immediate shipbuilding, the
next section had greater implications for naval construction over the long term.
“[The] President of the United States is hereby authorized to replace, by vessels
of modern design and construction, vessels in the Navy in the categories limited
by the treaties signed at Washington, February 6, 1922, and at London, April 22,
1930, when their replacement is permitted by the said treaties.”23
This clause provided the authority for which the Navy had longed—namely,
to plan for and build new warships as the current fleet aged. The date a vessel
became overage could be predicted, replacements could be scheduled, and construction requirements could be forecast with some accuracy. Accurate forecasting allowed shipyards to hire and retain workers, knowing that a consistent flow
of new construction was forthcoming.
On its passage, Vinson praised the act, stating that it “is no mere piece of paper. It means real fighting ships. We will provide the money this session to start
work on part of the vessels authorized.”24 Initial funding arrived when Roosevelt
allocated forty million dollars from the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of
1935 to augment the FY 1935 naval appropriations and start construction on the
first twenty ships and 225 aircraft authorized in the Vinson-Trammell Act. By
November 1934, the Navy let contracts and work began on these vessels, nine in
private yards and eleven in navy yards.25 Although the Vinson-Trammell Act provided only authorization and not appropriation, it reversed twelve years of naval
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retrenchment and represented the first significant action explicitly to strengthen
the Navy between the two world wars.
Nonetheless, to the dismay of naval leaders, President Roosevelt continued to
react to political pressure by reducing or deferring many of the Navy’s requests
for new warship appropriations. Roosevelt remained especially sensitive to the
political influence of those in the American peace movement and other isolationists. The 1935 naval appropriation, approved after the Vinson-Trammell Act
passed, amounted to just $11.7 million—half of President Roosevelt’s request,
and less than the previous year’s appropriation before the influx of money from
the NIRA.26 However, Congress gradually approved funding, but it did so without fanfare, allowing Roosevelt to placate the isolationists by downplaying naval
expansion and emphasizing that national policy aimed only to build a fleet to
treaty limits.27
Impact on Shipbuilding Capabilities
It was the authority that the Vinson-Trammell Act granted that allowed the
Navy to accomplish its prewar cultivation of shipyards that would be capable of
expanding to build a wartime fleet. In wartime, private shipyards provide critical surge capacity to build the fleet rapidly. The Vinson-Trammell Act reversed
the preceding decade’s shrinkage of private shipyards by allowing the Bureau of
Construction and Repair to distribute construction contracts among private and
government yards throughout the 1930s. This provided the shipbuilding industry
with practice in the construction of new ships and new shipbuilding techniques
in advance of World War II.
But the act authorized more shipbuilding than could be accomplished in
available shipyards. Existing yards had to expand or more yards needed to be
opened to build warships. Either option would mean greater employment. The
path chosen was to expand shipbuilding infrastructure within existing private
shipyards. No new private companies capable of building warships for the Navy
opened yards before 1937, but each of the existing yards ramped up manpower
and production capacity to meet the expanding demand. However, even with the
building program implemented by the Vinson-Trammell Act and subsequent
acts, the shipbuilding industry approached the high levels of production needed
for wartime support only in 1941, spurred by massive 1940 building programs. In
contrast, by 1938 just ten large private shipyards existed—only a modest increase.
That number reached forty by 1941 and eighty by 1945, the latter representing
the full expansion necessary to support the war effort and complete over 1,500
naval vessels.28 While the Vinson-Trammell Act provided a reliable program and
appropriations slowly followed, it took several years of combat before the volume
of production needed for war was achieved. This, however, represented a marked
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FIGURE 2
SHIPS IN THE U.S. FLEET, DECEMBER 1941
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improvement over the World War I program, under which less than 10 percent of
the projected construction was completed in time for war.
At the dawn of U.S. entry into World War II, the American fleet mustered
337 warships, consisting of ships built both before and after the signing of the
Five-Power Treaty (see figure 2). The peacetime rearmament efforts of President
Roosevelt and Representative Vinson contributed 95 percent of the modern warships available for the war—over 40 percent of the total active fleet on December
7, 1941. Because few of the ships laid down in the emergency programs of the
1940s were completed before the end of 1942, the fleet on hand when the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor differed little from that which existed in the late 1930s.
The ships already under construction soon more than quintupled the size of the
fleet—a feat that would have been impossible to accomplish without the deliberate
building program of the 1930s that the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 authorized.
By strengthening the shipbuilding industrial base, American shipyards
prepared for the wartime surge to build the enormous fleet that eventually defeated Japan. From 1940 through 1945, American public and private shipyards
produced over 1,500 naval vessels, from battleships and carriers to submarine
tenders and minelayers. This number does not include the thousands of smaller
vessels, from tugboats to landing craft, nor the massive merchant fleet that carried the American war machine overseas.29
This effort would have been impossible to carry out in 1934, given the depressed state of the American shipbuilding industry at that time. Rebuilding the
U.S. Navy in the 1930s provided not only the ships that held the line in 1942 but
also the necessary time and experience for American shipyards to recover from a
decade of neglect. By doubling the shipbuilding industry’s workforce between 1934
and 1938, the rearmament effort restored the nucleus of skilled labor that would
prove so crucial over the next seven years of increased naval construction. Shipyards expanded their infrastructure to meet the increased number of ships under
construction, including modernizing building ways, machine shops, and supply
chains, thereby setting up those yards for the surge of wartime construction.
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American shipbuilding during World War II was successful because of the
combined and concerted efforts of the president, Congress, the Navy, and industry in the decade prior to the war.
AFTER THE COLD WAR: DECLINE OF THE FLEET
The decline of the American fleet in the years following the end of the Cold War
(see figure 3) mirrors in many ways the decline of the 1920s. However, significant
differences do exist, primarily in their respective forcing functions. In the 1920s,
a global desire to end warfare led to international treaties that limited the size
of the fleet, whereas no such conventions exist today. Instead, a perceived post–
Cold War “peace dividend” initiated today’s decline.
There were other significant differences between the two declines. As mentioned above, one reason the United States limited investment in naval construction in the 1920s was its pursuit of isolationist policies that circumscribed its
commitment to world politics. So, although naval leaders complained that the
fleet was inadequate to project power across the Pacific, the ships of the 1920s
Navy were sufficient to defend the Western Hemisphere and meet the Navy’s
peacetime constabulary missions. In contrast, America not only maintained its
role as a global leader in the post–Cold War era but also took on the mantle of
the world’s single hegemon. Today’s fleet of 275 ships is tasked with maintaining
the same level of presence as the six-hundred-ship fleet of the late 1980s, and as a
result the fleet is operating at a much higher rate than it was designed to support.
As Vice Admiral Thomas S. Rowden, Commander, Naval Surface Forces, noted
near the end of his tenure in early 2018, “Simple math tells you that when you
FIGURE 3
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had 600 ships and were deploying 100, and when you’ve [now got fewer than] 300
ships and you’re deploying 100, there’s more stress on the force.”30
Just as in the 1920s, the post–Cold War decline of the fleet followed an impressive naval buildup, leaving a surplus of naval capacity once the conflict ended. In
the final decade of the Cold War, President Ronald W. Reagan’s administration
dramatically increased military spending in an effort to defeat the Soviet Union.
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman led the drive for a six-hundred-ship Navy,
an effort that peaked at 594 ships in 1987. Lehman’s Navy relied on recommissioned World War II–era Iowa-class battleships; service-life extension programs for Vietnam-era ships; and large new-construction programs, including
Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers with the new Aegis weapons system,
Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates, Los Angeles–class attack submarines, Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines, Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, Whidbey Island–class dock landing ships, and Henry J. Kaiser–
class replenishment oilers. Lehman also accelerated construction of Nimitz-class
aircraft carriers.31
As in the 1930s, the American shipbuilding industry benefited greatly from
this buildup. Naval ship construction provided 93 percent of all shipbuilding in
American shipyards in 1985. This level of shipbuilding activity buoyed an otherwise stagnant manufacturing sector, provided a robust, skilled ship-construction
workforce, and furnished an abundance of ships from which to draw when Congress curtailed shipbuilding in the 1990s.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent dissolution
of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991 meant that America and its allies had
won the Cold War. The aftermath brought calls for disarmament similar to those
after World War I. While those calls did not result in an international disarmament treaty as in 1922, they did persuade the United States and other NATO
nations to make internal decisions to capitalize on a peace dividend, including
drastically cutting military spending. Without a looming adversary, the justification for large defense budgets vanished, and the United States abandoned its sixhundred-ship Navy policies and building plans. From the defense budget’s peak
in 1985, America slashed defense spending over the next sixteen years, cutting it
to a low of 3 percent of the total budget by 2000.32
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in an immediate and
dramatic increase in defense spending, but spending on naval construction
remained stagnant through the first several years of the global war on terror.
Shipbuilding and conversion appropriations remained below 2001 levels in
current-year dollars until 2008 (see figure 4). With the additional war appropriations included, shipbuilding accounts rose slowly through the end of the decade,
and at an average rate of 25 percent through the first half of the 2010s. But after
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FIGURE 4
U.S. SHIP CONSTRUCTION, NAVY ACCOUNT, 2001–17
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Source: Derived from Department of Defense budget estimates for Navy shipbuilding and conversion for FY 2001 through FY 2018, available at www
.secnav.navy.mil/.

accounting for inflation, shipbuilding appropriations since 2001 have increased
by only 9 percent.
While the 1980s provided a boom of warship and naval auxiliary construction,
the 1990s saw curtailment of planned building programs, including truncating the Seawolf class of attack submarines to three ships from the twenty-nine
planned. The majority of ships decommissioned in the first decade of the peace
dividend were Vietnam War–era vessels that had reached or exceeded the end of
their expected service lives. Since 2000, the Navy has decommissioned 143 vessels, many—such as the Spruance-class destroyers and the Oliver Hazard Perry–
class guided-missile frigates—before the end of their planned service lives, to save
the cost of maintenance and modernization. During the post–World War I and
post–World War II drawdowns, the Navy retained large numbers of decommissioned vessels in inactive reserve status. By contrast, during the post–Cold War
drawdown, the Navy disposed of many of the ships it decommissioned through
foreign military sales or expended them as targets, making them unavailable for
reactivation to expand the fleet rapidly. The result is a present-day 275-ship Navy
with little capacity for rapid expansion in a time of crisis.
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the Navy has maintained a steady but
slow shipbuilding pace. Unlike during the 1920s, the modern Navy recognized
the need to build a balanced fleet that included surface combatants, submarines,
amphibious ships, and naval auxiliaries. The post–Cold War building programs
addressed this need, but building across this range of ship types resulted in an
overall reduction in the funds available to build warships.
The Navy and Congress also acknowledged, as Representative Vinson argued in the early 1930s, that it was necessary to maintain a minimum level of
industrial capacity. Keeping production lines operating became one of the goals
of the shipbuilding program during the post–Cold War drawdown. The Navy
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commissioned eighty-one vessels between 2000 and 2018, for an average of just
under five per year. But that rate merely maintained the status quo for a struggling shipbuilding industry, and the single-ship contracts and uncertain future
that resulted from this build rate prevented shipbuilders from investing in future
capacity. Naval drawdowns not only increase production costs but also degrade
industrial capacity, which severely impacts the Navy’s ability to respond in the
event a cold war turns hot.
Again, as in the 1920s, the dearth of new construction caused the American
shipbuilding industry to contract, with two significant effects. First, low-rate production caused an increase in per-ship costs as high as 30 percent. Second, lack
of naval-construction contracts resulted in the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure
and the skilled shipbuilding labor force. As shown in figure 5, seventeen shipyards have stopped building warships for the U.S. Navy since the end of the Cold
War. The Navy now depends on seven privately operated shipyards to build the
future fleet—just as it did in 1932. However, unlike during the 1930s, America’s
government shipyards no longer build new warships; thus the contraction of private shipyards represents an even more severe reduction in capacity.
The concentration of shipbuilding capacity risks significant reduction of
critical naval capabilities if combat losses occur, or our adversaries target these
few shipyards, or both. Despite the Navy’s attempts to provide sufficient work
for each shipyard to maintain a minimum operating capability, the workload
for warship construction is concentrated in only a few of these yards. Only one
shipyard is currently capable of building the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
deemed critical to the Navy the Nation Needs plan. Destroyer, submarine, and
littoral combat ship construction occurs in only two yards for each type. The
FIGURE 5
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remaining two yards involved in building ships for the Navy specialize in amphibious ships and fleet auxiliaries.
Huntington Ingalls Newport News Shipbuilding, the only yard building aircraft carriers, is delivering them at an average rate of 5.6 years per carrier. Submarines are building at an average rate of slightly less than one per year. Orders
for Arleigh Burke–class destroyers were halted in 2005 but restarted in 2010, with
the intent of keeping the two shipyards building them in business until the Navy
completed plans for the Flight III guided-missile destroyers, which will have
increased anti–air warfare and ballistic-missile-defense capabilities.33 These multiyear procurement contracts maintain a production rate of slightly more than
two destroyers per year. But with decommissioning rates of about eight per year,
commissioning rates of less than five per year continue the trend of a declining,
albeit more modern, fleet.
The cumulative effect of reduced shipyard employment is that it leaves the
United States without a viable surge shipbuilding capability. Unlike during the
interwar period, government shipyards no longer build ships, instead focusing their efforts on maintaining nuclear-powered vessels, to the exclusion of
most other activities. These navy yards, therefore, contribute nothing to current
shipbuilding capacity. Additionally, instead of nine navy yards, today only four
remain, further limiting surge production capacity in time of crisis. Exacerbating the shrinking of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, over the past three decades
the Navy severely cut ship-maintenance budgets to save money. Limiting the
use of shipyards conducting maintenance and modernization activities led to
the closure of additional shipyards that had specialized in ship repair and severe
workforce reductions in those that remained in operation.
Without a significant increase in shipbuilding and without a commitment to
funding maintenance and modernization budgets, the American shipbuilding
workforce threatens to disappear—again—over the course of the next decade.
Many of the same complaints heard in the 1920s and ’30s about the drain of
skilled workers out of the shipbuilding trades echo today. The current workforce
is aging, and shipyards struggle to recruit apprentices willing to commit to learning shipbuilding trades, because potential recruits do not foresee a secure future
in doing so. This decline is reversible, but—as before—only with increased shipbuilding contracts.
The one shipyard that has joined the naval construction effort since the end
of the Cold War—Austal USA, in Mobile, Alabama—demonstrated that shipyard
trades could be developed from a skilled workforce outside traditional shipbuilding regions. When Austal was awarded block-buy contracts for the Littoral
Combat Ship and Expeditionary Fast Transport, it nearly doubled its workforce.
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But the commitment to build expeditionary fast transports ends with Austal’s delivery of the twelfth ship in 2018, and the last littoral combat ship order is planned
for 2019. Unless Austal wins the contract for the next-generation frigate, its newly
trained workforce will have nothing to do.34
Jennifer R. Boykin, president of Newport News Shipbuilding, writes of the
shipbuilding industry’s cautious optimism resulting from the call for a 355-ship
Navy. A long-range shipbuilding plan that calls for growing the fleet “provides
certainty for the shipbuilding industrial base that stabilizes our workforce.”
She goes on to remind us that shipbuilders are not the only ones depending on
growth in naval construction. “Thousands of businesses, large and small, provide
the material, equipment, and services necessary to build our nation’s fleet. Shipyards across the country depend on these businesses every day to help us meet
cost and schedule commitments to the Navy. But that supplier base is smaller
today than in the past, declining from almost 15,000 companies at its peak in the
early 1990s to about 5,000 companies today, and many of them have fewer than
200 employees.”35
Without action to reverse these trends, America risks being unprepared to
recover this vital sector of our national defense capability. Worse, it will be unprepared for future conflict.
2018: REARMAMENT BEGINS?
Like President Roosevelt, President Donald J. Trump has called for rebuilding the
Navy. His proposal for a 355-ship Navy matches the Navy’s 2016 Force Structure
Assessment, which determined that 355 ships are necessary to meet the requirements placed on the Navy today, the Navy the Nation Needs.36 Congress, too, has
taken action to make a 355-ship Navy the policy of the United States.
But there the similarities end. The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934 provided a
specific and quantifiable shipbuilding program, to be executed within ten years.
In contrast, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2018 contains
a single sentence stating that “[i]t shall be the policy of the United States to have
available, as soon as practicable, not fewer than 355 battle force ships, comprised
of the optimal mix of platforms, with funding subject to the availability of appropriations or other funds.”37 In 1934, presidential and congressional action
resulted in real contracts for ship construction, but efforts today have not resulted
in any significant immediate increases in warship procurement.
The current plan is too little, too late, and has little in common with the robust
and enthusiastic commitments of the 1930s. In 1933, the Bureau of Construction
and Repair awarded contracts for new ship construction within two months of
the issuance of EO 6174; today’s Navy took six months to provide a shipbuilding
plan to Congress—a plan under which increased construction does not begin
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until a year in the future. The Navy justifies this delay by the need to conduct
critical maintenance and modernization of the current fleet, which does represent a more immediate priority.
However, even when shipbuilding increases begin, the anticipated pace does
not represent an urgent effort to restore fleet strength. The Navy’s FY 2019 shipbuilding plan achieves the Navy the Nation Needs, including a twelve-aircraftcarrier fleet, in 2060—over forty years in the future. The plan does meet the
requirements for the Navy the Nation Needs in all other ship categories by 2050—
but that is still over thirty years in the future.38 Between 2019 and 2024, the Navy’s
shipbuilding plan proposes building only ten additional ships over the previous
308-ship building plan—an increase of merely two ships per year.39 Congress had
asked the Navy to budget for an additional fourteen ships over the same period,
or an increase of two and a half ships per year. Senator Roger F. Wicker (R-MS),
chair of the Seapower Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
comparing the Navy’s plan with the 2018 NDAA language, put it succinctly:
“[T]he Navy shipbuilding plan that doesn’t get to 355 ships until the mid-2050s
is unacceptable.”40
The shipbuilding plan includes provisions for accelerated building, with “additional resources, service life extensions, and strong industry response.”41 Responding to Senator Wicker’s concerns, Under Secretary of the Navy Thomas B.
Modly claimed that 355 ships could be achieved in the 2030s, and placed responsibility for accelerated shipbuilding on Congress to provide additional funding.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, that additional funding would
amount to over three billion dollars—a sum potentially unacceptable to Congress
and the American public. Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore, the commander of
Naval Sea Systems Command, provided specific plans for service-life extensions
and delayed decommissionings of Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships,
Cyclone-class patrol craft, and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers, and a pilot program for extending the life of Los Angeles–class attack submarines.42 These
actions would abate the imbalance between decommissioning and commissioning, but, as Representative Robert J. Wittman (R-VA), chairman of the Seapower
and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee,
notes, “[T]hat is still of limited utility, you still have to build new ships.”43 Echoing
Wicker’s concerns, Wittman also criticizes the Navy’s FY 2019 shipbuilding budget submission for being so low, noting, “The floor is $26.2 billion and 13 ships.
Anything else is unacceptable.”44 Demonstrating Congress’s frustration with the
Navy’s less aggressive shipbuilding program, the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2018 provides $23.8 billion for ship construction, including building a total of fourteen ships—five more ships than the Navy requested. Congress’s action
adds an additional littoral combat ship and accelerates the acquisition of a fourth
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expeditionary sea base and the lead ship of the next-generation amphibious warship, the LX(R).45 There clearly is a disconnect between the Navy and Congress
over accelerating fleet expansion and the mechanism by which to achieve it.
Current CNO Admiral John M. Richardson claims that sufficient current
industrial capacity exists to increase production rates.46 Shipyards, however,
remain reluctant to hire and train additional workers or expand their physical
infrastructure without assurances of future orders.47 The additional ten ships
planned, spread out over five years and across seven shipyards, averages to an
additional 0.3 ships per year for each yard—well below the rates the CNO states
are possible, and not exactly a level of expansion that encourages investment.
But Boykin of Newport News Shipbuilding again offers some cautious optimism
that things are moving in the right direction, stating that “our industry has long
awaited a signal from the government to prepare, invest, and grow. I believe this
budget agreement, combined with the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan to grow
our fleet, are telling our shipbuilding industrial base that it is time for our Navy to
grow into the larger, stronger, and more powerful force that our nation needs.”48
One similarity with the 1930s buildup is the expansion of block purchases
of ships. Funding construction of multiple ships at a time using multiyear procurement contracts results in a 10 percent reduction in unit costs by allowing
shipyards to achieve an economy of scale not available with single-ship contracts.
The FY 2019 shipbuilding plan and the recently passed Bipartisan Budget Act of
2018 both allow for multiyear procurement contracts for destroyer, submarine,
amphibious dock landing ship, and fleet oiler construction.49
In the 1920s and ’30s, America possessed the greatest industrial potential of any
nation in the world. Although Japan’s naval construction exceeded America’s before 1941, both sides recognized America’s ability to outbuild the Japanese once
America reached its full industrial potential. Today, America’s ability to outbuild
its adversaries is not guaranteed. China presents the most significant threat to
American supremacy at sea today, as the seventy-eight-ship naval parade staged
for President Xi Jinping in April 2018 demonstrated. Chinese shipyards are building modern warships at a rate equal to U.S. yards, but the Chinese shipbuilding
industry is not operating at full capacity for naval construction. With over a
dozen shipyards building large merchant vessels, China has the industrial base
to expand warship construction rapidly; America has no such commercial shipbuilding base to expand.50 This disparity puts the United States in the precarious
position that Japan occupied during World War II: unable to match its opponent
in building a modern fleet or to make up for losses once conflict begins.
Much can be learned from the peacetime naval rearmament of the 1930s. It
takes a concerted effort from the executive, Congress, the Navy, and industry to
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achieve the balanced fleet required to fight and win wars at sea. Today, each of
these players asserts the desire to rebuild the Navy in this age of renewed maritime competition, but coordination among them is missing. The Navy needs a
more aggressive shipbuilding plan. Congress needs to follow up on its policy
statement and appropriate the funds required to accelerate ship construction.
More importantly, the Navy and Congress must work together toward a common understanding of fleet requirements. The shipbuilding industry’s response
to calls for a larger fleet naturally lags government action. Therefore, the government must collaborate with private shipbuilders to meet the strategic imperative
of expanding the American shipbuilding industrial base.
Rebuilding the fleet in the 1930s prepared the nation for an unknown war that
came in 1941. In the same way, the United States must embark on a fleet-rebuilding
effort now to ensure the nation is ready for the next conflict when it arises.
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REVIEW ESSAYS

the plurality of american war

John T. Kuehn

Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial
Era to the Twenty-First Century, by Matthew S. Muehlbauer
and David J. Ulbrich. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2017. 516
pages. $74.95.

Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich have produced an admirable text
built around Russell Weigley’s framework in his now classic American Way of
War.1 The occasion for this review is the release of an updated, second edition of
this work. As mentioned, the book clearly seems designed as a text, specifically for
an upper-level undergraduate course, but possibly
for graduate-level seminars on American military
Dr. John T. Kuehn is a professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colhistory as well. Accordingly, this review assesses
lege (CGSC). He retired from the U.S. Navy in 2004
the book on the basis of that pedagogical design.
at the rank of commander after twenty-three years
The authors’ study is primarily narrative in naof service as a naval flight officer. He has taught a
variety of subjects at CGSC since 2000. He authored
ture, but never far from the flow of facts, figures,
Agents of Innovation (Naval Institute Press, 2008),
A Military History of Japan: From the Age of the faces, and the occasional military fiasco hangs the
Samurai to the 21st Century (Praeger, 2014), and authors’ overarching thematic argument: there
Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the
is no one American way of war, but rather many
Great Campaigns (Praeger, 2015), and coauthored
Eyewitness Pacific Theater (Sterling, 2008) with D. ways, determined by a complex interaction of
M. Giangreco. He was awarded a Moncado Prize
factors and institutions. They have updated this
from the Society for Military History in 2011. His lataspect of the book in an expanded introduction
est book from the Naval Institute Press is America’s
to the second edition, but its fundamental claim
First General Staff: A Short History of the Rise and
Fall of the General Board of the Navy, 1900–1950 remains unchanged (pp. 5–6). The student or pro(2017).
fessor wanting one-stop shopping for these ways of
war will be rewarded here.
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The sheer scope of the text is impressive, yet it does not descend overmuch
into the weeds of battles and military trivia, instead remaining focused on how
conflict involving Americans, and not just European Americans, has evolved
over the years. Nonetheless, the narrative does start—as advertised in the title—
with the mass arrival of “modern” Europeans on the North American continent
during the sixteenth century. However, that is preceded by cogent contextual
discussions of native warfare prior to the arrival of the Europeans; the so-called
military revolution in early modern Europe; and necessary discussions of tactics,
technology, and logistics. In other words, the authors do a fine job of setting up
the in-place “initial conditions” for the continuum of conflict that follows. This
is good news for novices to these debates, since it gives them, up front, an understanding of the key definitions and concepts used throughout the text. Another
welcome discussion is that covering the “levels of war.” All too often Americans,
and readers and writers of military history specifically, are two-dimensional in
their thinking about war as just tactics and strategy (pp. 4–5). The operational
level of warfare and the higher level of policy beyond military strategy often are
disregarded in instruction and writing on these matters beyond what one might
find in esoteric discussions of military doctrine.
As for the narrative itself, in something of such broad scope the biases and
preferences of the authors are almost inescapable. But they tend to succeed in
achieving their aim of using the most updated scholarship to avoid perpetuating the tired myths and unchallenged legends that make up so much of what
sometimes is called popular American military history. However, no one author,
or two, can be expected to get it all completely correct, or agreeable, as if such a
thing is even possible. The purpose of this review is not to catalog all those places
where the authors’ narrative differs from the reviewer’s interpretation of things,
especially causation. A larger understanding of history includes such arguments
about the past, but the purpose of this study is more of an ongoing refinement
rather than a final word.
However, one minor error that occurs in the last chapter is worth correction.
The authors claim that the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 delineated as follows: “The chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS] . . .
assumed a new position in the operational chain of command: Theater commanders reported to the chairman, who then reported to the president” (p.
468). Goldwater-Nichols does make the CJCS the “principal military adviser to
the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense,” but
under §211 it states: “CHAIN OF COMMAND.—Unless otherwise directed by
the President, the chain of command to a unified [i.e., regional or theater] or
specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of
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Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command” (emphasis added).2 In other words, the CJCS is simply the
principal military adviser, and civilian control over regional or global combatant
commanders is absolute and does not include the chairman.
That quibble aside, many of the accounts listed here are refreshing in the new
way in which they cast American conflict, in terms of both its political context,
owing to foreign and domestic factors, and what has been called the “war and
society” approach.
Finally, the later chapters in particular might be regarded as the starting point
for future conversations about events still ongoing and will serve instructors
and teachers well in engaging their students in debates about more-recent and
familiar events. The second edition takes the book up to the most recent times of
President Barack Obama’s second term and, particularly, includes a heavy critical component of the (still ongoing) so-called Global War on Terror as well as a
discussion of the impact of the neoconservative movement on the American way
of war (pp. 478–79, 490–95). These are welcome additions and fit nicely into the
overall construct of the book.
Historian N. A. M. Rodger recently wrote about Americans and history as
follows: “Our problem is not that we know too little history to understand the
present but that we know too much, and most of it is wrong.”3 Muehlbauer and
Ulbrich’s effort here goes a long way toward correcting that problem—if only
more people would read it. Highly recommended for all audiences, not only college undergraduate and graduate students.

NOTES

1.	See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of
War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1973).
2.	Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
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(1986).
3.	N. A. M. Rodger, “The Hattendorf Prize Lecture: The Perils of History,” Naval War College
Review 66, no. 1 (Winter 2013), p. 8.
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counting the cost of learning

Dale C. Rielage

Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S.
Navy, 1898–1945, by Trent Hone. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 432 pages. $34.95.

There are two widely popular narratives of the U.S. Navy in the Pacific during
World War II. On the surface, they are contradictory.
The first narrative thread is that in the interwar years the U.S. Navy created
an extraordinary laboratory for innovation and learning. Its perceived success
finds validation in Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s assertion that rigorous and
repeated Naval War College wargames had ensured that “nothing that happened
during the war was a surprise . . . except the kamikaze tactics.”1
But there is also a second, less triumphant story. The U.S. Navy’s victories at
Coral Sea and Midway were darkened by repeated defeats in the waters off Guadalcanal. Most recently chronicled in James Hornfischer’s Neptune’s Inferno, the
loss of ships and sailors in the face of competently handled Japanese naval forces
reveals an organization that failed in the crucible of combat.
Both narratives, of course, describe the same navy. While conflicting historic
narratives are commonplace, the gap between these two views is more than an
academic exercise for serving naval officers. As the U.S. Navy contemplates how
to meet the challenge of great-power competition, the perceived lessons of the interwar years have become a touchstone. Following the lead of the wider Department of Defense, the Naval War College is seeking to reinvigorate wargaming.
The U.S. Pacific Fleet has resurrected the name, and to some extent the model, of
the interwar Fleet Problem exercises as a practical laboratory for advanced war
fighting. If the intellectual ancestors of these structures produced hidebound
conventional wisdom rather than high-velocity learning, much of the service is
potentially on the wrong track and needs to look at other examples.
In his extraordinary new book, Learning War, Trent Hone seeks to reconcile
these two views, producing a nuanced understanding of the U.S. Navy as an organization. In doing so, Hone manages to view the familiar through new eyes,
a feat he accomplishes by making two distinctive
Dale C. Rielage is a senior civilian with the Naval Intelligence Activity, assigned as Director, Intelligence choices in his analysis.
and Information Operations, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
First, Hone focuses his attention on the surface
navy, reversing the view of many standard works
© 2019 by Dale C. Rielage
Naval War College Review, Spring 2019, Vol. 72, No. 2
that emphasize the emerging naval aviation arm.
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Hone rejects as simplistic and incomplete the conventional view that the loss
of the battle line in the attack on Pearl Harbor forced conservative admirals to
embrace, if only out of necessity, the potential of carrier aviation. Before World
War II, naval aviation was a small, although controversial and important, part of
larger questions of naval strategy and tactics. As a result, the U.S. Navy’s thinking
on naval aviation formed only a part of how it adapted to the stresses of combat
during the first years of World War II. Senior officers’ understanding of naval
combat, including the employment of naval aviation, was formed through the
lens of a fleet focused on its surface line.
Second, Hone approaches the U.S. Navy as a “complex adaptive system.” Applying his professional background as a management consultant, he approaches
the interwar Navy as if it was a business client working to adapt to a dynamic
competitive environment. Through this approach, he touches on the commonly
cited mechanisms—the General Board, the Fleet Problem exercises, and Naval
War College wargames—but transcends them to address more-fundamental issues of institutional culture. While previous authors have described the relationship among these institutions as a “virtuous cycle,” Hone expands beyond that
simple description. Large institutions are inherently complex systems, which
evolve through the interactive behavior of their individual elements and their
wider environment. He eschews the neat cause-and-effect narrative of most
histories, describing instead a network of officers with differing understandings
of the profession, the environment, and their roles. This network interacted,
adapted, and learned in a nonlinear way. Even if this formal systems approach
is new to the reader, every naval leader who has guided or shaped meaningful
change will recognize its elements instinctively.
Adaptability—which is to say, effective evolution—is not a given in complex
institutions. Within the considerable latitude of USN doctrine, Hone discovers a strong diversity of tactics, techniques, and procedures within and among
individual commands and warfare communities. To modern eyes, this diversity
represents a troubling lack of standardization. In Hone’s view, it was a strength,
ensuring that the U.S. Navy entered the war with “clouds” of possible options that
became seeds for rapid evolution. As Nimitz suggested, while not everything that
came to pass in the war was expected, very little was unanticipated. Effective evolution requires a place where it is “safe to fail.” The Fleet Problem exercises and
wargames provided that opportunity. Hone, however, approaches these events as
opportunities to test and share dynamic thinking rather than create it, focusing
on the innovative culture of the officer corps.
This war-fighting diversity was bounded by a body of doctrine that created
a common understanding among senior and midgrade commanders of how to
view and react to tactical and operational situations. Hone takes the doctrine
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
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discussion a step further, describing the “tactical heuristics” that guided the U.S.
Navy (p. 123). Heuristics can be thought of as rules of thumb or habits of thought
that rapidly suggest an “adequate, though often imperfect, answer to difficult
questions.”2 For Hone, the cumulative effect of the interwar Navy’s culture, learning, and doctrine caused the officer corps to internalize three tactical heuristics:
a bias toward aggressive action, an emphasis on quick and effective gunfire, and
a culture of decentralized command and control.
In the early days of the war, when confronting expected challenges such as the
Imperial Japanese Navy’s long-range torpedoes and night-fighting tactics, these
heuristics guided the reactions of the fleet. While they inherently suggested imperfect solutions, in the dynamic environment of combat they were more right
than wrong. For example, while gunfire was more or less effective given the tactical situation, generations spent training officers to open fire quickly at maximum
ranges focused the fleet on attacking effectively first—a habit that translated into
the employment of naval aviation.
Thus, Hone arrives at one of the most difficult issues for serving officers seeking to understand the U.S. Navy’s performance in the early days of World War II:
how to understand the two views of the U.S. Navy’s performance in the Pacific.
What Hone suggests is that there is no dichotomy in the two accounts. Rather,
the early defeats represented a dynamic and adaptable institution of learning in
the harshest of environments. The diversity of thought and views allowed for a
range of approaches to combat, with the best ones emerging as models for the
fleet. The success of the U.S. Navy was not that it correctly anticipated every part
of the World War II combat environment. Rather, it was successful because it was
in the position to learn from the reverses that would have rendered a less adaptable navy a permanent loss.
Hone also suggests that, unfortunately, the factors that created this adaptability
could not scale to meet the needs of modern industrial warfare. In 1938, there
were just over 6,500 USN officers, growing to almost 39,000 by December 1941.
By the end of the war, there would be more than 325,000 commissioned officers.
In the massive wartime expansion, new officers and sailors could not be allowed
the time and space to learn in the old familiar ways. Out of necessity, the Navy
moved from exploration (learning new approaches) to exploitation (using patterns that had proved successful). This approach was remarkably successful in the
critical task of transmitting knowledge and culture to inexperienced personnel.
While there remained pockets of innovation—Hone reexamines the introduction
of the combat information center as one such example—the interwar approach
could not survive through the conflict.
As the U.S. Navy considers a return to great-power competition, the parallels to the interwar years are attractive. As in the 1930s, navies are working to
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understand and exploit new technologies: cyber warfare, unmanned systems,
artificial intelligence, and long-range sensor networks. Multiple peer competitors
are making their own plans and assessments about the future. With the purchase
of every new ship or system, the Navy makes a multidecade bet on how the old
assumptions will change. Unfortunately, Hone does not paint a reassuring picture
of the post–World War II Navy. Despite the peace, the Cold War required the
U.S. Navy to remain a large institution, requiring standardized and repeatable
approaches. Exercises and games that had been sandboxes for experimentation
became mechanisms to refine and reinforce established solutions.
Nonetheless, the postwar Navy did learn and adapt to nuclear weapons,
nuclear power, electronics, space, and long-range strike. If Hone is correct that
the interwar model was unsuitable for the modern U.S. Navy, then the question
of how the U.S. Navy learned and evolved after World War II presents a worthy
subject for a separate book.
Until that volume comes along, Learning War represents one of the most profound contributions to the discussion of high-velocity learning in a naval setting
in print. Few historians have captured the past in a way that raises so many ideas
and challenges for the present. As a result, no serious consideration of the U.S.
Navy in World War II will be complete without reference to this volume.
Quite simply, if you are a serving officer and propose to read even one work of
naval history this year, this book should be the one.

NOTES

1.	Chester W. Nimitz [FAdm., USN], speech to
Naval War College, October 10, 1960, folder
26, box 31, RG15 Guest Lectures, 1894–1992,
Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College, Newport, RI, quoted in John M. Lillard,
“Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy
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Preparations for WWII” (PhD dissertation,
George Mason Univ., 2013), p. 1.
2.	Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2013),
p. 98, quoted in Hone, Learning War, p. 12.
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HIGHS AND LOWS
The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George, by
G. H. Bennett. London: Bloomsbury, 2016. 296 pages. $120 (paperback $39.95, e-book $28.76).

Royal Navy captain Stephen Roskill’s
1968 study Naval Policy between
the Wars (Naval Institute Press) has
dominated the historiographical scene
on this subject for half a century. G. H.
Bennett’s volume now successfully adds
much depth and new understanding
to the naval policies of Prime Minister
David Lloyd George’s government in the
immediate aftermath of the First World
War. Bennett’s volume follows, but with
a much different focus, Erik Goldstein
and John Maurer’s The Washington
Conference 1921–22 (Routledge, 1994)
and Donald Lisio’s British Naval
Supremacy and Anglo-American
Antagonisms, 1914–1930 (Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2014). Rather than following the traditional approach to this
period of concentrating on international
diplomacy and external issues, Bennett
demonstrates “a multifaceted approach
rooted in political and naval history
but opening up new and cutting-edge
debates in other areas of historical study
to transform traditional debates” (p. xiv).
Laudably, Bennett seeks an approach
to naval history that breaks down the
artificial barriers that place the study of
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navies in a watertight compartment and
isolate it from “total history” and the
broader patterns of relevant linkages in
political, military, economic, business,
social, gender, and labor history.
The works of Volker Berghahn, Jon
Sumida, and Samuel P. Huntington
have had an impact on Bennett’s focus.
Significantly, Bennett’s approach reflects
the parallels he sees in the 1919–22
period with the issues surrounding
British naval policies in the second
decade of the twenty-first century.
In opening his sensitive and innovative
study of this three-year period, Bennett
points out that Lloyd George’s government had a particularly tricky range of
problems to balance after World War I.
While other recent historians have interpreted the period as one of discontinuity
in British naval and defense policies,
Bennett sees continuity. The inability of
the government to “get it right” in the
area of naval policy was a direct result
of the size and complexity of the issues
that it faced. The difficulty lay in the
interconnectedness of naval policy with
government politics, the private sector,
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and communities. As Samuel Huntington would have put it, British naval
policy had been in a state of “disequilibrium” even before the beginning of the
First World War, and this continued into
the postwar period. Britain’s economy
was declining in comparison with
other national economies; changing
technology and weapons were rendering obsolete Britain’s investment in its
battleship fleet; and other countries,
notably Japan and the United States, had
the potential to build navies that would
end British naval mastery. British leaders
correctly saw these developments as
significant threats to the security, stability, and future of the British Empire.
In the immediate postwar era, Britain
faced massive war debts, along with a
range of severe social and political issues
complicated by unemployment, labor
unrest, and the rise of socialism. These
issues combined to create challenges
to the existing social, economic, and
political order. In trying to create naval
policies in this complex environment,
the Lloyd George government made its
national security decisions on the basis
of what it might be able to afford rather
than on preparing for the worst-case
scenario. That worst-case situation, of
course, was the war that would occur
twenty years later, but that neither the
government nor the British voter could
contemplate so soon after the horrific
events of World War I. Ministers were
forced to balance naval preparedness for
a future war against national bankruptcy
and the fears of a socialist victory by
election or revolution. In this situation,
Lloyd George placed his ministry’s
priority solely on the financial consideration and the reduction of public
spending rather than on a considered
analysis of the strategic situation and
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the likelihood of war. The ministry’s
institution in 1919 of the “ten-year rule”
in defense planning effectively excluded
the possibility of thinking about war.
As Bennett points out, this was in one
sense a logical and pragmatic approach,
but it forced the Royal Navy and the
other armed services to find alternative
explanations for keeping the service
in a state of preparedness to deal with
the future security of Britain and the
empire. While the service turned to
effective arguments such as showing that
battleship construction helped reduce
unemployment, Bennett argues that
this undermined a clear understanding
of the purpose and value of the navy,
harming it in the long run. He goes
on to argue that the ten-year rule had
a pernicious and long-term effect by
establishing the precedent that leaders
could make competent defense decisions
without an assessment of strategic needs
and threats. Bennett underscores the
lesson from this period that political
imperatives cannot compromise strategic threat assessments and decisions.
“Dangers must be identified and noted,
even if the means to meet them are not
immediately at hand” (pp. 179–80).
Bennett’s book is a significant contribution to naval history. Not only
does it provide a new interpretation
of historical events, but it does so by
placing the navy in a much broader
context. While other scholars may
argue points of interpretation, his
vision in bringing about a broader
understanding of the naval dimensions
of this period is a model for others to
follow and apply. Equally important,
his volume has much to say to current
practitioners and strategic planners.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century, by Simon Reich
and Peter Dombrowski. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2017. 252 pages. $30.

As Hal Brands wrote in his 2014 work
What Good Is Strategy? (Cornell Univ.
Press), grand strategy is “very much
in vogue these days” (p. vii). In the
broadest sense, it is a quest to find some
semblance of order in the intricately
complex security environment. The
more disorderly the global security
system, the more expansive the change
under way in this system; and the
more fragile the domestic consensus
on national priorities, the greater the
need for some sort of unifying and
guiding strategy. That is why Americans
desperately are seeking one now.
Even though the body of scholarly
literature on grand strategy is large and
growing, in The End of Grand Strategy
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
have made an original, provocative,
and contrarian contribution, arguing
that Americans are inclined toward
a “one-size-fits-all” grand strategy
based on global primacy that has “little
utility in the twenty-first century” (p.
2). Primacy, Reich and Dombrowski
believe, “has become the default option
of American academics and policy makers who deliberate over grand strategy”
(p. 41). This option leads to two major
problems: primacy is no longer feasible
for the United States, and the actual
application of American power, particularly military power, does not reflect
the grand strategy on which Reich and
Dombrowski feel that it is based.
The authors advocate abandoning
the “one-size-fits-all primacist” grand
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strategy and using a flexible array of six
strategies: primacist-hegemony, leadership / cooperative security / unilateral
hegemony, formal sponsorship, informal
sponsorship, isolationist retrenchment,
and restrained retrenchment. Reich
and Dombrowski then provide six
maritime case studies to illustrate that
the United States already is using this
array of strategies even while claiming
to use a unitary one-size-fits-all one.
This argument makes sense if—and
only if—the authors’ conceptualization
of grand strategy is accurate. But has
anyone outside the academy ever
claimed that there is a discernible,
unitary American grand strategy that
dictates the application of national
power? The authors write: “By definition, the architectural design of any
single, abstract strategy is relatively
rigid if not indeed static—intellectually,
conceptually, analytically, and organizationally” (pp. 167–68). But outside
the academy, there is no “single,
abstract” U.S. grand strategy. There
never has been and never will be.
A case can be made that what Reich
and Dombrowski are describing is
the natural and enduring distinction
between theoretical grand strategies,
which often strive for logical consistency
and internal coherence, and applied
strategy. Just as no military operation
ever perfectly reflects the operational
plan behind it, there never is perfect
congruity between a theoretical grand
strategy and the practice of strategy.
That is the reason that the grand strategic guidelines that the U.S. government
uses to guide its action—particularly
the congressionally mandated National
Security Strategy documents—do not
constitute coherent, logically consistent
grand strategies for a theorist or scholar.
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In practice, American political leaders
use the national grand strategy, be it primacy or something else, as a shorthand
way of explaining the complex security
environment to the public and its elected
representatives, and as a very broad and
pliable set of historically derived best
practices and aspirations. No policy
maker ever made a decision and no military leader ever crafted a theater strategy
or operational plan because it was what
the grand strategy demanded. As John
Gaddis phrased it in On Grand Strategy
(Penguin Random House, 2018), grand
strategy is simply “the alignment of
potentially unlimited aspirations with
necessarily limited capabilities” (p. 21).
It is a constantly shifting web of patterns
and habits blending both aspirations
and predilections, a creed, even a myth,
and not something prescriptive, such
as a legal code. Outright dissonance
between its theory and its practice
would be worrisome, but some level of
incongruity is normal, even inevitable.
While theorists of grand strategy talk
of primacy, in reality the United States
is focused more on maintaining the
system it created rather than trying to
dominate it. Thus the configuration of
the U.S. military, which is derived from
a practice of reasonably being prepared
for low-probability/high-risk threats
such as major war, while devoting most
of its effort to system-maintenance
missions, makes sense. Ultimately, Reich
and Dombrowski’s contention that the
United States is at the end of grand strategy does not stand up if grand strategy
is conceptualized as a set of if/then statements or rules of thumb, as a shorthand
way of communicating and building
consensus rather than official writ.
That said, The End of Grand Strategy is
a challenging, erudite, and worthwhile
read. It is unusual in its use of sea
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power to illustrate its points. It is
right about the enduring centrality
of American naval power. It is right
that a “new” grand strategy is not the
solution to America’s security problems.
However, to borrow from Mark Twain,
the authors’ report of the death of grand
strategy may be an exaggeration.
STEVEN METZ

Hell on Earth, by Avigdor Hameiri, trans. Peter
C. Appelbaum. Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ.
Press, 2017. 478 pages. $39.99.

War memoirs and war literature
frequently intersect. Because of the
traumas and tragedies of war and the
impact they have on individuals, it is
not uncommon for authors to write
of their experiences of war using
fiction to give voice to both literary
creativity and personal experience. Karl
Marlantes’s powerful novel Matterhorn
(Grove, 2010) is one example, written
about his experience of the Vietnam
War as a Marine officer. So also are
the writings of Israeli author Avigdor
Hameiri (1890–1970) a reflection of the
author’s experience of an earlier war.
Born in the village of Odavidhaza,
in Carpathian Ruthenia in AustriaHungary (near present-day Mukacheve,
western Ukraine), Hameiri fought
in World War I as a soldier in the
Austro-Hungarian army and recounted
his experiences in two fictionalized
memoirs, The Great Madness (1929;
translation published by Vantage, 1952)
and Hell on Earth (original-language
publication, 1932). The former recounts
experiences of a Jewish soldier on
the eastern front, while the latter, the
translation of which is the subject of this

120

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

review, recounts a soldier’s (Hameiri’s)
experiences as a Russian prisoner of war.
Interestingly, Hameiri does not write of
bearing a grudge or resentment toward
his captors. He writes candidly of cruelty
and deprivation, but the cruelty is more
often on the part of other prisoners
with different nationalities or ethnicities than of his Russian captors.
Published in Hebrew in 1932, Hell on
Earth was not translated into English
until military historian and translator
Peter C. Appelbaum did so in the
present volume. Much of Appelbaum’s
research and writings focus on the experience of Jewish soldiers during the First
World War, and, that being the case, he
chose an excellent project and provided
an exceptional result. Hell on Earth
presents a vivid and memorable account
of the experiences of soldiers taken
captive on the eastern front during the
war. When readers think of the literature
of World War I, it is often the British war
poets or novels from other nationalities
such as Erich Maria Remarque’s All
Quiet on the Western Front (1929) or
Ernest Hemingway’s A Farewell to Arms
(1927), and, perhaps, memoirs such
as Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth
(1933) and Ernst Jünger’s Storm of Steel
(1920). Writings from the war in the
east are often overlooked, as are writings
about prisoners of war. Yet World War
I created eight million prisoners of
war. In fifty-four chapters (and each
could be read separately with benefit),
Hameiri brings the reader into a world
of uncertainty and survival. His narrative presents conversations, thoughts,
and reflections on the mundane and the
profound. Set far from the western front,
Gallipoli and the Dardanelles campaign,
the siege of Al Kut, or the battle of
Jutland, Hameiri’s work is a reminder
of the war in a locale often overlooked.
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From the first words—“A rainy, filthy,
muddy morning” (p. 27)—readers are
drawn into the world of the soldier
who would soon become a prisoner of
war. The author is descriptive, detailed,
haunting, and humane. Remarkably,
the author ends the work on a note
of humanity and forgiveness. In so
doing, he provides readers with hope
in the midst of a broken world and a
reminder that ultimately, every prisoner
(and person) must confront the limits
of what others can do to them and
wrestle with what is within the prisoner’s
power and what is beyond the prisoner’s
power. Such a reckoning is exactly what
Vietnam prisoner of war and Congressional Medal of Honor recipient Vice
Admiral James B. Stockdale, USN, wrote
of frequently with respect to his captivity
(as have many others, such as Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn and Viktor Frankl).
A translator’s preface and a map set the
stage for the work and give prescient
insight into the challenge of translating such a linguistically rich book. A
remarkable introduction, written by
Avner Holtzman, a professor of Hebrew
literature at Tel Aviv University, provides
extensive contextualization of the work
in Jewish literature of the era and war
literature of World War I. Hell on Earth
is filled with drawings of captivity made
by Hameiri, including one of his escape
from the camp in Irkutsk. Each drawing
adds a dimension to the work that is
powerful and thought provoking.
The volume contains helpful endnotes
illuminating geography, history, and
historical characters, as well as biblical
and Talmudic citations the author used.
Appelbaum’s translation flows smoothly,
such that the writing readily engages the
reader, drawing the reader quickly into
a world of the warrior often forgotten in
war literature. What strikes the reader

121

2/25/19 10:40 AM

116

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 2, Art. 1

frequently throughout the book is the
almost prophetic foreshadowing of the
experience of millions of people of the
Holocaust—pointless cruelty, medical
experiments, starvation, disease, louse
infestation. Although this deprivation
was not true of all Russian prison camps
during the war, it was of Hameiri’s.
The book is important as war literature
and as prisoner-of-war literature and
deserves a wide reading. The writing
is graphic and the horrors of war are
presented in a manner that few will
forget. Hell on Earth is a vivid reminder
that the tragedy of war never should
be forgotten or minimized. It is a book
to read and on which to reflect. Those
who do so will not be disappointed.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and
Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire, by Brian Drohan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2018. 256 pages. $45.

During its late-twentieth-century
wars of decolonization, Great Britain
employed counterinsurgency methods,
such as indefinite detention and coercive
interrogations, that human rights activists
challenged. Initially in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the United States employed the same
counterinsurgency policies and tactics the
British had used decades earlier, and, not
surprisingly, the United States faced the
same legal challenges in the first decade
of this century that the British faced from
the 1950s through the 1970s. The U.S.
legal battles have been well documented
over the past decade, and now Brutality
in an Age of Human Rights exposes the
controversial colonial policies and
tactics sanctioned by British civilian and
military authorities from 1955 to 1975.
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When the insurgencies in Iraq and
Afghanistan began, U.S. leaders studying
past counterinsurgencies had relatively
few scholarly works to consult. Then, as
the focus on international human rights
law grew, so too did the number of
books that exposed contentious wartime
policies and methods. Brian Drohan’s
book is a valuable resource for lawyers,
planners, and policy writers studying
the history of human rights and its
effect on counterinsurgency warfare.
Brutality in an Age of Human Rights
unequivocally dispels the myth that
the British were anything but brutal
in their counterinsurgency methods
while maintaining a public façade
of rule of law adherence during the
Cyprus emergency (1955–59), the Aden
emergency in Yemen (1963–67), and
the Northern Ireland Troubles (during
the 1970s). Drohan, a U.S. Army officer,
West Point history professor, and
historian of modern Britain, expanded
his University of North Carolina–Chapel
Hill dissertation into this scholarly
work that includes 847 endnotes and
a detailed bibliography documenting
the author’s extensive research.
Drohan uncovers what others largely
have ignored: the role of human rights
activists in shaping wartime policies
and practices. Backed by colonial-era
records, Drohan persuasively argues
that lawyers, local and international
societies, and political groups actively
challenged British civilian and military leaders—shaping the strategic
debates on human rights that affected
operational- and tactical-level counterinsurgency methods. Relying on
documented incidents, Drohan
exposes Britain’s harsh tactics and
counters the British narrative that
mythologized its image of colonial
rule through minimal force.
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For each conflict considered, Drohan
describes its origin, introduces the
activist groups, exposes the human
rights violations, details the activists’
challenges to the British methods, and
reveals the British leaders’ systematic
and bold efforts to deny any brutality against insurgents and innocent
civilians. Throughout the book, Drohan
provides numerous examples of lawfare,
a concept he describes as a strategy for
using—or misusing—the law to achieve
an operational military objective.
Chapters 1 and 2 cover the late 1950s
Cyprus insurgency and the Cyprus Bar
Council’s extensive efforts to counter
Britain’s coercive interrogation methods
to obtain intelligence. With parallels to
the war on terror, Greek Cypriot lawyers
challenged the colonial secretary’s
Emergency Regulations that vested nearabsolute power in the British military
commander on Cyprus. The legal
battles continued for years, including
an appeal to the European Commission
of Human Rights to investigate the
British atrocities; however, Britain
successfully deflected the allegations
until the conflict was resolved without
any meaningful resolution of the abuses
that British soldiers perpetrated.
In the 1960s, when an anticolonial
insurgency arose in the British territory
of Aden and Britain employed the same
brutal tactics used in Cyprus, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) stepped in to protect unlawfully
detained nationalists. Chapters 3 and
4 detail the ICRC and Amnesty International efforts to counter and expose
British violations on the international
stage. With aggressive, unrelenting
campaigns on both sides, it was, as
Drohan notes, a protracted and messy
affair, with numerous investigations,
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British manipulation of the process,
and hollow victories for the advocates.
Chapter 5 focuses on British brutality
during the Northern Ireland Troubles,
including Britain’s approval of five
techniques used for interrogation of
interned prisoners: wall standing,
hooding, white noise, sleep deprivation,
and a bread-and-water diet. Despite
evidence of illegal detention and
coercive interrogations, Britain successfully limited government inquiries and
shielded or absolved officials and interrogators from legal liability. Years later,
when George W. Bush administration
officials sanctioned similar enhanced
interrogation techniques, those officials
likewise were shielded from liability.
Drohan’s examination and detailed
study of the relationship between
human rights activism and British
counterinsurgency practices is worthy of
review by civilian and military leaders
with a role in shaping wartime policy,
particularly lawyers, military planners,
and policy writers. Brutality in an Age of
Human Rights is eminently worthy of a
spot on the counterinsurgency bookshelf
next to David Galula’s Counterinsurgency
Warfare (Praeger, 2006), John Nagl’s
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Univ.
of Chicago Press, 2005), and the U.S.
Army / U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Cosimo, 2010).
JEFF A. BOVARNICK

Realist Ethics: Just War Traditions as Power Politics, by Valerie Morkevičius. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018. 268 pages. $34.99.

Professor Valerie Morkevičius offers
a provocative thesis in her new book:
the just war tradition has more in
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common historically with realist views
of international relations than with the
idealist views that characterize contemporary just war thought. She argues that
just war thinking will be a more effective
constraint on the use of force if it returns
to those realist roots, rather than
continuing trends toward pacifism and
“liberal crusading” that dominate much
modern work on just war. Morkevičius
supports her thesis with careful scholarship in the Christian, Islamic, and Hindu
just war traditions and persuasive arguments about the relationships among
religion, power, law, and the use of force.
Morkevičius was motivated by puzzling
behavior prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion
of Iraq. Prominent realists, such as John
Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Robert
Pape, vocally opposed the war as unnecessary and inimical to U.S. interests.
Prominent just war thinkers, including
Michael Walzer, James Turner Johnson,
and Jean Elshtain, expressed cautious
support for the war. Curious about
how realism—often associated with the
amoral use of force by states—could be
invoked to oppose the war, while the
just war tradition—normally associated
with limits on the use of force—could
be called on to support it, Morkevičius
studied the history of just war thought.
“I expected—in typical liberal fashion—
to see a constant evolution of just war
norms toward the good. . . . What I
found was a history of power” (p. 5).
The book rigorously traces that history.
Drawing on representative thinkers from
major periods of Christian, Islamic, and
Hindu just war thought, Morkevičius
shows that just war thinking can be
evaluated through an international relations lens as expressing evolving norms
about the use of state power. Norms are
a more efficient way for powerful states
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to enforce their desires than frequently
going to war. Just war traditions
represent one way to create and sustain
norms that benefit powerful states. To be
clear, she does not suggest that religious
authorities cynically serve the interests
of the state; rather, they are pragmatic
about the scope of their influence.
Morkevičius shows how the relationship
between religious authority and the
state can explain the historical focus of
just war thought. When the political
power of religious authorities was
tenuous, religious thinkers emphasized
the legitimacy of the state and focused
on questions of how believers could
justify war—jus ad bellum questions.
When the relationship between religious
authority and the state was more secure,
the religious leaders offered views
on how political authorities should
conduct themselves in war—questions
of jus in bello. Thus, early Christian and
Islamic writers were concerned with
whether, when, and against whom war
could be justified, while later writers
in both traditions explored the duty to
protect noncombatants from the evils
of war. Hindu just war thought is more
difficult to trace, since it relies more
on oral traditions and less on written
scriptures, but Morkevičius shows a
similar development in Hindu epics and
sacred texts. Concern with the treatment
of noncombatants, she asserts, reflected
not only a religiously founded moral
emphasis on mercy but also a politically
expedient emphasis on avoiding actions
that would make it difficult to govern
conquered territories by fostering bitterness among the defeated population.
The three disparate religious traditions
Morkevičius examines are united by a
pessimistic view of human nature. They
all believe that, although humans need
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each other to survive and thrive, people
are naturally fractious, routinely fighting
with one another rather than cooperating. Political realism shares this outlook.
By contrast, much contemporary just
war thinking begins from a secular legalist perspective, which is more optimistic
and idealistic about human nature and
the ability of rules and norms to create a
just society. Morkevičius argues that this
modern idealism is responsible for both
a pacifist tendency in modern just war
thinking, which can weaken its power to
create norms, since states are unlikely to
give up the use of force entirely, and an
interventionist tendency, which leads to
concepts that challenge sovereignty, such
as the responsibility-to-protect doctrine.
While the motives are laudable, she
asserts, these trends risk marginalizing
the influence of just war thought.
Practitioners will find the argument
of this book interesting and will
benefit from exposure to Islamic and
Hindu just war traditions, which
are likely less familiar to them than
the Christian tradition. Scholars
will enjoy the rigorous research and
careful textual analysis. Whether one
agrees with its thesis or not, the book
challenges readers and engages them
in an important dialogue about how
power, religion, authority, and norms
interact in the international arena.
DOYLE HODGES

Cadets on Campus: History of Military Schools of
the United States, by John Alfred Coulter II. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2017. 464
pages. $50.

J. A. Coulter has done a masterful job
tracing the evolution and history of
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military schools throughout the United
States over the past 216 years. What really makes this book unique is the extent
of Coulter’s research. He provides a
comprehensive review of all the military
schools that have been established across
the United States. The appendices,
notes, and references are a testament
to the research Coulter conducted to
prepare the manuscript. He provides
both history and analysis to demonstrate
the impact of each of these schools on
American history. As a graduate of the
U.S. Military Academy, I was fascinated
to learn about the important role that
the graduates of military schools
have played in our nation’s history.
Initially, Coulter lays the foundation
and explains the elements of military
school culture in terms of Edgar
Schein’s organizational culture model
using artifacts, espoused values, and
underlying assumptions. Artifacts
include the cadet uniforms, rank, and
insignia. Espoused values consist of
the cadet honor codes and leadership
values. “According to Edgar Schein,
the final and most powerful element
of organizational culture is shared
tacit assumptions which result in
perceptions, feelings, and behaviors
that are learned and taken for granted
and are not debatable” (p. 4). These
elements make the military schools
unique and give them a special place
in the history of American education.
Coulter tells the story of how just a few
men, such as Major Sylvanus Thayer,
USA, and Captain Alden Partridge,
USA, who worked together in the early
years at West Point, were instrumental
in the growth of military schools
and colleges across the United States.
Partridge’s subsequent court-martial
and removal from West Point laid the
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groundwork for him to establish a
military school in Norwich, Vermont,
which later became Norwich University.
“Partridge would eventually be associated with the citizen soldier concept
and years later be known as the father
of ROTC [Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps]” (p. 38). Thayer implemented
systems still in use today, including
a rigorous academic curriculum
and the West Point honor code. “As
superintendent at West Point, Sylvanus
Thayer would lead that institution from
1817 to 1833. In that role he firmly
established an ethos and standard of
education that led to the expansion of
the military school concept well into
the current century” (p. 35). Thayer and
Partridge planted the seeds of military
education that would grow and prosper
across the country. The students taught
by Thayer and Partridge would go on to
establish military schools and colleges
throughout the United States on the
basis of the model they developed.

percent reduction in the nation’s military
schools” (p. 250). Military service was
clearly not the same badge of honor
that it had been after previous wars.

Coulter does a superb job explaining
how the growth and expansion of
military schools and colleges is tied to
events in U.S. military history. He notes
that “[b]y far the greatest impact on
military schools of the United States has
been war” (p. 249). Except for a slight
decline immediately after the Civil War,
the number of military schools increased
steadily from 1802 through 1926. Thus,
it reached its peak after World War I; the
numbers declined steadily after World
War II and the Korean War. But it was
the Vietnam War and the ongoing atmosphere of social change that sounded
the death knell for several military
schools and colleges. Coulter writes,
“The political impact of the Vietnam
War, along with a cultural shift among
young people, was responsible for a 65

Coulter’s research and storytelling
indicate a level of scholarship that
few achieve. My only criticism is that
it would have been useful to have
more background on the history of
military schools in other cultures for
comparison. Are the military schools in
the United States unique, compared with
the models established in other cultures?
If so, what makes them unique?
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Recently, however, there has been a
resurgence in the number of military
schools. “Starting in 1999 and continuing until at least 2014, the decline in the
number of military schools and their
enrollment ended, and these indicators
have reversed” (p. 239). There are a
number of reasons for this. Charter
schools increasingly are adopting the
military school model as a means of
improving students’ character. Women
also have integrated seamlessly into
many of the programs. For example, the
first captain at West Point last year was
a female who eventually was accepted
as a Rhodes Scholar. Finally, the public
image of the military profession has
improved radically, according to recent
Gallup polls (p. 240). Each of these
factors contributes to the resurgence of
military schools in the United States.

Coulter has done an exceptional
job tracing the history and factors
that influenced military schools
across the United States. I would
recommend this book wholeheartedly to anyone interested in learning
about the military school model.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

126

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

B O O K R E V I E WS

121

Admiral James B. Stockdale Professor
of Ethics at the U.S. Naval War College.
Soft War: The Ethics of Unarmed Conflict, ed. Michael L. Gross and Tamar Meisels. Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 294 pages.
$27.99.

Over the last twenty years and arguably
long before that, the line between
“war” and “not war” has become more
blurred than it ever has been. In part,
this is because of a greatly increased
number of actors using force to achieve
a variety of goals, but also because
new technologies and applications
present grave challenges to attempts to
determine what are “acts of war.” Cyber
attacks, economic sanctions, so-called
media warfare, and lawfare now exist
in the increasingly large and complex
gray zone separating peace and war.
There has been little examination
of applicable rules and guidelines to
encourage and ensure right behavior
in this growing gray zone. Soft War
examines the potential benefit in
applying the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) and the just war tradition to
these arenas of soft conflict. The result is
a collection of fourteen eclectic chapters
examining eight separate areas related to
soft war. Not surprisingly, some chapters
make their case much more strongly
than others, but together they make for
provocative and interesting reading.
Although the quality of individual chapters is uneven, the editors are sincere in
their efforts to examine the role of ethics
and rules in an area where currently all
but none exist. The lineup of authors is
impressive and includes such notables
as Cécile Fabre of All Souls College,
Oxford University; Joy Gordon of
Loyola University; and George R.
Lucas, the recently appointed Vice
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Those who adhere to a traditional view
of security, peace, and war will find
many of their assumptions and beliefs
challenged by Soft War. Concepts such
as jus ad vim (the use of force short
of war) raise questions about the sort
of operations that would belong in
this category and what, if any, ethical
framework could be applied to these
operations. One of the strengths of Soft
War is the identification of operations
conducted by both state and nonstate
actors that do not meet the threshold
of war but definitely are not peace.
The book’s introduction and first
chapter suggest a new definition of
war that is thought provoking and
useful. Given that formally declared
war apparently is passé, efforts to define
just what the term war encompasses are
overdue. For example, does the use of
force against an opponent remain one of
the prerequisites for moving from peace
to war? Or can the effects of nonlethal
actions produce outcomes so severe
as to be considered an act of war?
The book’s strongest chapters are
those dealing with subjects that are
better known to the larger security
profession. Authors of these chapters
tend to produce the best arguments
and convincing conclusions. For
example, chapter 7, “State-Sponsored
Hacktivism and the Rise of ‘Soft’ War”
by George Lucas, is excellent. The
other chapters in this section on cyber
warfare, media warfare, and lawfare
are also among the best in the book.
That said, editorial sincerity and
several excellent chapters likely will not
convince traditional security professionals to support applying the LOAC as a
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guide to dealing with these emerging
threats. Whether soft war is actually
war still remains up for debate, despite
Soft War’s well-crafted arguments.
Having examined cyber war, media
war, and lawfare, Soft War takes on the
general category of nonviolence, and
the more-specific questions of hostage
taking and prisoners. One of the
more-provocative chapters examines
the use of unarmed bodyguards. This
title applies primarily to unarmed
civilians performing the role of
peacekeepers without UN authorization. Some readers will be surprised to
learn that some small-scale operations
of this nature have been undertaken,
but no reader should be surprised
at the complications deriving from
attempts to conduct such operations
on a much broader scale. Even more
surprising is the argument that under
some circumstances, civilians might
be conscripted, morally and legally,
to conduct such an operation.
Soft War’s concluding chapter, “Proportionate Self-defense in Unarmed
Conflict” by Michael Gross, is not a
summation of the book’s content but
a separate piece of scholarship that
stands on its own merit. Gross discusses
appropriate responses to sanctions,
lawfare, and cyber warfare/terrorism,
and he also identifies and examines
some of the very significant challenges
in constructing a valid response to
unarmed attacks. His conclusion that
“soft war poses an abiding challenge for
just war theory” (p. 232) is somewhat
anticlimactic; for all that, it is defensible.
In the end, Soft War is much more an
invitation to a conversation than it is
a set of ready-to-use solutions. It does
raise questions to which, so far, there are
no answers. It proposes solutions, some
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of which are likely to create additional
and potentially worse problems. Its
contributors do not hesitate to challenge
status quo thinking and deliver new
perspectives. Perhaps most importantly, this book recognizes that ethical
considerations must be part of operations in the gray area between peace
and war and that the time to identify
tools and guidelines for resolving those
associated ethical issues is now.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Patton’s Way: A Radical Theory of War, by James
Kelly Morningstar. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 352 pages. $35.

When most people think of General
George S. Patton Jr., USA—even people
who should know better—they tend to
confuse him with George C. Scott, the
actor who played him in the 1970 movie
Patton. In many ways, that is a tribute
to Scott’s acting and the power of film
in contemporary society, but there is a
reason the motion picture was made in
the first place: Patton was an exceptionally good general who got results.
James Kelly Morningstar reminds us of
that fact in this powerful and significant
account of Patton’s approach to war
fighting. Much of Patton’s unique
approach to combat operations has been
obscured by a number of factors. He
died soon after the war, which allowed
other Allied generals to offer accounts
in the form of interviews, speeches, and
memoirs that emphasized their contributions and, in turn, downplayed those
of Patton. In addition, many people,
including historians and army officers
studying his battles, did not understand
or appreciate fully his approach, and
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attributed Patton’s results simply to
“daring . . . intuition . . . determination.”
Morningstar chooses to differ. He
quotes Brigadier General Oscar W.
Koch, USA, Patton’s chief intelligence
officer, on this matter: “If one can call
anticipation of enemy reactions based
on a lifetime of professional training
and on thinking and application
‘intuition,’ he had it” (p. 7). Morningstar
argues that “Patton was one of the
Army’s few deep thinkers and an astute
theoretician” (p. 16). He contends that
Patton’s theories were the subject of
careful study of military history and
geography and an understanding about
the logic of power—in particular, the
combination of time, space, and mass.
Patton rejected the U.S. Army doctrine
of the day that emphasized firepower
and attrition. In a sense, he was the rebel
against the system that the George C.
Scott movie presents. “Patton developed
a new calculus of war: fire to enable
maneuver, maneuver to create shock,
shock to frustrate enemy decisionmaking, frustrate decision-making to
destroy enemy morale, and destroy
morale to collapse the enemy’s will”
(pp. 3–4). To do these things, Patton
encouraged subordinate initiative, speed,
and flexibility at the tactical levels. He
relied on intelligence, not only to know
where the enemy was but to get a sense
of how a battle would unfold, which gave
him an understanding of how to beat his
adversary. As in the game of chess, he
wanted to cut off his opponents’ options
and beat them before they had a chance
to take action. Many contemporaries
looked at what Patton was doing and
failed to understand. Subordinate
initiative looked like poor command
and control. Maneuver and the application of firepower against lightly held
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positions often made others think his
units were never battle tested, which
ignored the fact that he was not trying
to get into an attritional engagement.
This book is one that every serious
specialist of World War II should
read. More importantly, it is an account that any individual involved
in developing doctrine in any
professional army—be it the U.S.,
British, or South Korean—should
read, study, and consider carefully.
NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy
Shaped Religion and State in Modern America, by
Ronit Y. Stahl. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 2017. 384 pages. $39.95.

Ronit Y. Stahl, a professor of history at
the University of California, Berkeley,
has written a detailed and fascinating
book on the American military chaplaincy. Of the piles of books on military
topics that authors, historians, analysts,
and academics publish each year, books
on emergent military technology, historical battles, and biography dominate the
stacks; religion and the chaplain corps
responsible for tending to servicemembers’ ecumenical needs tend to get short
shrift. And when religious matters—and
in particular chaplains—are written
about, these works often focus on larger
matters of ethics or morality in military
service. Thus, it is welcome to see Stahl’s
scholarly work on a military specialty
that is one of the smallest across all
military services but whose effect on
servicemembers and their culture is
often directly inverse to its size.
Stahl begins the story in the early twentieth century, when the modern American
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military chaplaincy constituted one of
the World War I–era progressive reforms
of the military services. It probably is
not a surprise that in 1917 the American
military chaplaincy involved three major
religious groups: Catholicism, Judaism,
and Protestantism. Stahl notes that what
the U.S. government and U.S. military
needed was ministers, priests, and rabbis
to perform three vital functions for the
servicemembers fighting in Europe: bury
the dead, perform religious services, and
provide training to military members.
At the crux of Stahl’s story is a military
with a chaplain corps that from its
creation always has lived a precarious
balance: the need to minister spiritually
to the men and women in uniform
while refraining from making the state
a proponent of any one church or moral
teaching. In fact, Stahl summarizes this
quite nicely, saying, “When Americans
live, fight, and die together, religion
does not reside on the margins or
evaporate from communal compounds.
Instead, the military chaplaincy tries
to navigate a careful course that
enables religious practice without
trampling on the rights of others or
establishing a state religion” (p. 264).
Also, from the genesis of the chaplaincy
to its current form, in each decade
and during every war, there has been
friction. Stahl walks the reader through
these challenges, beginning in World
War I with the building of a young
chaplaincy in the services and simply
efforts to recruit enough chaplains to administer ecumenical rites to thousands
of servicemembers serving in Europe.
From World War I and into the interwar
years and through World War II, other
issues arose. How should chaplains
serve a segregated military? Which
religions should the military officially
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recognize, and how quickly should they
do so? (Interesting fact: Stahl notes that
we began with three religious groups
and now the Department of Defense
[DoD] recognizes 221 “faith group
codes.”) In World War II, questions of
sex caused plenty of headaches among
chaplains. With religious groups such
as Catholicism advocating abstinence
until marriage and prohibiting the use
of prophylactics, how were Catholic
chaplains to remain faithful to their
church’s teachings while realizing that
DoD distributed condoms to servicemembers to minimize sexually transmitted diseases, with the goal of preserving
an effective fighting force? These
issues and others—female chaplains,
homosexuality, grooming standards,
food observances—have been contentious points for many religious groups.
Religious clashes were inevitable—and
will continue to be. As Stahl notes, one
of the long-standing points of friction
is “the military’s unbending insistence
on the appearance of uniform bodies” (p. 252). Here, the professor, of
course, is referring to years and years
of prohibitive grooming standards or
dress exemptions. The most well-known
standards and exemptions are beards for
Sikhs and yarmulkes for Jews. In 2014,
DoD took additional steps to encourage commanders to give members of
various religious groups the latitude to
practice their beliefs and authorized
beards, for instance, as long as they did
not disrupt good order and discipline.
The only criticism I have about the
book is that, frankly, it would have been
interesting to read more about the role
of the chaplaincy in the past twenty
years. Stahl stays away from detailed
analysis of anything after Vietnam. I
suppose, however, that the Afghanistan

130

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

and Iraq wars deserve their own books
on how religion and the chaplaincy
shaped servicemembers who served in
those conflicts. Also, as noted earlier,
this is a scholarly work—it is detailed,
includes extensive bibliographic notes,
and, thankfully, has a fine index. Stahl’s
work is a great addition to any military
chaplain’s library and valuable to the
military historian interested in understanding how sometimes the society that
military members serve affects them in
the most basic of human spheres—the
spiritual and religious ones.
Ironically, Stahl’s book shows that for
religion, the military, and the men
and women who are bound by a creed
and worship something greater than
themselves, the relationship among
them is one that is always changing and
evolving—sometimes contentiously.
To paraphrase Stahl, the chaplaincy—a
point of tension between church and
state—will be a battleground in the
future, as it has been in the past.
CHRISTOPHER NELSON

The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–
1991, by Gregory Fontenot. Columbia: Univ. of
Missouri Press, 2017. 526 pages. $36.95.

Retired U.S. Army colonel Gregory
Fontenot’s excellent book details the
transformation of the Army’s famous
1st Infantry Division—“the Big Red
One”—following the end of the Vietnam
War and culminating in its combat
success in the First Gulf War. Fontenot,
a retired U.S. Army armor officer, is
well qualified to write this book, having
served in the division, including command of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor
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before and during DESERT STORM. As
the former commander of the Army’s
Battle Command Training Program
(now called the Mission Command
Training Program), he is an expert on
collective military training. He is also a
coauthor of the Army’s initial history of
the more recent Gulf War, On Point: The
United States Army in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (Naval Institute Press, 2005).
Fontenot’s latest book, The 1st Infantry
Division and the US Army Transformed,
begins with an Army racked with training and disciplinary problems at the end
of the Vietnam War. Fontenot describes
how senior Army leaders responded
with a strategy designed to reestablish
military standards by improving training
programs and professional military
education for officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) alike. Central to
this was the development of the National
Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin,
California. Located on a site larger than
the state of Rhode Island, the NTC is a
world-class training center with a robust
opposing force, instrumented ranges,
sufficient equipment, and a professional cadre of observer-controllers
who watch every action throughout the
training rotations. The adoption of and
adherence to a rigorous and thorough
after-action review process enables those
participating in the training to improve
on every aspect of their performance.
Functioning not only as a training
center that duplicates near-combat
conditions for brigade-sized Army units,
the NTC also integrates other service
elements into its training rotations.
Fontenot then focuses his book on
detailing the planning and preparation
that enabled the 1st Infantry Division—
as well as other combat units—to deploy
successfully from the United States to
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Saudi Arabia during the DESERT SHIELD
buildup of 1990. He does not shy away
from discussing the matériel shortcomings and the significant logistical
challenges encountered in achieving
this unprecedented deployment of
soldiers, vehicles, equipment, and
supplies into the theater of operations.
As DESERT SHIELD prepared to become
DESERT STORM, the book explores how
senior military leaders wrestled with
operational planning for the attack on
and defeat of the Iraqi military. With the
commencement of military operations,
Fontenot discusses DESERT STORM from
the operational and tactical-level perspectives of the VII Corps commander,
Lieutenant General Fred Franks; the 1st
Infantry Division commander, Major
General Thomas G. Rhame; and numerous brigade, battalion, and company
commanders. Fontenot especially is
attentive to identifying by name the
NCOs and soldiers of the division,
and highlights their many individual
contributions to the unit’s collective
success as he follows the 1st Infantry
Division through the course of the war.
Fontenot provides similar detail in his
consideration of the very real problems
faced at the operational-strategic and

strategic leadership levels—where the
most senior decision makers were
hundreds, even thousands, of miles from
the action on the battlefield’s frontages.
Some of these commanders’ expectations were frustrated by the battlefield’s
ever-present “friction,” famously
described in Carl von Clausewitz’s
classic study On War. Indeed, lessons
drawn from Clausewitz and other
military philosophers are peppered
throughout the book. Fontenot uses
these historical touchstones to validate
the study of military history and its
continued operational relevance.
I heartily endorse this well-written
and well-researched analytical study
of the experiences of the 1st Infantry
Division. It is a success story that
provides invaluable insight into the
training renaissance the U.S. Army
experienced following the Vietnam
War—a transformation that led directly
to the successes of Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM. This insight
speaks to ongoing questions about
military education and training as the
nation continues to wage a war on terror.
NEAL H. BRALLEY

OUR REVIEWERS

Jeff A. Bovarnick, Judge Advocate, USA, serves as executive officer and special counsel in the
Office of the Army General Counsel. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College (MMS, 2015);
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (2006); U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s
School (LLM, 2002); New England School of Law, Boston (JD, 1992); and the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst (BBA, 1988).
Neal H. Bralley served on active duty in the United States Army from 1974 to 2000. From 2000
to 2016, he served as an assistant professor and teaching team leader at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College. In addition to his numerous assignments in South Korea, Germany, and
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Saudi Arabia, he commanded the National Training Center Support Battalion, Fort Irwin, California, and was Chief of Staff, Defense Supply Center, Columbus. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College.
Timothy J. Demy is a professor of military ethics at the Naval War College. He is a retired Navy
chaplain and graduate of the Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare. Among other graduate degrees, he received his MSt from the University of Cambridge, ThM and ThD from Dallas
Theological Seminary, and MA and PhD from Salve Regina University. He is the author and editor
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Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He retired from the Navy as a commander in 2013.
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He holds a PhD from Johns Hopkins University and is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of
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strategy and national security policy.
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RUNNING SILENT AND ALGORITHMIC
The U.S. Navy Strategic Vision in 2019

A

s of January 2019, the U.S. Navy does not possess a coherent, public, strategic
vision.1 The official statement of strategy, or the Navy’s strategic concept, to
use a term inspired by the late Samuel P. Huntington’s term, remains A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015,
whose acronym is CS21R (R for revised).2 The Department of the Navy (DON)
leadership has never declared CS21R to be superseded, nor has anything been
published to supplant it.3 However, CS21R was written to support (and possibly
shape) the foreign policy proclivities of the administration of President Barack
H. Obama; its predecessor document, CS21 of October 2007, was released during the administration of President George W. Bush. Both of these presidents
endorsed engagement with the international community (albeit in contrasting
forms).4 The public statements of President Donald J. Trump appear to indicate
that some of the principles articulated in CS21R may no longer be a good fit,
and indeed the emergence of an international system dominated by great-power
competition is now more apparent. Outsiders who study the policies of the U.S.
Navy are well aware of this disconnect.5
Yet the U.S. Navy does, in fact, have a strategic vision that reflects the tenets of
former Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis’s National Defense Strategy (NDS).
Within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV), this strategic document
has been referred to as “the Navy’s response to the NDS” or “the Navy’s contribution to the joint force.” Like the NDS, it is classified “Secret” and not available
publicly. Unlike the NDS, however, the Navy document does not have an unclassified summary, and there is little indication that one eventually will be prepared.
If the Navy’s strategic vision is not available publicly, how can we make sense
of the service’s future policies, resource requirements, dispositions and deployments, and budget submissions? Likewise, how can the U.S. Navy convince the
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American people—and obviously the political decision makers—of the validity
and logic of its course? How do we know what the naval leadership intends?
In the spirit of the descriptions (and hype) of current discussions of artificial
intelligence (AI), we can apply human intelligence by analyzing the sum of what
can be described metaphorically as a complex algorithm. In other words, we
can combine the current white papers and program guidance(s) of the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) and Secretary of the Navy, along with related official
and semiofficial sources, to generate an approximate outline of the U.S. Navy’s
strategic focus.6
STRATEGIC VISION BY ALGORITHM
Included in this algorithm are (1) the 2018 National Defense Strategy and its
publicly released Summary; (2) CS21R, which lays out what remains the official
(DON) strategy but appears overtaken by events and out of sync with presidential
guidance; (3) three white papers that provide general direction from the current
CNO, Admiral John M. Richardson, USN; (4) remnants of the officially superseded Air-Sea Battle, a victim of joint ideology; (5) the report to Congress from
an officially unofficial Navy future fleet architecture study team; (6) a numerical
goal—355 ships—that appears largely in the rhetoric of senior officials; and (7) a
book-length monograph attempting to define the current Navy in terms of naval
war fighting that was commissioned by a previous CNO but released only weeks
before his retirement (and thus is of questionable authority). Unlike the seven
samurai (or seven gunfighters) of legend and film, these seven share a similar
cause but do not necessarily fight well together.
In addition to these seven items there are statutory reports to Congress, such
as the thirty-year shipbuilding plan and the Secretary of the Navy’s annual report,
from which can be gleaned particular details or other clues about the Navy’s navigational track.7 Additionally, as previously noted, classified top-level guidance or
guidances from the Secretary of Defense exist—including the 2018 NDS—that
cannot be ignored and, under Secretary Mattis, shaped (and changed) the Navy’s
approach to building its vision.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy also has its classified guidance prioritizing its
resource requirements for its program objective memorandum (POM) submission to the defense budget.8 This strategic planning guidance, long-range
planning guidance, Navy strategic plan for program objective memorandum, or
simply guidance (the name changes with CNOs) is used by Navy program analysts and resource sponsors in lieu of translating a loftier strategic vision from
strategy-speak to programese.9 The current Chief of Naval Operations guidance
(CNOG) for the fiscal year 2020 program objective memorandum actually was
written ahead of the then-under-draft “response to the NDS.” So, in fact, the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1
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SEVEN PRIMARY SOURCES FOR DETERMINING NAVY’S STRATEGIC VISION
Document Type

Source

1

Secretary of
Defense guidance

Summary of the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (Summary NDS)

2018

Dominant joint/DoD guidance

2

Preexisting
strategic vision

A Cooperative Strategy for 21st
Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready (CS21R)

March 2015

Current Navy official vision

3

Fleet design
guidance from
current CNO
Richardson

a. Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority, 1.0 (Design 1.0)

January 2016

Updated by 2.0

b. The Future Navy

May 2017

In effect

c. Design for Maintaining Maritime
Superiority, 2.0 (Design 2.0)

December
2018

Affirms majority of 1.0; adds
specific guidance

Air-Sea Battle
remnants

a. Admiral Greenert, USN, and
General Mark Welsh, USAF, Breaking
the Kill Chain

2013

b. Air-Sea Battle Office, Air-Sea
Battle: Multi-service Collaboration
to Address Anti-access and Area Denial

May 2013

c. Hutchins et al., “Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global
Commons,” Joint Force Quarterly, no.
84 (1st Quarter 2017)

2017

Publicly subsumed by Joint
Access and Maneuver in the
Global Commons (JAM-GC)
joint concept paper (however,
JAM-GC is applicable only
tangentially to antiaccess
challenges)

4

Release Date

Status

5

Navy Project
Team report to
Congress (N8
representative
lead)

Report to Congress: Alternative Future
Fleet Platform Architecture Study

October/
November
2016

Overtaken by events and 355
number?

6

Directive for 355ship Navy

Executive Summary, 2016 Navy
Force Structure Assessment (FSA), 14
December 2016

December
14, 2016

2018–19 FSA is under way

7

Former CNO
Greenert’s
handbook on
Navy enduring
attributes

How We Fight: Handbook for the
Naval Warfighter

July 2015

Unclear and unpublicized

programming transliteration actually appeared (within the OPNAV staff) prior
to the written strategy narrative.10
In a well-planned deployment, all these sources would synchronize to create
a whole greater than the sum of their parts. Alas, conflicting perceptions of the
post–post–Cold War world and rival political and bureaucratic ambitions have
created crosscurrents that subtract as well as add. For example, some of these
documents were written under the assumption of increased defense resources,
whereas the midterm election of November 6, 2018, led to new House Armed
Services Committee leadership that has been warning of leaner defense budgets.11
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The intent of this article is to sum the algorithm and provide an outline of the U.S.
Navy’s current service strategic vision.
DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
Before describing each of the seven algorithmic inputs, we first need to deal
with the question whether having a public USN strategic vision really matters.
To the naval analyst operating in fleet commands, or even in the trenches of the
Pentagon, and other navalists in general, the probable answer is “not really.” As
Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (CNO, 1986–90), stated, “Over the years our
Maritime Strategy has been very much like the British Constitution—unwritten
but thoroughly understood by those who practice it.”12 Indeed, for those who
serve in the fleet, the objectives of deterring war, maintaining U.S. access to
the materials and markets of international trade, intervening in crises when so
ordered, fighting terrorist groups, and providing a sovereign, forward presence
are quite evident. For those who work on future Navy programs and budget, the
CNOG and other classified documents are more directly useful.13
Ultimately, however, it is not the Navy or even the Secretary of Defense that
actually determines Navy programs and budget, but rather the members of
Congress as representatives of the American people. The fact that congressmen
who normally are supportive of the naval services recently have expressed their
desire that the Navy articulate a clear vision should be of concern to the service.14
Yet, taking its cue from Secretary of Defense Mattis, who showed a penchant to
discourage “too much” openness to media, the Navy has continued to run (relatively) silent.15
There are at least three likely explanations for the secretary’s caution with the
media. First is the official reason: too much information should not be transmitted to potential enemies. But in the case of the U.S. Navy, whose strategic
predilections were made clear through media speculation (and some public
discussion) of the air-sea battle concept (circa 2009–15), that reason seems a
bit implausible. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and others know toward
whom the Navy’s operational planning is directed.16 Second might be his desire
that the services tightly conform to the jointly focused NDS. Since the Navy is
known for its independently derived strategic visions—primarily on the basis of
applying its own traditional operating concerns against changing conditions and
emerging threats—this seems a more plausible concern. Third, more speculatively, is that the Secretary of Defense wants to ensure that the Navy—along with
the other services and the rest of the Department of Defense (DoD)—does not
get crosswise with future tweets and other sudden proposals emanating from the
White House.17 The president announced his desire for a 350-ship Navy at approximately the same time as he announced his proposals for a reduced federal
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budget.18 Quiet might be prudent at this particular moment. However, silence
over its service visions never has seemed to help the Navy’s long-term viability in
the past, particularly in terms of budget and force structure.
THE CASE OF THE MARITIME STRATEGY
The public release of the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy in 1986 is one example
of how public discussion—particularly by influential academics, with all the disputation and opposition that implies—actually improved the vision, raised public
awareness of the Navy’s mission, and generated considerable congressional interest.19 With strong presidential interest and support for the strategy (which justified the political goal of a six-hundred-ship Navy), the public discussion served
the Navy’s institutional interests.20 Primarily through media reports of reactions
and resulting controversies, American citizens who might never have given their
Navy a thought became aware that the Navy was doing something important.21
Additionally, a case can be made that public release of the Maritime Strategy
actually heightened Cold War conventional deterrence, since the cacophony of
debate reinforced a belief in the minds of Kremlin decision makers that the U.S.
Navy / Marine Corps actually would employ its major forces in carrying out
audacious and high-risk attacks on the Soviet periphery in the High North and
Pacific in the event of a war in central Europe.22 If the U.S. Navy was willing to sail
its carrier battle groups (in conjunction with its attack submarines [SSNs]) in the
face of long-range Soviet bombers and attack aviation in an attempt to penetrate
ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) bastions and destroy the Soviet fleet within
home waters, what else might it attempt?23
Interestingly, there are continuing indications that, similarly, analysts working
for the CCP today frequently are concerned that they might miss critical policy
nuances revealed in cacophonous American public debates, even while many
American decision makers treat that cacophony as background noise.24
VISION AMID AUSTERITY
There is yet another purpose for creating and updating a clear strategic
vision—but one that naval decision makers hesitate to contemplate, lest their
fears become reality. A clear strategic vision helps to maintain the motivation and
morale of naval personnel and public support for the naval services during times
of fiscal austerity. Samuel Huntington identified this factor in his argument for
a naval strategic concept in the 1950s. Huntington noted that “if a service does
not possess a well-defined strategic concept, the public and political leaders will
be confused as to the role of the service . . . and apathetic or hostile to the claims
made by the service on the resources of society.”25 At that time, both a shrinking (or, rather, already shrunk) budget and the arguments of the U.S. Air Force
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threatened to strip the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps of their wartime missions.
Initially, the DON seemed unable to articulate its purpose in the nuclear age.
After all, having defeated imperial Japan in the greatest joint campaign in military history, the service’s relevance seemed evident—at least to the Navy itself.
However, by accepting the need to develop and promulgate a strategic concept
understandable to the public as well as political decision makers, Navy and Marine Corps leaders were able to reestablish an internal sense of purpose as well as
regain public and congressional support. Having a vision that was both internal
and public was a particular priority under the extended tour of duty of Admiral
Arleigh A. Burke (CNO, 1955–61). As an internal guide, an unclassified Naval
Warfare Publication (NWP) 1, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, was created as
the foundation for all other naval publications. It was updated routinely until its
quiet demise in the 1990s.26
The post-Vietnam Navy (circa 1974–81) was racked by personnel problems,
arguably because of both reduced funding for readiness and a lack of a motivating sense of purpose. The creation of the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in
regaining this sense of purpose.
There are strong indications that the promise of a 350- or 355-ship Navy by
the Trump administration—whatever its degree of commitment—may give way
to a reduction in the overall defense budget under new Democratic leadership
in the House of Representatives. There had been previous stirrings among fiscal
hawks in both parties, and Secretary of Defense Mattis never committed himself
to the 355 number.27 Thus, the Navy’s anticipated increase actually may turn into
a winter of decreased resources.28 Such winters are times when strong and clear
vision seems to be needed most.
In sum, a clear, publicly articulated Navy strategic vision has mattered—for
congressional and public support, as well as for internal morale and sense of
purpose. Its absence does have effects.
NDS AND THE NAVY
If NDS is the driver of the current Navy self-vision, what is in the document that
directly affects the Navy?
Working from the unclassified Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy
of the United States of America (hereafter Summary NDS), one first observes that
its strategic change toward a “balance of power” approach to deterrence should
mean a tilt toward the Navy’s traditional missions. The Summary NDS states
unequivocally, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”29 Although the U.S. Marine Corps, Naval
Special Warfare (SEAL), and explosive ordnance disposal units and naval tactical
aviation were involved deeply in countering jihadists—who also occasionally
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were targeted by Tomahawk-firing ships and submarines—most of the bluewater Navy had but tangential roles in countering terrorism, even if one counts
the Navy individual augmentees in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.30 The Navy’s primary purposes—of ensuring access to the markets and materials that constitute international trade and deterring, fighting, or facilitating power projection
in interstate war—were not part of what former Defense Secretaries called “the
wars we are in.” If interstate conflict is now “where it’s at,” with the primary list of
likely opponents being represented by the 2+2 construct of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) and Russia, followed by Iran and North Korea, then the Navy has
to be a primary fighting component, given that all the above are separated from
the United States by oceans.31
However, as one reads through the Summary NDS, a subtle ground force–
centric approach to strategy can be detected. For example, the global operating model for joint force posture is described by the four terms contact, blunt,
surge, and homeland (CBSH).32 The first three are general descriptions of phases
of a land campaign that do not have exact naval equivalents. Would forwarddeployed naval forces constitute a contact layer, or are they a standing blunt
force? Both terms imply a classic ground engagement among armies, whereas
modern naval combat is described most persuasively as “a struggle for the first
salvo” (even if that is a Cold War Soviet concept) or an attempt to “attack effectively first” (in the words of Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr., USN [Ret.]).33 The U.S.
Navy never actually has surged in a war against a powerful naval opponent. In
the World War II Pacific War, most high-value units were already at sea or within
range of the enemy; instead, the surge occurred in industrial production and
mobilization—a feat that many doubt could be replicated today. Likewise, the
maritime defense of the homeland is largely the responsibility of the U.S. Coast
Guard, although SSBNs remain the most survivable leg of strategic nuclear deterrence, and naval theater ballistic-missile defense, along with Aegis Ashore, could
be integrated into national missile defense (a mission the Navy has avoided).
It simply is tough to fit naval war fighting into the CBSH formula—a fact that
may have deeper implications. One can shoehorn naval force structure into the
formula for comparative modeling with land forces, but only by “fuzzing” their
designed operational employment.
Following a fairly traditional description of objectives, strategic objectives,
and desired capabilities—none that would be completely out of place in a Cold
War document—the Summary NDS sets goals of “building a more lethal force”
and “modernizing key capabilities” in such areas as “forward force maneuver
and posture resilience”—presumably a Navy forte. Although the Summary NDS
calls for prioritizing investment in forces that “can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack,” the sole detail offered
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for this force investment is the effort to transition from “large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing.”34 Since
the Navy has advertised itself long and loudly as the strategic alternative to large,
centralized, unhardened (land) infrastructure, one might assume that unique
naval capabilities might be mentioned briefly at that point in the Summary NDS
document—but they are not.
What does the absence of the quite standard praise of naval forces (even in
joint documents) as maneuverable and dispersed sovereign territory not fettered
to land infrastructure and capable of crisis response (blunting, perhaps?) mean?
One merely can speculate, but perhaps the Secretary of Defense really did not
believe that the fleet is actually as effective or survivable in an antiaccess scenario
(or the current preferred term of contested environment) as the Navy perceives
itself to be. In any event, the Summary NDS does not contain a lot of hooks on
which the Navy can hang its narrative hat—unless it wants to challenge joint
ideology. A search of the Summary NDS failed to detect a single use of the word
ocean.35
The Summary NDS does devote a full two pages (out of eleven total) to DoD’s
desire to “strengthen alliances and attract new partners.”36 It focuses on three
elements: “uphold a foundation of mutual respect, expand regional consultative mechanisms and collaborative planning . . . and deepen interoperability.”
Regional alliance and partnership networks are delineated (Indo-Pacific, NATO,
Middle East, Western Hemisphere, and Africa). In this, the Summary NDS could
fit easily into an Obama or Bush (either forty-one or forty-three) administration
document. It also, amazingly, could fit within CS21R—except for a few telling
details in the “uphold” element that tie back to Trump administration themes,
including accountability.
The first of those details alluding to the Trump administration’s particular
viewpoint is the recognition that “alliances and coalitions are built on free will and
shared responsibility” (emphasis added). Then, in a possible jab at previous administrations (whether stocked with neoconservatives or liberal internationalists)—
and, in truth, a practical and significant change—the summary proclaims: “While
we will unapologetically represent America’s values and belief in democracy, we
will not seek to impose our way of life by force.”37 But even as strongly, it states
that “we expect allies and partners to contribute an equitable share to our mutually beneficial collective security, including effective investment in modernizing
their defense capabilities.” Those are not firm requirements found in CS21R. It is
hard not to perceive that “accountability” is the main message of the NDS cooperation section and that the remaining standard alliance/partnership recitation in
no way implies that America is absolutely dependent on its alliance structure or
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that it expects any limits on its free will. In short, CS21R is built around alliances,
partnerships, and (obviously) cooperation; the NDS is not.
Inclining one toward the cynical view that the two pages extolling cooperation
are simply standard fare is the fact that they are followed by a concluding section
titled “Reforming the Department for Greater Performance and Affordability.”
That goal has remained beyond the power of mere humans (including Defense
Secretaries) nearly forever.
THE STATUS OF CS21R
As previously noted, officially the Navy’s strategic vision remains A Cooperative
Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015,
much better known by its acronym, CS21R. CS21R is a revision of the original
CS21, signed by the three chiefs of the sea services (Marine Corps, Navy, Coast
Guard) in 2007. No successor has replaced it; no naval leader has publicly repudiated it.
Although the original CS21 was released under Admiral Gary Roughead
(CNO, 2007–11), it was largely a confirmation of the concept of Admiral Michael
G. Mullen (CNO, 2005–2007; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007–11) of
a one-thousand-ship Navy (without using that term), consisting of the U.S. fleet
and those of its allies and partners who would cooperate to ensure security at sea
in accordance with international law and guided by the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).38 Thus, the changes in the
world environment between 2007 and 2015 (primarily the expansion of a potentially hostile People’s Liberation Army [PLA], along with the definite hostility of
Russian president Vladimir Putin) necessitated a revision that—while maintaining an emphasis on global partnerships—expands its discussion of U.S. naval
missions or functions and a fleet design that describes the capabilities needed to
carry out these functions. One could invite the PLA Navy (PLAN) to participate
in the U.S. Navy’s annual RIMPAC exercise, but that would not mean the Chinese
would honor any international tribunal ruling on law of the sea violations. Yet the
flashing light of the one-thousand-ship Navy still shines through both texts; it is
dimmer in the second (CS21R) only because the additional section was added to
discuss naval missions and general force-design goals, making the revised document twice as long as the original.
Consider the contrast. The Summary NDS devotes two of eleven pages to alliances, partnerships, and international cooperation (18 percent of the document);
CS21R devotes almost twenty of thirty-seven pages to alliances, partnerships,
and international cooperation (54 percent). This provides the initial clue that
the CS21R does not quite fit the Trump administration’s focus on deterring (or, if
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necessary, winning) great-power conflict with China or Russia. CS21R’s stress on
cooperation always betrayed an optimistic view of the future roles of China and
Russia in supporting the current international system (instead of undermining
it) and often referred to their roles as “responsible stakeholders.” In contrast, the
National Security Strategy of the United States of America of December 2017—
parent of the NDS—envisions a world of great-power competition in which
cooperation cannot be assumed. Quite simply, CS21R is out of sync with current
higher directives.
So, what can be salvaged? The second half of CS21R, beginning with “Seapower in Support of National Security,” contains the traditional description of naval
missions, including deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.39 But it also adds a fifth mission that had not appeared previously in other
higher-level documents: “all domain access,” a focus on defeating the antiaccess
“reconnaissance strike networks” of potential opponents.40
To achieve all-domain access requires the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and
U.S. Coast Guard (to whatever extent it can) to commit to investments in battlespace awareness (persistent surveillance), assured command and control (resilient networks that can fight jamming), cyberspace operations, electromagneticmaneuver warfare (EMW) (i.e., electronic warfare spread across domains), and
integrated fires. This is certainly an appropriate list of capabilities necessary for
countering antiaccess strategies. Additionally, it is similar to such lists contained
in all subsequent USN public documents. If one added unmanned systems, machine learning, and AI as means of achieving the above capabilities, one would
have a depiction of the Navy’s current desired investments. These desired capabilities permeate discussions of the Navy’s future fleet designs.
THE CNO, THE DESIGN FOR MAINTAINING MARITIME SUPERIORITY,
AND THE FUTURE NAVY
The current CNO, Admiral Richardson, has released a series of three white papers that describe a design for maritime superiority and the characteristics of the
future navy. Although they would seem disconnected from some of the premises
of CS21R, the first document, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,
Version 1.0 (hereafter Design 1.0), describes itself as a step “along a future course
to achieve the aims articulated in [CS21R] in this new environment.”41 (Notably,
the subsequent Design 2.0 does not mention CS21R.)
Design 1.0
Design 1.0 is a total of eight pages that are intended to “guide our behaviors and
investments, both this year and in the years to come.”42 However, it also states
that “[m]ore specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be
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reflected in our annual budget documents,” undoubtedly referring to, among
others, the CNOG.
Design 1.0 begins by describing the U.S. Navy’s mission in the joint-approved,
domain-specific fashion: as conducting “prompt and sustained combat incident
to operations at sea.” But it subtly broadens this to include “protect[ing] America
from attack and preserv[ing] America’s strategic influence in key regions of the
world,” presumably through persistent naval presence. It follows with a description of the “strategic environment,” which links Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer
Mahan’s articulation of the need for a navy that could guarantee access to international trade and overseas markets and materials to the technological changes
driving prosperity. Later in the document, the CNO acknowledges the fundamental truths of the nature of war: “a violent human contest between thinking
and adapting adversaries for political gain.” He cites the thinkers whose wisdom
has shaped the Naval War College course curriculum: Mahan (obviously), Thu
cydides, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao (strangely), and Corbett.43
Design 1.0 describes the strategic environment in terms of three trends, all
of which have been articulated in previous Navy documents: increased international trade across seas, and potentially through the Arctic; a continually growing
global information network; and increased rates of technological creation and
adoption, including robotics, energy storage, three-dimensional printing, lowcost sensors, genetic sciences, and AI.
Adapting is the key point, and the CNO sees a peacetime competition in strategic technology among global powers: the United States, China, and Russia. This
is a view that CNO Richardson has espoused frequently since the beginning of
his tenure, before the election of President Trump, and in sync with proponents
of the Third Offset Strategy such as former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of the Navy Robert O. Work (albeit not in the same words). Unlike
CS21R, Design 1.0 very clearly refers to China and Russia, pointing out that the
“Russian Navy is operating with a frequency and in areas not seen for almost two
decades, and the Chinese PLA(N) is extending its reach around the world.” (The
+2 of North Korea and Iran also are mentioned, but very briefly.) Here is where
technological advancement links with the Navy’s desired capabilities, as identified in the second half of CS21R; they are elements of the strategic competition
with two regional powers that have antiaccess networks.
CNO Richardson does not use his predecessor’s assured access term, and he
has made his dislike of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) terminology evident.44
Yet it would seem that the Navy’s goal is to adapt emerging technologies so as to
retain (or regain) the ability to penetrate opponents’ A2/AD networks. A2/AD
remains a regularly used term throughout DoD.
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Design 1.0 also lists the CNO’s view of Navy “core attributes of our profession”
as consisting of “integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness.” These are
distinct from the also-cited Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment. In the CNO’s guidance, “[i]f we abide by these attributes, our values should
be clearly evident in our actions.”45 Although his predecessor expressed these
attributes somewhat differently, the desire to define naval attributes provides a
link to the quietly released How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval Warfighter,
document number seven in our algorithm, of Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert,
USN (CNO, 2011–15).
The heart (and conclusion) of Design 1.0, however, is found in three pages
describing the CNO’s “four lines of effort,” which are his objectives that are intended to guide current Navy decision-making. Since each of the four lines of
effort is individually color coded, it has become common for Navy staff officers
to explain their projects or tasks in the form of “it supports purple (or blue, green,
or yellow).”
The first of the four lines (blue) is to “strengthen naval power at and from
sea,” an obvious and continuing goal.46 Within this goal resides a prioritization
of programs to align “our organization to best support generating operational
excellence.” First is to “[m]aintain and modernize the undersea leg of the strategic
deterrent triad,” described as “foundational to our survival as a nation.” Indeed,
CNO Richardson consistently has identified the forthcoming Columbia-class
SSBN as his priority acquisition program.47
The second program priority in the blue line is to develop and test new
concepts through fleet exercises for war fighting in “highly ‘informationalized’
and contested environment[s]” in “partnership with the Marine Corps.” Since
contested environment is a euphemism for A2/AD, one can speculate that this is
intended to patch over some of the fraying between the two naval services that
occurred during the development of the air-sea battle concept. The third priority
calls for expansion of the EMW capabilities identified in CS21R.
This is followed by a related fourth priority: to “explore alternative fleet
designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and
unmanned systems” capable of operating in the “highly ‘informationalized’ environment.” Indeed, as we shall see, this is a task to which OPNAV is devoting a
considerable amount of effort.
The two final tasks of the blue line are organizational examinations of U.S.
Fleet Forces Command (FFC); Commander, Pacific Fleet; and OPNAV itself. In
reality, the comprehensiveness of this task has been impacted by the more immediate studies of the western Pacific warship collisions. However, a Second Fleet
command has been created out of operational elements of FFC.
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The second line of effort (green) is to “achieve high velocity learning at every
level.”48 Tasks in this line include the incorporation of best practices, expanding
the use of “learning-centered technologies, simulators, online gaming, analytics
and other tools,” and “[o]ptimiz[ing] the Navy intellectual enterprise.” Of personal concern to the CNO is his desire to make Navy wargaming—a learning tool
for which the service is justifiably famous—more iterative, possibly via the use of
AI or AI-assisted systems.
The third line of effort (yellow), to “strengthen our Navy team for the future,”
focuses on improvements in personnel management and leadership, including
information-technology learning in a Sailor 2025 program.49 It does not discuss
radical changes to personnel accessions, however. Most of the language of yellow
has been used before.
The fourth line of effort (purple) is to “expand and strengthen our network of
partners.”50 But international partnerships (à la CS21R) are but a small piece of
this effort, while partnerships with other services and agencies (including future
planning and assessments), private research and development labs, and commercial industry are emphasized.
Design 1.0 concludes with an exhortation for all to adopt a sense of urgency:
“We will remain the world’s finest Navy only if we all fight each and every minute
to get better. Our competitors are focused on taking the lead—we must pick up
the pace and deny them. The margins of victory are razor thin—but decisive!”51
No one could deny that the CNO sees the U.S. Navy locked in a strategic and
technological competition with very capable opponents.
The Future Navy
However, by 2017, CNO Richardson, possibly concerned that his Navy continued
to lack his sense of urgency, issued a supplemental white paper, The Future Navy.
There have been some contending interpretations of the impact and importance
of The Future Navy.52 In its defense, it is not designed to impart new direction or
tasking beyond that already laid out in Design 1.0. Rather, as noted, it is intended
to ratchet up the intensity of the Navy’s analytical efforts for determining how to
integrate unmanned systems and other technological developments.
In part, The Future Navy white paper likely was a reaction to several future
force architecture studies that were performed at the direction of Congress as
part of defense legislation for fiscal year 2016 (FY16). Congress (led by the late
Senator John S. McCain) required three alternative studies of future Navy force
structure (for the 2020–35 period) to use in checking the Navy’s thirty-year
shipbuilding plan. The first was by an independent study group made up of Navy
staff members from OPNAV N8, Fleet Forces Command, and the Naval War College, and other naval analytical organization representatives. This report was not
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staffed by the normal OPNAV process and was not endorsed by a cognizant flag
officer but simply was forwarded to Congress by the CNO along with the other
two alternative studies (via the Secretary of the Navy) without endorsement. This
is the officially unofficial unclassified Navy Project Team report (source number
five in table 1) that will be described later.53
At a total of nine pages, The Future Navy begins with its conclusions up front
concerning the FY16 studies: (1) “the nation needs a more powerful Navy, on the
order of 350 ships, [but] that includes a combination of manned and unmanned
systems”; (2) “more platforms are necessary but not sufficient. The Navy must
also incorporate new technologies and new operational concepts.” This is followed by a section header intended to get across the sense of urgency: “Faster and
More Complex. And Faster.”54
The Future Navy does add statements of the value of naval forward presence
back into the dialogue, pointing out that the “presence of capable platforms
enables naval forces’ inherent responsiveness” and that “U.S. ships are sovereign
American territory” and “are self-sufficient when they respond.” However, this is
couched as enabling the U.S. Navy (and Marine Corps) to be “full partners with
the Army and Air Force as conflicts unfold,” being “often first on the scene, and
continu[ing] to preserve U.S. interests in the long term, after the conflict subsides, through continued and routine operations forward.”55
The Future Navy also attempts to clarify that, regardless of whether the optimum fleet size is 355 ships, numbers of ships do matter, because “[t]he number
of ships in the Navy’s fleet determines where we can be, and being there is a key
to naval power.”56 In other words, a modern, highly capable warship may have the
firepower of two less capable vessels, but—unlike the pair—that one ship cannot
be in two oceans at the same time. Quantity does have a quality that quality alone
cannot replicate.
The remaining text of The Future Navy concentrates on the need for greater
force connectivity (even while dispersed), technological advances such as those
identified in Design 1.0, and unmanned and autonomous systems as both extensions of existing platforms and sources of new capabilities.
One observation that does appear in The Future Navy and not in the other
sources discussed here is CNO Richardson’s conviction that the defense industrial bases can increase their speed of production to build a larger fleet faster than
some analysts suggest. “Multiple shipbuilding and aircraft production lines are
‘hot’—currently producing”—but “[t]hey can do more. . . . Buying aircraft carriers at the economically-optimal rate—three or four years apart instead of the
current five or more years—will not only get us a more powerful fleet faster, but
also will save considerable money. . . . [Likewise,] an analysis of the industrial
base shows we could build up to seven additional destroyers in the near term,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 142

148

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

TA N G R E D I

143

and up to 14 more small surface combatants.”57 Similar industrial base statistics
are cited for other ship types, adding to a total of “29 more ships and almost 300
more aircraft over the next seven years than our current plan.” Therefore, if there
is the will, the sense of urgency can be answered with action.
Design 2.0
In December 2018, the CNO released A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0. Advance CNO briefings about the document indicated that
it would note both areas in which progress had been made and where more or
different types of progress would be needed. It does both, and, more importantly,
it attempts to balance an ever-increasing sense of urgency against the need for
“sustainability”—the avoidance of “overextension in the short- and long-term.”
Overextension is defined as “the pursuit of ends that are beyond the ways and
means of the force.”58 Although the remarks on overextension appear in a section
entitled “Our Response” (to the challenges of competition with China and Russia), it is buttressed by an earlier statement on the security environment: “We cannot become overwhelmed by the blistering pace. This is a long-term competition.
We must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames. Only sustainable
approaches will prevail.”59
Design 2.0 continues the four color lines of effort; however, “yellow” has been
changed to “gold.” Their overall substance remains the same, but they are packed
with much more detail, which is why Design 2.0 is twenty pages, whereas Design
1.0 was eight. The green line of effort is modified significantly from “achieve high
velocity learning at every level” to “achieve high velocity outcomes,” which allows
for inclusion of very specific acquisition goals that did not appear in the previous
version. These acquisition goals include the following: “Award the Future Frigate
contract by 2020 to deliver as soon as possible (ASAP). . . . Develop and field an
offensive hypersonic weapon by 2025,” and other equally specific items.60 There
is a bit of irony, however, in having these goals as directives in a CNO-authored
document since—as the CNO himself admits—DoD reorganizations in the past
three decades have resulted in very limited CNO control over the acquisition process. The program executive officers of Navy acquisition programs largely report
to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development & Acquisition),
with the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense critiquing almost every
step along the way.
The green line also splits Navy analytical efforts into a “concept development
hub” centered on the East Coast (DEVGRUEAST) and a “capability development
hub” centered on the West Coast (DEVGRUWEST). Of the Navy’s advanced educational institutions, the Naval War College would be a core of the former and the
Naval Postgraduate School a core of the latter.
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Meanwhile, the revised blue line identifies continuing Navy support to recent
operational changes: the reestablishment of Commander, Second Fleet in the
Atlantic, and the implementation of the dynamic force employment concept
outlined in the NDS to make warship deployments more situational and less
predictable.61 The gold line adds the establishment of a three-star Director for
Warfighting Development (including education, experimentation, and analysis)
as N7 in OPNAV. The purple line’s discussion of partnerships specifically delineates supporting NATO and maturing Joint Forces Command–Norfolk “as the
NATO headquarters for high-end naval operations and warfare in the Atlantic
theater.”62
Additionally, the CNO attached two letters to Design 2.0 as addenda. The first,
a “Charge of Command” to commanding officers, clearly reiterates that “[t]he
responsibility of the Commanding Officer for his or her command is absolute,”
under all circumstances. The second, “One Navy Team,” emphasizes inclusion
and diversity within the Navy.
AIR-SEA BATTLE: FROM VISIBLE FOCUS TO UNDER THE RADAR
If broadened beyond its (presumably) exclusive focus on the PLA, the air-sea
battle concept that consumed so much of the Navy’s intellectual capital (along
with some of the U.S. Air Force’s) earlier in this decade could make a coherent
Navy strategic vision by itself. Similarities to the Maritime Strategy are evident.
The basic concept was to integrate Navy and Air Force capabilities to deal more
effectively with the toughest potential war-fighting challenge of the day: to defeat
the PRC’s antiaccess strategy and respond to PRC aggression by conducting operations within Chinese-claimed water and airspace, including targeting military
forces ashore. In short, it attempted to answer the A2/AD problem.
A detailed argument has been made that the Cold War–era Maritime Strategy was itself a counter-antiaccess strategy, with the U.S. Navy and Marine
Corps attempting to penetrate the layers of Soviet long-range bombers, cruisemissile-firing submarines, and the Soviet naval fleet to breach the Soviet Union’s
periphery and take pressure away from NATO’s central land front in Europe.63
Ironically, the title Air-Sea Battle is a reference to the air/land battle doctrine
that the U.S. Army and Air Force fashioned jointly to blunt a Soviet offensive
on the central front. Similar to the Maritime Strategy, Air-Sea Battle acquired a
number of influential academic and policy opponents, whose resistance gave the
appearance of official doctrine to what, in reality, was a combination of think
tank publications and an Air-Sea Battle Office assigned the task of coordinating
USN and USAF programs appropriate to an antiaccess scenario in the East Asian
maritime and littoral regions.64
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However, by 2015, the air-sea battle concept was devitalized and finally consumed by joint ideology. It was a very logical approach to containing potential
PRC expansion—so logical that it frightened the U.S. Army (which naturally
had focused its force structure on “winning the wars we are in”) into believing
it could lose its appropriate share of the defense budget. Obviously, no one was
contemplating a land war in East Asia. If counterterrorism would no longer
be the primary fight for U.S. armed forces, what would be the role of decisive
land forces? (At the same time, the Marine Corps—which would have a role in
a maritime campaign—became concerned that its permanent partner, the U.S.
Navy, might be spurning it for greater integration with the Air Force.) The result
of bureaucratic and political pressure was that the Navy–Air Force Air-Sea Battle
Office was converted into a joint staff with the inclusion of Army and Marine
Corps representatives and outside contractors, under the supervision of the Joint
Staff, to develop a concept for joint access and maneuver in the global commons
(JAM-GC).
JAM-GC is another document that is classified but whose drafters have discussed it in open-source literature.65 However, it is focused on a problem that is
different from the air-sea battle concept. Its primary focus—access of military
forces into and within the global commons of sea, airspace over the oceans, and
space, all of which are not contested seriously—is not the same challenge as the
penetration of PRC antiaccess networks, the hardware of which is located largely
within sovereign PRC territory.66
Thus, the Navy lost control of a concept and narrative that could define its
de facto strategic focus: deterring potential PRC aggression by holding at risk
China’s antiaccess networks and its protection of its military capabilities and
homeland territory, and doing likewise to the potential threats of Russia, North
Korea, and Iran. Such an effort would require capabilities to defeat the PLA’s
maritime and conventionally armed rocket forces and to suppress its land-based
air defenses, hence requiring close Navy / Air Force collaboration. Inclusion of
decisive ground forces simply would not seem to be a part of this mission—the
approximation of a Cold War Maritime Strategy without any central-front battle
on land. Such an independent strategic vision of the Navy’s primary war-fighting
purpose conflicts with the twenty-first-century version of joint ideology that
mandates participation (or at least veto power) of every service in every mission.
Given the reluctance of the Obama administration to identify the PRC as a primary security threat, slipping the premises and operational concepts of Air-Sea
Battle under the radar in favor of the joint examination of a much more theoretical threat could be justified. However, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and the NDS provide the justification for its resurrection. There is
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much in the air-sea battle concept that could shape a naval strategic vision—and,
because of the Navy’s focus on the Indo-Pacific region, it already has.
PACIFIC FLEET DOMINANCE OVER NAVAL STRATEGY
Although there is no one public document at which to point, the dominance of
the U.S. Pacific Fleet in defining the Navy’s de facto strategic vision is evident and
deserves some comment.
The Obama administration’s pivot to the Pacific may have required an adjustment for other U.S. agencies, but the USN pivot occurred prior to the 2006 transformation of U.S. Atlantic Fleet into FFC. The Atlantic’s numbered war-fighting
command, U.S. Second Fleet, also was disestablished in 2006. This move could
be viewed as a delayed response to the collapse of the Soviet navy (and Soviet
Union). The change also was prompted by the conversion of the joint combatant
command (COCOM) U.S. Atlantic Command into U.S. Joint Forces Command
(JFCOM) in 1999, an obvious indication that American decision makers did not
envision a challenge from the Russian navy (or anyone else) in the Atlantic Ocean
region.67 FFC retained responsibility for training and readiness for Atlantic-based
U.S. naval forces but also took a lead position in “providing” naval forces for all
COCOMs. Additionally, FFC was assigned “command and control of subordinate
Navy forces and shore activities during the planning and execution of assigned
service functions in support of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).”68 This paralleled the tasking of JFCOM to support the Joint Staff. (Ironically, JFCOM was
disestablished in 2011 and its functions were transferred back to the Joint Staff.)
The result of the former Atlantic Fleet taking on staff responsibilities that
might otherwise be directed by OPNAV was that its focus on naval war planning
became diluted in comparison with U.S. Pacific Fleet, which, additionally, has a
present potential threat in an expansionist PRC. Because of this circumstance and
the force of personality of the commanders, Pacific Fleet increased its influence
on naval strategy as a whole, with the creation of Air-Sea Battle as but one result.
Through a series of articles and statements, and with heavy use of the Navy’s
wargaming and analytical assets, Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT),
Admiral Scott H. Swift, USN (COMPACFLT, 2015–18), became a primary
spokesman not only in identifying the PLAN as the U.S. Navy’s primary “pacing”
threat but in elucidating the changes the U.S. Navy would make to meet it.69 It
became obvious that U.S. Pacific Fleet sought its direction directly from the CNO,
not through FFC, and, in turn, sought to influence the CNO’s vision.
With the tremendous expansion of the PLAN, it is logical that the Pacific
region would focus and dominate Navy thinking in the same way that imperial Japan did during the interwar years. However, with the reactivation of U.S.
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Second Fleet on August 24, 2018, as a subordinate of FFC, it is possible that this
dominance eventually will be challenged.
AN OFFICIALLY UNOFFICIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY16 required DoD to furnish
Congress with three studies of the composition of the future U.S. fleet that would
function as alternatives to the U.S. Navy’s thirty-year shipbuilding plan. As previously noted, the first of these studies was conducted by a Navy team consisting of
subject-matter experts from naval analytical organizations without the concurrence or endorsement of DON leadership. The other two were conducted by a
federally funded research and development center, MITRE Corporation, and an
independent think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analyses (CSBA,
which previously had devoted a considerable amount of its own research to AirSea Battle).
The three reports took significantly different approaches to evaluating a future
fleet. MITRE evaluated requirements against an air-sea approach to defeating
the antiaccess “reconnaissance strike network” of the PRC. The result was a set
of specific recommendations concerning new capabilities and platforms. CSBA
proposed a new concept for naval operations, dividing the fleet between tailored
regional presence forces and a powerful maneuver force that would surge to a
region of conflict. Meanwhile, the Navy team centered its recommendations on
three concepts then under investigation by FFC and Pacific Fleet: distributed
fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics.70 The visibility and viability
of these three concepts have been challenged and their relative prominence has
changed since then because of changes in operational Navy leadership. However,
it is fair to conclude that they still might be, or eventually will be, aspects of a
Navy strategic vision.71
The guiding premise of the Navy Project Team was that the Navy needs a
distributed fleet, which would be created by breaking the current methodology
of battle-force deployments centered on an aircraft carrier strike group (CSG,
formerly known as CVBG for “carrier battle group”) consisting of an aircraft carrier, destroyers as escorts, and associated logistics ships. In contrast, a distributed
architecture “would field a widely dispersed force, operating in dozens of areas,
netted to mass firepower, and supported by robust kill chains and survivable
logistics.”72 The study views the proposed change from CSG-centered operations
to a distributed architecture of dispersed forces as a significant change in the
Navy’s operational strategy (and thereby in its strategic concept or strategic vision). The distributed fleet architecture integrates the three mutually supporting
concepts of distributed fleet lethality; EMW; and distributed, agile logistics.
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Distributed lethality was a concept championed by Vice Admiral Thomas S.
Rowden, USN, former Commander, Naval Surface Forces, and Naval Surface
Force, Pacific.73 In its simplest expression, the concept proposed placing offensive
weapons on platforms that previously had not carried them—particularly the
littoral combat ship (LCS) and, presumably, amphibious warships and combat
logistics force ships. Unfortunately, the details for the latter two types of vessels
were never elucidated prior to Vice Admiral Rowden’s retirement in February
2018, and choosing a missile for the LCSs took an unexpectedly long time. Vice
Admiral Rowden tied distributed lethality to his desire to shift the focus of the
surface navy away from the power-projection (strike against land) mission emphasized by Air-Sea Battle and toward sea control against the PLAN fleet.74 With
the change in surface navy leadership, the status of distributed lethality is now
unclear.
The EMW concept is described by the Navy team study as promoting “improvements in protected, assured datalinks and communications paths . . . to
support a geographically distributed force . . . [including] unmanned vehicles,”
as well as providing “soft-kill” of enemy communications and weapons systems.75
EMW is also an element contained in CS21R and can be considered almost a
traditional operational concept for the modern U.S. Navy, since it was clearly a
major component of war-fighting operations in previous conflicts.
The third concept on which the study was built—distributed, agile logistics—
is described as combining “new technologies, more secure shore-based hubs,
afloat sea-based hubs, afloat sea-bases supporting maneuver forces, and assured
and resilient logistics command and control networks to sustain distributed fleet
operations in a contested environment.”76 Unfortunately, there is no programmatic evidence or public, professional discussions that indicate that distributed,
agile logistics is a developed or developing concept. Improvements in the Navy’s
current logistics capabilities remain marginal, incremental, and secondary to
acquisition of new combat platforms. Since 2017, the distributed, agile logistics
nomenclature has been used only rarely. However, there has been public discussion of improving capabilities for rearming vertical-launch system missiles at
sea, a capability in which the U.S. Navy chose not to invest during the unipolar
moment. There also is a recognition within the Navy that greater planning and
resources need to be directed toward improving logistics capacity in contested
environments.
In responding to Congress, the Navy team report argues that shifting to a distributed fleet requires a much greater number of platforms over the thirty-year
shipbuilding plan that had proposed building up to 314 vessels (identified as 304
manned, ten unmanned). However, the report proposes a vast increase in large,
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unmanned platforms and a comparatively modest increase in manned ships.
Proposed numbers are 321 manned, 136 unmanned, for a total of 457 vessels.77
What elements of the Navy Project Team report would constitute new aspects
of a Navy strategic vision? There are at least two: (1) a move away from a CSGcentered employment/deployment concept toward a distributed fleet, and (2)
adoption of unmanned systems as equivalents to ships. Both would change both
internal and public conceptions of naval operations and force structure. The 355ship goal postdates the submission to Congress of the Navy Project Team report.
THE RHETORIC OF 355 SHIPS
Most critics view the Navy as opportunistic in publicizing a goal of 355 battleforce ships for a future fleet.78 There seemed to be little coincidence in the fact
that presidential candidate Trump suggested the number of 350 ships as an appropriate size for the American fleet during his campaign. (This was first suggested on September 7, 2016, in a campaign speech in Philadelphia. In subsequent
speeches as president, he has adopted the 355 number.)79 At the time, few inside
the Beltway possibly could conceive of a Trump victory and the Navy was content
to urge a fleet size of 308, derived from a Navy Force Structure Assessment (FSA)
conducted in 2014. Once President Trump achieved his unexpected electoral
victory, the Navy issued a new FSA on December 14, 2016, “justifying” the 355
number, with the claim that the assessment had been conducted in a thoroughly
analytical manner. Critical doubts about the thoroughness of the analytics have
prompted the Navy more recently to conduct a new, 2019 FSA (already under
way) that “is expected to better detail the types of ships needed.”80
However, as noted in the Navy Project Team report to Congress (source number five in table 1) and the competing independent reports, the 355 number (depending on how calculated) is actually a lower estimate of the fleet size required
for a full-scale conflict versus the PRC or Russia, let alone a fleet to handle some
mix of dispersed 2+2 contingencies. The Navy Project Team called for a total of
457 ships, although 136 of those would be large, unmanned vessels. The competing reports from CSBA and MITRE called for 382 (arguably 340, by current
ship-counting rules) and 414 ships, respectively.
It is difficult to find a single independent naval analyst who will argue that
fewer than 355 ships would be sufficient to ensure victory in a naval campaign
against the antiaccess network of the PRC. Instead, many will argue that the current defense budget cannot support the acquisition and subsequent operations
and maintenance costs of a 355-ship fleet—making that estimate moot.81 However, that is a different assessment from whether the current fleet would prevail
in war or even match peacetime COCOM requirements.
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What, then, does the 355 number really mean? It simply means that the U.S.
Navy recognizes that in a world of 2+2 threats (as opposed to the assumption of
global cooperation that laces CS21R), neither the current number of approximately 285 total ships, nor the thirty-year shipbuilding plan total of 304 ships,
nor the previous 2014 FSA total of 308 would be enough when the potential opponent (the PRC) simply is building ships—with designed capabilities similar to
U.S. warships—at a much faster rate. Unlike under previous administrations, the
Navy leadership now is willing to say so. In previous administrations, the rhetoric
was that, even if fewer in numbers, U.S. warships were more capable. Yet again,
rigorous and detailed unclassified/open-source analyses of that claim have not
been conducted in recent years. And they particularly have not been done in the
context of planned PLA capabilities (such as indigenous aircraft carrier construction). From the perspective of an aspirational goal, and given the lack of detailed
analyses, 355 ships is as good a number as any other that is greater than today’s.82
The wrinkle, however, is that the acquisition of a 355-ship Navy now has
become law! The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision
requiring a buildup to 355 ships “as soon as practicable.”83 Of course, the weakness of the statement (“as soon as practicable” could be 2050) and the inability
to enforce such a provision—even if it were to be placed into a subsequent appropriations act—is well evident to the rest of Congress. As noted, changes in
House of Representatives leadership following the 2018 midterm elections augur
fiscal restraints.
HOW WE (MIGHT) FIGHT
Of all the inputs to the algorithm, How We Fight: Handbook for the Naval War
fighter is the least authoritative but originally was intended to be the most publicly accessible.84 It remained on CNO Greenert’s “to do” list from his first day in
office but with a low priority, so attending to other events frequently superseded
work on it, and it was released only several months before his retirement from
office in September 2015. It was placed on the Navy’s professional reading list
immediately, but—since it never was endorsed by his successor, Admiral Richardson, and never was publicized—its impact on public debate can be described,
charitably, as minimal.
CNO Greenert envisioned a public monograph that would explain the missions, attributes, capabilities, current operational concepts, and combat history
(in brief) of the U.S. Navy to new officers and petty officers and the American
public at large.85 It was meant to highlight the uniqueness of the Navy (with all
the consequences for public and congressional support that implies). With a final
product at 166 pages, it obviously is a more extensive exposition than a standard
official document. It is not a service strategic vision, per se, but describes its
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purpose thus: “to articulate in a single volume the elements that determine the
way we [the Navy] operate, as well as some of the overall concepts that guide
our methods.” The book proceeds in a logical sequence, describing the shaping
factors of “the maritime environment, our Service attributes, our history, and
our current and projected future missions,” in that order.86 This is more akin to
Samuel Huntington’s strategic concept approach to articulating the Navy’s purpose than the more recent strategic vision approach.
The value of How We Fight as an evocation of the Navy’s strategic vision is
that it gathers many of the justifying arguments used by the strategic-level documents into one source. Many of the justifying arguments are captured succinctly
in tables and, more importantly, are presented in context rather than the isolated
factoid manner in which they appear in other documents. As an example, the
“political characteristics of the maritime environment” (which, incidentally, are
not mentioned at all in the Summary NDS) are listed as the following:
• Customary Law of the Sea (LOS) provides rights of ships, delineates high seas
from territorial seas
• Warships are the sovereign territory of their nation wherever they operate in
accordance with LOS
• Freedom of navigation must be demonstrated against unlawful claims
• Sea provides a base for power projection, forward presence and crisis
response
• Littorals are population, economic and political centers
• Operating forward, navies have considerable political influence and deterrent
effects and can provide humanitarian assistance87

Similar concise depictions and tables are provided for physical characteristics,
economic characteristics, strategic and tactical attributes, basic types of naval
warfare, future trends with operational effects, and others—all often incorporated into Navy strategic documents but rarely roped into one corral in mutual
support. The ties to the other sources also include expanded discussions of alldomain access and EMW, both introduced in CS21R and, in the case of EMW,
remaining in subsequent documents. Access and EMW are placed in the context
of more-traditional naval warfare areas such as air warfare and missile defense,
expeditionary warfare, strike warfare, surface warfare, and undersea warfare.
Resilience is discussed as an attribute required of sailors as well as ships, which
resonates with CNO Richardson, even if he prefers the word toughness.
In bringing the seven sources into a Navy future vision, How We Fight could
be put in the “background information and detailed explanation” category,
supporting the more authoritative documents. However, given its content and
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structure, perhaps the work would be better subtitled “Handbook for Drafting
Navy Strategic Visions.”88
GLEANING FROM OTHER SOURCES
Other sources from which may be gleaned additional clues about the Navy’s
strategic vision include the DON Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Financial Report, a
report that appears to have taken the place of what once was the Annual Report
of the Secretary of the Navy to Congress.89 The title and format of the report have
changed throughout different presidential administrations, but it still is meant to
be a DON report created independently of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
To deconflict potential parochial statements by the Secretary of the Navy from
more-authoritative statements by the Secretary of Defense, the report’s scope has
been narrowed to focus on the DON budget. However, it still gives the Secretary
of the Navy some room to discuss priorities and objectives that could shape a
new naval narrative.
Other sources are the congressional testimonies of the Navy leadership as well
as speeches and articles, primarily by the Secretary of the Navy and CNO, to a
wide variety of audiences. As in political stump speeches, frequently repeated
themes indicate elements of the Navy strategic vision. Such speeches and articles
might be expected to coincide with the NDS, CS21R, and the other five sources
we have examined. However, they often are tailored to audiences in a way that
can identify emerging concepts not elucidated previously. Other naval leaders
also may expound on emerging concepts.
Many of the speeches can be obtained from official Navy websites (such as
www.navy.mil). However, much more can be gleaned from the independent
professional publication U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, which routinely publishes articles by senior naval leaders alongside critiques, alternative ideas, and
criticisms by other serving naval personnel and civilians in a continuing debate
on the future of national security. Few ideas make it into naval documents that
have not been discussed—perhaps debated fiercely—in Proceedings previously.
Authoritative information also can be obtained from reports on the Navy
prepared for Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Even OPNAV staffers rely on CRS and CBO
reports as quick sources for data.
AND THEN THERE IS THE POM
The longest-running debate concerning DoD is whether it is strategy or budget
that drives its programs and force structure.90 In theory, national strategy should
be the driving factor. The military is a tool the nation uses to achieve its security
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objectives in a dangerous world. Of course, the economic reality is that wants are
generally unlimited, while resources are limited. In battle, the commander wants
every possible resource available to defeat the enemy while preserving the lives
of his or her own troops. History indicates that overwhelming force applied decisively ends most wars quickly. Yet no one can determine fully how much money
to spend on security since—at least for democratic states—wars can be predicted
only in the abstract, not their precise occurrence in time and space.
In peacetime, a democratic state may use a security strategy to determine
the details of its military, but funding these details becomes a political process
requiring compromise among competing domestic requirements. This is a weakness that democratic states do not necessarily share with authoritarian states
having command (or mostly command) economies. The situation provokes
critics to argue that public strategy documents are poor guides for determining
a democratic state’s defense strategy.91 Better, they argue, to “follow the money”
in the president’s budget submission and congressional legislation. Others have
argued that a realistic strategic vision should be designed primarily on the basis
of resources available, rather than the service’s (or defense agency’s) self-concept
or aspirations.
For the Navy, CNO Richardson attempted to end the debate by directing in
October 2016 that the Navy’s POM process be initiated by the Deputy CNO
(DCNO) for Operations, Plans and Strategy (OPNAV N3/N5) and consist of
three phases.92 First is the strategy phase, led by OPNAV N3/N5, with other
OPNAV staff codes participating, followed by a requirements program-integration
phase, led by the DCNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9), and a resourceintegration phase, led by the DCNO for Integration of Capabilities and Resources
(OPNAV N8). At the CNO’s direction, “under this new process, POM-19 and
subsequent POMs [began] three months earlier than historical POMs . . . [with]
the end product of the POM development process [being] a strategy-based, fiscally balanced, and defendable Navy Program for submission to OSD [Office of
the Secretary of Defense], which appropriately implements OSD fiscal and programming guidance, addresses [Secretary of the Navy] and CNO priorities, and
achieves the best balance of strategic guidance as provided in the CNOG.”93 To
achieve this result, the CNO also directed an OPNAV staff realignment.
The significance of the CNO’s directive is that it again reinforces the theoretical role of strategy as the determinant of program requirements and force structure. In turn, this also should reestablish the importance of a Navy strategic vision
in guiding future Navy decision-making. Of course, thorough implementation of
the renewed process under the congressional mandate of a 25 percent headquarters staff reduction throughout DoD may prove challenging.
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A MURKY MIX
If we metaphorically sum up the algorithm, what can we determine concerning
the U.S. Navy’s collective vision of its appropriate future?
Although the Navy always has had a reputation for independent views that
make the staunchest joint ideologues livid, it is clear that CNO Richardson and
the Navy leadership are committed to a vision that conforms to the 2018 NDS and
its joint requirements. The problem they face is that the NDS (at least in its Summary) betrays a land-centric approach to understanding warfare that is hard to
translate into a naval strategy. It is not only that the terminology does not fit naval
campaigns; it is that, although there can be a tactically defensive naval posture,
there is no such thing as a strategic defensive posture in naval warfare except not
to fight at sea. Unlike in a land campaign, there are no physical spaces to defend,
only forces. Thus, wartime forces at sea exist only to attack; there are no contact
or blunt phases in naval warfare.
This problem is magnified by the fact that the great-power competition, which
serves as the premise of the NDS, is not inherently a land-centric competition. If
conflict were to break out today or in the immediate future with the potentially
toughest opponent, the PLA, the fighting would not take place on the land. It
primarily would be (for the United States) a counter-antiaccess campaign in the
maritime, air, space, and electronic spectrum / cyber dimensions.94 No planner
has suggested that it is in the interest of the United States and its allies to fight a
land war in East Asia. Victory in a counter-antiaccess campaign would require
strikes on military targets in mainland China (C4ISR nodes, missile TELs, airfields, command structures, etc.). However, most of these strikes would not come
from ground forces. Such a campaign simply does not fit a land-centric approach.
In the case of Russia, there could be ground combat, but—given the methods
the Putin regime has demonstrated—it likely would be small-unit combat in a
hybrid/gray-zone scenario. However, the likely locations of such scenarios—the
High North, the Baltic region, the Black Sea—largely would require a naval and
air response by U.S. forces, at least in the initial phases.
The other two potential opponents, Iran and North Korea, have unique characteristics but would not present the regional-to-global character of great-power
war. However, in both cases, the majority of U.S. forces would be located outside
the contested territory and would require an initial maritime response to reenter.
Thus, it is very difficult to craft a naval strategic vision to satisfy the challenges
of the great-power competition world while remaining within the confines of
the public Summary NDS. A great-power-competition strategy for naval forces
would be more similar to the Cold War Maritime Strategy than any recent conception. However, a Maritime Strategy approach to describing the Navy’s vision
rams into joint ideology.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/1

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 154

160

2/25/19 10:40 AM

Naval War College: Naval War College Review Spring 2019

TA N G R E D I

155

The NDS does discuss the need for allies and coalitions. CS21R is premised
completely on such cooperation. However, the Trump administration does not
appear willing to make the sacrifices necessary to maintain the tight alliance
structure on which America’s Cold War posture was predicated and that is the
overarching assumption of CS21R. If preserving the alliance structure is no longer a priority, much of the front section of CS21R cannot be a rallying point for
the Navy’s public image.
There is nothing in the 2016 Design 1.0 that contradicts the 2018 Summary
NDS. However, much of Design 1.0 is concerned with Navy organization, leadership, and training—all subjects that are of great importance to the CNO and that
have an impact on operations, but that are not involved primarily in defining the
service’s force structure or employment. The sections that discuss force structure
assessments have stimulated debate and resulted in considerable internal discussion concerning gaps in naval capabilities and employment of unmanned and
potentially autonomous platforms, but it was not the CNO’s intent to define an
answer to such questions. Design 1.0 does emphasize the complexity of contested
environments, particularly the need for the Navy to examine how it would operate in severe electromagnetic warfare conditions that would interfere with its
objective to conduct dispersed but networked operations. This is a problem that
OPNAV and the fleet commands previously had a tendency to ignore, although
the Naval Postgraduate School has been examining the need for “network optional” operations for some time.95
CNO Richardson’s The Future Navy also is in sync with the NDS and willing
to name names concerning the threats from the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and
Iran. The paper’s emphasis is new technology development, and in its own way
it casts doubt on the 355-ship number as a defining metric by maintaining that a
“355-ship Navy using current technology is insufficient for maintaining maritime
superiority.”96 Rapid introduction of technology is the CNO’s measure of success.
There is a significant contradiction within the CNO’s white paper series, however. This contradiction begins to show itself in Design 2.0, in the remarks on
sustainability and the call to avoid being overwhelmed by the blistering pace. It
is the CNO who is directing—throughout the three papers—the sense of urgency
in response to the security environment. One could surmise that, in adding the
caution in his second version of the Design, he is reacting to analyses of the recent
Seventh Fleet ship collisions that blamed them, in part, on a sense of operational
urgency that required the crews to skip necessary training and certification.
Indeed, Design 2.0 does direct the “execution of the Comprehensive Review and
Strategic Readiness Review program” resulting from the accident investigations.97
Yet the sense of great urgency remains at the forefront, and there are no details on
how to achieve a balance between that and sustainability.
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Moreover, there seems to be no final, identifiable goal. In saying that “[w]e
must think in terms of infinite, instead of finite, time frames,” the CNO is giving
the Navy an endless quest.98 How can one maintain morale and conviction in the
face of a perilous and absolutely infinite voyage? Even in the high-tempo/highpressure competition of the Cold War, American leaders held to the expectation
that someday the internal contradictions in Communism would bring about its
own collapse. There was, therefore, light at the far end of the tunnel, a victory
(through deterrence) for which to strive. Not only does Design 2.0 not define an
end state, but it seems to imply that—except through a major war—there is no
possible end to the urgent, relax-not-a-minute military competition. It is hard to
establish a pace or balance if there is nothing but an endless loop ahead. And it is
hard to construct a persuasive public Navy strategic vision if endless competition
is the only goal—a reason why the Design series, in itself, cannot fill the role of
Navy vision.
The air-sea battle concept certainly would support the objectives of the NDS,
but it only defines one particular Navy mission, in one particular theater. On
the other hand, it does define a victory. Unfortunately, Air-Sea Battle effectively
has been declared “not joint enough.” The whole premise of its joint successor,
JAM-GC—that the struggle is over access to the global commons—is, in contrast,
anemic.
The various force-structure assessments and the 355-ship number together do
not constitute a strategic vision. Meanwhile, How We Fight is obviously too long
for executive reading and does not have the narrative arc that makes modern
nonfiction popular.
Therefore, the overall conclusions are as follows:
1.	 The Navy leadership recognizes that CS21R does not fit the Trump
administration’s needs for a Navy strategic vision. Some sections could
be recycled, but the overall package has been overtaken by events.
2.	 The current Navy leadership does want to have a Navy vision that fully
supports the NDS focus on great-power competition, but the NDS (at
least in its Summary) is not written in a way that the Navy can parrot.
The tenor of the NDS seems to be that because strategy should be
joint, there is no distinction in the strategic approaches to land and
naval combat. (We will put traditional airpower doctrine aside for this
discussion.)
3.	 At present, the Navy leadership still is following Secretary of Defense
Mattis’s concerns about the negative effects of extensive public
discussion.99 A publicly articulated strategic vision is not a current
priority.
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4.	 Design 1.0 and its subsequent statements do give the Navy internal
directions and tasks that conform to the NDS; however, they are
not written in a way that would provide for a public strategic vision
that captures the Navy’s current and future missions (and resulting
structure). Both Design 1.0 and 2.0 contain one-paragraph summaries of
the Navy mission, but they are too brief to present a full image. Perhaps
the most important inclusion from the CNO’s Design in a public vision
would be his sense of urgency in experimentation and technology
adoption.
5.	 Nevertheless, a public, unclassified, strategic vision could enhance
public and congressional support for the U.S. Navy. The correlation
between a compelling public vision and enhanced support has been
demonstrated historically.
6.	 On the other hand, the internal programs and operations of the U.S.
Navy do not need a publicly articulated and elegantly crafted vision to
conform to the direction of the NDS. Highlighted by the pivot to the
Pacific, the Navy largely had conformed to Secretary of Defense Mattis’s
NDS even before the 2018 NDS existed.
7.	 A Navy strategic vision that focuses on great-power competition as it
exists and that conforms to the objective, although not the strategic,
philosophy of the NDS would look more like Air-Sea Battle (with an
appropriate addition of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities) than any other
strategic concept currently extant. However, joint ideology and U.S.
ground forces have defeated Air-Sea Battle. The air-sea battle concept
had the misfortune of coming into prominence when the presidential
administration did not want the word China spoken except in the
context of that country inevitably being a “responsible stakeholder.” This
prohibition does not apply, necessarily, to the current administration.
8.	 The 355 number is a program and budgetary marker that, in itself, has
no dependence on—nor does it provide a basis for—a Navy strategic
vision.
9.	 The panoply of Navy and independent force-structure assessments are
useful for exposing appropriate debates—such as how much of the fleet
should be unmanned, and why. The most-detailed analyses have been
done appropriately on the basis of an Air-Sea Battle approach, even if it
is not mentioned. Yet it is difficult to explain why the fleet should have
355 ships instead of 354 or 353 or 350. The consensus is that the current
number of approximately 285 is too low for war fighting and, possibly,
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for great-power deterrence. What the actual number should be has not
been assessed thus far to conclusive and persuasive rigor. What the new
Congress will fund may be another number entirely.
10.	 To provide the number of platforms necessary in a conflict against a
great power, the Navy intends to pursue aggressively the development
of unmanned surface and undersea vessels (as well as aircraft), some of
which will be self-deploying and comparable in size to manned vessels.
This could help operationalize the distributed fleet and distributed
lethality concepts. The assumption, however, is that unmanned vessels
can be acquired and operated more cheaply than manned platforms.
11.	 A summarized How We Fight could provide the keel for an updated
public Navy strategic vision, with appropriate NDS themes and Design
1.0 and 2.0 concerns added. In its current state, however, How We Fight
is an unread textbook.
What should a Navy strategic vision appropriate to the objectives of the NDS,
the CNO’s directions, and Trump administration objectives overall say? Summing the algorithm and adding other clues, a concise recommended summary
follows.
In the peacetime, military-technological competition with great powers, the
U.S. Navy will experiment continually with new technologies and concepts so
as to remain ahead of competitors and profit from the ideas of competitors,
when appropriate. New technologies and concepts will be introduced to the fleet
when matured and engineered for sea. These will include substantial numbers of
unmanned, partly manned, and optionally manned vessels and aircraft, which—
combined with EMW capabilities—could enable a more widely distributed
fleet. These experiments and developments—necessary for achieving victory in
future conflicts—will take priority over the peacetime deployment and forwardpresence requirements of the COCOMs. Additionally, a dynamic forceemployment model will modify the previous predictability and length of forward
deployments, allowing for greater experimentation.
The U.S. Navy will be sized and structured to support and win a conventionalweapons joint campaign that likely will be primarily maritime (which includes
air over sea, space, and electromagnetic/cyber warfare) in character against the
PRC, as led by the CCP, or Russia, as led by President Putin. Being able to win
such a conflict will provide the most effective deterrence against its occurrence.
It is assumed that all other missions can be accomplished successfully by tailoring
this force structure in scope to other assigned tasks.
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With these capabilities, the U.S. Navy will carry out its enduring function
as the guarantor of access to the global commons and to overseas markets and
materials on which America’s economic prosperity depends. Access to the global
commons also ensures the ability of the joint force to transit foreign areas of
crises and conflict when called on. The U.S. Navy also will provide for defense of
the U.S. homeland by maintaining the most survivable leg of the strategic nuclear
triad, and the Navy can function as the forward edge of U.S. missile defense when
necessary.
A perusal of U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings would indicate that the Navy has
the narrative and speechwriting talent to write an updated public strategic vision
quite well.

SAM J. TANGREDI

Dr. Sam J. Tangredi is a professor of national, naval, and maritime strategy and the
director of the Institute for Future Warfare Studies at the Center for Naval Warfare
Studies of the Naval War College. A retired Navy captain, his active-duty billets included serving as head of the Strategy and Concepts Branch of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and director of strategic planning and business development
for the Navy International Programs Office, in addition to command at sea. He is
the author of numerous articles on strategy and defense policy and has published
five books, including Anti-access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Naval
Institute Press, 2013).

NOTES

1.	The term strategic vision is used instead of
strategy (as in the Maritime Strategy) because
of the controversy over which Department
of Defense component “does strategy.” Under
joint ideology, the services man, train, and
equip the forces, but do not create strategy,
which is the exclusive purview of the combatant commanders. While this may seem to be
merely an argument over terminology, and
despite the fact that the services and defense
analysts routinely refer to service plans as
“strategy,” use of the term strategic vision sidesteps that whole debate. Many of the plans
are indeed visions that do not survive contact
with the reality of the budget.
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2.	The term strategy concept is from Samuel
P. Huntington, “National Policy and the
Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 80/5/615 (May 1954), pp. 483–93.
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s, the
U.S. Navy was enamored of using strategic
concept to describe its definition of purpose,
but it largely has been dropped in the last two
decades. (For example, after the Cold War,
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations’
Strategic Concepts Branch was renamed
the Strategy and Concepts Branch.) This
is another reason this article uses the term
strategic vision.
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3.	A bureaucratic reason that CS21R remains in
the public vision is that it is a DON document signed by the Secretary of the Navy as
well as the heads of the three sea (not only
naval) services: the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine
Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard (the latter is
not actually part of the DON). To negotiate
a document approved and signed by all four
individuals (thus representing all their equities) is a prodigious and lengthy effort.
4.	Like all endeavors done well by military officers and defense civil servants, the drafting of
naval strategic visions takes time and energy
that spill over between administrations, and
the process does not necessarily follow the
drafting of higher-level guidance (such as the
National Security Strategy) in tight, sequential
order. In the case of CS21R, drafting of the
document—which involved Navy and Marine
Corps staff officers, scholars at the Naval
War College and Naval Postgraduate School,
and other members of the naval analytical
enterprise—began in the waning months
of the George W. Bush administration,
even though it eventually was issued under
President Obama. For an assessment of the
drafting of CS21R, see Peter Swartz, William
Rosenau, and Hannah Kates, The Origins and
Development of A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower (2015) (Arlington,
VA: CNA, September 2017), available at www
.cna.org/.
5.	An underlying theme found in Simon Reich
and Peter Dombrowski, The End of Grand
Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the
Twenty-First Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 2017). The book, however, does
not necessarily endorse the Trump administration’s foreign policy perspective.
6.	There is an existing official USN web page
that holds links to so-called strategic documents ranging from the Summary NDS and
2018 Nuclear Posture Review to the U.S. Coast
Guard Arctic Strategy and DON Innovation
Vision. See “Strategic Documents,” Navy.mil.
However, this is a nonhierarchical mixture,
and there is no attempt to explain how they
relate to each other or whether they are directive or aspirational. The site also includes
links to Secretary of the Navy and CNO
speeches and transcripts.
7.	The full name of the thirty-year plan is
the Report to Congress on the Annual
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Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval
Vessels. Officially overlaid on all these is joint
doctrine—but a good portion of joint doctrine is so banal or boilerplate that the services often can ignore it with some impunity.
8.	The POM is the formal document each
DoD entity prepares for submission to the
Secretary of Defense outlining its spending
on new systems acquisition, operations and
maintenance, personnel, and other costs.
All programs of record must be included in
the POM to ensure sustained funding. The
internal DoD approval process, now referred
to as PPBE (planning, programming, budgeting, and execution), is complex, with multiple
(and sometimes redundant) phases. Not all
POM submissions necessarily make it into
the defense budget the Secretary of Defense
presents to the president, or that the president
transmits to Congress, or that Congress
approves.
9.	On the most recent title changes, see Swartz,
Rosenau, and Kates, Origins and Development, p. 88.
10. Stuart B. Munsch [RAdm., USN], unclassified
phone conversation with author, October 2,
2018.
11. Jeff Schogol, “Rep. Adam Smith: Trump’s
Military Spending and Planning Needs a
Reality Check,” Task & Purpose, February
19, 2018, taskandpurpose.com/; Katie Bo
Williams, “What the Midterms Mean for
National Security,” Defense One, November 7,
2018, www.defenseone.com/.
12. Carlisle A. H. Trost [Adm., USN, CNO],
“Looking beyond the Maritime Strategy,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings 113/1/1,007 (January 1987), p. 15.
13. Swartz, Rosenau, and Kates suggest that the
OPNAV programming organizations (codes)
do not always see the need for a formal strategic vision document, since they “have tended
to believe that they have more than enough
other guidance to get their jobs done without
an additional product . . . to accommodate in
the POM process” (p. 102). My own view is
that the absence of a formal document allows
the programmers and budgeteers to cherrypick preferred guidance statements from the
CNO and Secretary of the Navy documents
and speeches. On this point, a good discussion can be found in Irv Blickstein et al., Navy
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Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution: A Reference Guide for Senior Leaders,
Managers, and Action Officers (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2016), p. 10.
14. Joe Gould, “Wittman to US Navy: ‘You Have
to Say 355 Is the Number,’” Defense News,
April 11, 2018, www.defensenews.com/.
15. Jason Schwartz, “‘We Are Fighting for Information about War’: Pentagon Curbs Media
Access,” Politico, July 26, 2018, www.politico
.com/.
16. The reference to the CCP is deliberate, because the People’s Liberation Army is pledged
to the party, not to the state of China.
17. Kevin Baron, “Pentagon Began Clampdown
on Senior Leader’s Public Speaking Months
Ago,” Defense One, November 14, 2018, www
.defenseone.com/.
18. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I
am certain that, at some time in the future,
President Xi and I, together with President
Putin of Russia, will start talking about a
meaningful halt to what has become a
major and uncontrollable Arms Race. The
U.S. spent 716 Billion Dollars this year.
Crazy!,” Twitter, December 3, 2018,
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/
1069584730880974849.
19. An excellent example of a discussion by an
influential academic is John J. Mearsheimer,
“A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy
and Deterrence in Europe,” International
Security 11, no. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 3–57, available at mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/. There was
also concern that implementing the Maritime
Strategy might spark a nuclear exchange. See
Barry R. Posen, “Inadvertent Nuclear War?
Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,”
International Security 7, no. 2 (Fall 1982), pp.
28–54, available at www.jstor.org/. A detailed
assessment that is supportive of the Maritime
Strategy is found in Norman Friedman, The
U.S. Maritime Strategy (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1988). The best source
for the briefings and documents that built
the Maritime Strategy is John B. Hattendorf
and Peter M. Swartz, eds., U.S. Naval Strategy
in the 1980s: Selected Documents, Newport
Paper 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College
Press, December 2008), available at
digital-commons.usnwc.edu/.
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20. William Schneider Jr., “Financing the Reagan
600-Ship Naval Modernization Program,
1981–89” (statement at the “Options and
Considerations for Achieving a 355-Ship
Navy from Former Reagan Administration Officials” hearing before the Seapower
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, July 18, 2017), pp. 1–4, available
at www.hudson.org/.
21. John T. Hanley Jr., “Creating the 1980s Maritime Strategy and Implications for Today,”
Naval War College Review 67, no. 2 (Spring
2014), p. 22, available at digital-commons
.usnwc.edu/.
22. In addition to articles in such journals as
International Security, the Soviets undoubtedly were aware of some of the results of the
Navy-sponsored Global War Game series
(conducted at the Naval War College) in
which both DoD civilian appointees and individual academic experts participated as game
decision makers. Elements of the Maritime
Strategy were gamed at this forum even before
its public release. For details, see Bud Hay and
Bob Gile, Global War Game: The First Five
Years, Newport Paper 4 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, June 1993).
23. In a special issue of Journal of Strategic Studies
edited by Lyle J. Goldstein, John B. Hattendorf, and Yuri M. Zhukov, two Russian scholars maintain that the Kremlin did not see a
credible threat to their SSBN bastions but
were concerned about Tomahawk land-attack
cruise missiles carried on U.S. SSNs, which
could be used to attack military installations
ashore from positions in the northern seas.
See Vladimir Kuzin and Sergei Chernyavskii,
“Russian Reactions to Reagan’s ‘Maritime
Strategy,’” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 2
(April 2005), pp. 429–39. In a review of John
Lehman’s Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold
War at Sea (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018),
Dov Zakheim insists that Soviet leaders did
take notice of the U.S. naval threat to their
SSBNs and that “[i]t is no exaggeration to
assert, as Lehman does, that the Navy played
a vital role in bringing the Cold War to a
successful conclusion in America’s favor.” Dov
S. Zakheim, “Lehman’s Maritime Triumph,”
review of Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold
War at Sea, by John Lehman, Naval War
College Review 71, no. 4 (Autumn 2018), pp.
141–46.
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24. An interesting recent commentary on this
from a reputable source is found in George
Friedman, “A Speech by Mike Pence and
the Sum of All Chinese Fears,” Geopolitical
Futures subscription e-mail list, November
9, 2018. Friedman contrasts U.S. media
disinterest in a speech that was given by the
vice president and whose themes had been
expressed previously by subordinate officials
with Chinese parsing of it and resultant
perceptions of it heralding increased tensions.
In reference to CS21R, Swartz, Rosenau, and
Kates maintain that by failing to engage academic “carpers” the Navy lost opportunities
to reinforce its message publicly (Origins and
Development, p. 109).
25. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” p. 483. Also cited in Swartz,
Rosenau, and Kates, Origins and Development, p. 2.
26. The final version of NWP 1 is available at
www.history.navy.mil/. During the shift of
responsibility for drafting naval doctrine
from OPNAV to the short-lived Naval Doctrine Command in the early 1990s, NWP 1
fell through the cracks. There was a stillborn
effort within OPNAV to revive it in 1998–99.
27. John Grady, “Congress Presses SECDEF
Mattis on US Navy Path to 355 Ships,” USNI
News, June 13, 2017, news.usni.org/.
28. David B. Larter, “Will Looming Budget Cuts
Bust Up the Navy’s Plans for an Enormous
Fleet?,” Defense News, November 16, 2018,
www.defensenews.com/.
29. U.S. Defense Dept., Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy of the United States
of America [hereafter Summary NDS] (Washington, DC: 2018), p. 1.
30. Individual Navy personnel played surprising
roles. For example, a nuclear submarine commander served as the commanding officer of
the provincial reconstruction team in Khost,
Afghanistan.
31. Although the 2+2 shorthand is not used in
the Summary (despite the military’s proclivity
for acronyms and numerical descriptions),
those four states are identified clearly as the
threats. U.S. Defense Dept., Summary NDS,
p. 4.
32. Ibid., p. 7.
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33. Wayne P. Hughes Jr. [Capt., USN (Ret.)], Fleet
Tactics and Coastal Combat, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp.
40–44.
34. U.S. Defense Dept., Summary NDS, p. 6.
35. However, Secretary of Defense Mattis has
made some independent statements concerning the need for U.S. strategy to have a more
maritime focus. See, for example, Mike Gallagher, “How to Save the U.S. Navy,” National
Interest, October 15, 2018, nationalinterest
.org/. Gallagher quotes Mattis as follows:
“I believe we are moving toward a more
maritime strategy in terms of our military
strategy to defend the country”; quoted from
Office of Sen. Roger Wicker, “Wicker Asks
Mattis about Shipbuilding Schedule, Russia
Threat,” press release, April 26, 2018, www
.wicker.senate.gov/. In the press release, the
Secretary of Defense continues, “It is the
nature of our time, so I would be supportive if the Senate found a way to increase the
shipbuilding budget.”
36. U.S. Defense Dept., Summary NDS, pp. 8–10.
37. It does seem strange, however, that this statement appears in the midst of a section on
alliances rather than threats.
38. The United States has never ratified the Law
of the Sea Treaty officially. But it has adhered
to and demonstrated support of its provisions, and therefore still can be considered a
participant in UNCLOS.
39. U.S. Navy Dept., A Cooperative Strategy for
21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged,
Ready (Washington, DC: March 2015), pp.
19–26.
40. The reconnaissance strike network construct
was popularized in the publications of the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. For a study in antiaccess and its related terminologies from all aspects, see Sam
J. Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare: Countering
A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2013).
41. John M. Richardson [Adm., USN, CNO], A
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,
Version 1.0, Navy.mil, January 2016, p. 1.
42. Ibid., p. 4.
43. Ibid., pp. 1, 4.
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44. John M. Richardson [Adm., USN, CNO],
“Deconstructing A2/AD,” National Interest,
October 3, 2016, nationalinterest.org/.
45. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 1.0, p. 5.
46. Ibid., p. 6.
47. Several fellows of the Brookings Institute, an
influential and long-standing Washington
think tank, have suggested that the Navy will
find it unaffordable to fund both the replacement SSBNs and a 355-ship “conventional”
fleet. John Grady, “Panel: Navy May Have to
Choose between New Ballistic Missile Subs
or 355 Ship Fleet,” USNI News, November 23,
2018, news.usni.org/.
48. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 1.0, p. 7.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 8.
51. Ibid. Emphasis in original.
52. See Peter Dombrowski, “One Cheer Only,”
and Sam J. Tangredi, “A Powerful Helm Order,” both in U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
143/7/1,373 (July 2017), pp. 62–64.
53. The CNO also convened his own advisory
panel (October 2016–March 2017) to analyze
the three reports, during which many of the
themes that later appeared in The Future
Navy were discussed.
54. John M. Richardson [Adm., USN, CNO], The
Future Navy, Navy.mil, May 17, 2017, p. 1.
55. Ibid., p. 3.
56. Ibid., p. 4.
57. Ibid., p. 7.
58. John M. Richardson [Adm., USN, CNO], A
Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,
Version 2.0, Navy.mil, December 2018.
59. Ibid., p. 4.
60. Ibid., p. 9.
61. Ibid., p. 8.
62. Ibid., p. 15.
63. A point used to illuminate the origins and
outlines of the concept of antiaccess warfare
in Tangredi, Anti-access Warfare. See especially pp. 36–40.
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64. An example of academic opposition is Amitai
Etzioni, “Who Authorized Preparations for
War with China?,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 8, no. 2 (Summer 2013), pp. 37–51,
available at yalejournal.org/.
65. Michael E. Hutchins et al., “Joint Concept for
Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons: A New Joint Operational Concept,”
Joint Force Quarterly, no. 84 (January 2017),
pp. 134–39. JAM-GC is also one of the most
cringe-worthy acronyms ever to come out of
DoD.
66. For a discussion on aspects of and threats
to the maritime commons—which includes
the airspace over the water and, arguably,
aspects of space and cyberspace—see Sam
J. Tangredi, “The Maritime Commons and
Military Power,” in Conflict and Cooperation
in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive
Approach for International Security, ed. Scott
Jasper (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ.
Press, 2012), pp. 71–88.
67. Properly, the term COCOM refers to the
individual in command of a U.S. unified combatant command (UCC), not the organization
itself. However, COCOM has become standard usage inside and outside the Pentagon
to refer to an entire UCC organization, not
only its commanding officer. This discussion
continues that bad habit.
68. “U.S. Fleet Forces Command Mission,” U.S.
Fleet Forces Command, www.public.navy.mil/.
My own view is that many of these functions should be returned to the OPNAV staff,
under tighter control of the CNO.
69. For example, Scott H. Swift [Adm., USN],
“A Fleet Must Be Able to Fight,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 144/5/1,383 (May 2018),
pp. 28–33, available at www.usni.org/.
70. U.S. Navy Dept., Report to Congress: Alternative Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study
(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations [N8], November 2016), pp.
3, 11–13.
71. For example, one commentator proclaimed
distributed lethality as the surface navy’s
“strategy for the Trump era.” See Loren
Thompson, “‘Distributed Lethality’ Is the
Surface Navy’s Strategy for the Trump Era,”
Forbes, January 10, 2017, www.forbes.com/.
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(January 2015), pp. 18–23, available at www
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74. Thomas S. Rowden [VAdm., USN], “Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control”
(presented at the 29th Annual Surface Navy
Association Symposium, Arlington, VA, January 9, 2017), available at www.public.navy
.mil/.
75. U.S. Navy Dept., Report to Congress, p. 12.
76. Ibid., p. 13.
77. The question of what size an unmanned
system must reach to be designated a “ship”
remains unresolved.
78. Steven Stashwick, “The U.S. Navy’s New
30-Year Plan Grows Its Fleet Realistically, but
Slowly,” The Diplomat, February 16, 2018,
thediplomat.com/.
79. Amy Sherman, “Trump Touts 350-Ship
Promise at Naval Academy Graduation,”
Politifact, May 25, 2018, www.politifact.com/.
80. Joe Gould, “US Navy to Launch Force Structure Assessment,” Defense News, September 5,
2018, www.defensenews.com/.
81. The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that current Navy budget requests barely can
support the current fleet size, let alone fund
an increase to 355 ships. “CBO: 355-Ship
Fleet Will Cost $6.7 Billion More per Year
Than Current Navy Budget Request,” USNI
News, March 15, 2018, news.usni.org/.
82. In fact, there are indications that the 2019
Navy Force Structure Assessment still will
consider 355 to be the minimum number
of ships. Vice Adm. William R. Merz, USN,
Deputy CNO for Warfare Systems (OPNAV
N9), stated at a congressional hearing on November 27, 2018, “We have seen nothing from
the combatant commands to date, or from
Secretary Mattis’s National Defense Strategy,
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2015), available at news.usni.org/.
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state that CNO Greenert “was looking for a
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One can speculate that the result could have
motivated CNO Greenert to insist that How
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95. See Todd Wyatt and Donald Brutzman, “Network Optional Warfare,” NPS Wiki, May 3,
2018, wiki.nps.edu/. Responding to the issue
from the Pacific Fleet perspective, Admiral
Swift has championed “mission command.”
See Scott H. Swift [Adm., USN], “Master the
Art of Command and Control,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 144/2/1,380 (February
2018), pp. 28–33, available at www.usni.org/.
97. Richardson, A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 2.0, p. 8.
98. Ibid., p. 4.
99. Current CNO Richardson was Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) Director of Strategy
and Policy (J5) while General Mattis was
the JFCOM commander. One logically can
assume that the CNO is particularly aware
of the former Defense Secretary’s strategic
philosophy.

93. Ibid. The last comment indicates that the
CNOG is expected to be a translation of the
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REFLEC TIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-

A

ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

s we have noted in previous articles in this series, one of the primary missions of the CNO Professional Reading Program is to encourage sailors at
all levels to develop the habit of reading books of consequence. In this article, we
would like to share with you some short excerpts (somewhat paraphrased) from
writings by influential leaders about how much reading contributed to their lives
and successes. Perhaps one or more will inspire you to take the time to make
reading a part of your professional development.
• “When I want to discover something, I begin by reading up everything that
has been done along that line in the past—that’s what all the books in the
library are for. I see what has been accomplished at great labor and expense
in the past. I gather the data of many thousands more. The three essentials to
achieve anything worthwhile are, first, hard work; second, stick-to-it-iveness;
third, common sense.”—Thomas Edison
• “I really had a lot of dreams when I was a kid, and I think a great deal of that
grew out of the fact that I had a chance to read a lot.”—Bill Gates
• “The function of education is to teach one to think intensively and to think
critically. Intelligence plus character—that is the goal of true education.”—
Martin Luther King Jr.
• “If you cannot read all your books . . . fondle them—peer into them, let them
fall open where they will, read from the first sentence that arrests the eye, set
them back on the shelves with your own hands, arrange them on your own
plan so that you at least know where they are. Let them be your friends; let
them, at any rate, be your acquaintances.”—Winston Churchill
• “I insist on a lot of time being spent, almost every day, to just sit and think.
That is very uncommon in American business. I read and think. So I do
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more reading and thinking, and make less impulse decisions than most
people in business. I do it because I like this kind of life.”—Warren Buffett
• “Of all things, I liked books best.”—Nikola Tesla
• “If we encounter a man of rare intellect, we should ask him what books he
reads.”—Ralph Waldo Emerson
• “From a child I was fond of reading, and all the little money that came into
my hands was ever laid out in books.”—Benjamin Franklin
• “Once you learn to read, you will be forever free.”—Frederick Douglass
• “My definition of an educated man is a man who never stops learning and
wants to learn. I am not interested in whether a man has a PhD or not, or an
MA for that matter, or a diploma. Mao never had one, neither had Khru
shchev, nor Stalin.”—Lee Kuan Yew, first prime minister of Singapore
• “When I decided to return and work in Africa in the early 1980s, I sold all
my few possessions—things like my stereo systems, my color TV (big thing
in those days!), my prized music albums . . . everything I could sell. I then
used all the cash to buy books, because I wasn’t sure if I’d be able to find
some of my most important books. When one of my friends asked me why
I was doing this, I said books were my most important possession, because
with the knowledge they give me, I can make enough money to buy anything
else!”—Strive Masiyiwa, international entrepreneur and philanthropist
• “Balance your reading. Read broadly. Include people you don’t agree with.
This is how we are stretched.”—Rick Warren
• “Reading is important. If you know how to read, then the whole world opens
up to you.”—Barack Obama
• “Years ago I got hooked on a habit that turned out to be one of the most
valuable of my life: reading at least 30 minutes a day. Jim Rohn, one of my
teachers, told me that reading something of substance, something of value,
something that was nourishing, something that taught you distinctions, was
more important than eating. ‘Miss a meal,’ he said, ‘but don’t miss your reading.’ Remember: leaders are readers.”—Tony Robbins, personal development
coach
• “If there is education, there will be everything in life. Government can make
roads, hospitals, and also construct school buildings. But your homes can
brighten up only if your children are educated. I am confident that if we focus on education, our society will certainly develop.”—Narendra Modi, prime
minister of India
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So there you have it: words of wisdom and encouragement from billionaire
businessmen, world leaders, and noted philosophers. We could not agree more!

JOHN E. JACKSON

(adapted from an article on SmartandRelentless.com posted on October 20, 2016)
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